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Abstract
Traditionally, timing requirements as (technical) safety requirements have
been avoided through clever functional designs. New vehicle automation
concepts and other applications, however, make this harder or even impossi-
ble and challenge design automation for cyber-physical systems to provide a
solution. This thesis takes upon this challenge by introducing cross-layer de-
pendency analysis to relate timing dependencies in the bounded execution
time (BET) model to the functional model of the artifact. In doing so, the
analysis is able to reveal where timing dependencies may violate freedom
from interference requirements on the functional layer and other interme-
diate model layers. For design automation this leaves the challenge how
such dependencies are avoided or at least be bounded such that the design
is feasible: The results are synthesis strategies for implementation require-
ments and a system-level placement strategy for run-time measures to avoid
potentially catastrophic consequences of timing dependencies which are
not eliminated from the design. Their applicability is shown in experiments
and case studies.
However, all the proposed run-time measures as well as very strict imple-
mentation requirements become ever more expensive in terms of design
effort for contemporary embedded systems, due to the system’s complexity.
Hence, the second part of this thesis reflects on the design aspect rather than
the analysis aspect of embedded systems and proposes a timing predictable
design paradigm based on System-Level Logical Execution Time (SL-LET).
Leveraging a timing-design model in SL-LET the proposed methods from
the first part can now be applied to improve the quality of a design – timing
error handling can now be separated from the run-time methods and from
the implementation requirements intended to guarantee them. The the-
sis therefore introduces timing diversity as a timing-predictable execution
theme that handles timing errors without having to deal with them in the
implemented application. An automotive 3D-perception case study demon-
strates the applicability of timing diversity to ensure predictable end-to-end
timing while masking certain types of timing errors.
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Zusammenfassung
Traditionell wurden Timing-Anforderungen als (technische) Sicherheit-
sanforderungen durch geschickte funktionale Entwürfe vermieden. Neue
Fahrzeugautomatisierungskonzepte und Anwendungen machen dies jedoch
schwieriger oder gar unmöglich; Aufgrund der Problemkomplexität er-
fordert dies eine Entwurfsautomatisierung für cyber-physische Systeme
heraus. Diese Arbeit nimmt sich dieser Herausforderung an, indem sie
eine schichtenübergreifende Abhängigkeitsanalyse einführt, um zeitliche
Abhängigkeiten im Modell der beschränkten Ausführungszeit (BET) mit
dem funktionalen Modell des Artefakts in Beziehung zu setzen. Auf diese
Weise ist die Analyse in der Lage, aufzuzeigen, wo Timing-Abhängigkeiten
die Anforderungen an die Störungsfreiheit auf der funktionalen Schicht und
anderen dazwischenliegenden Modellschichten verletzen können. Für die
Entwurfsautomatisierung ergibt sich daraus die Herausforderung, wie solche
Abhängigkeiten vermieden oder zumindest so eingegrenzt werden können,
dass der Entwurf machbar ist: Das Ergebnis sind Synthesestrategien für
Implementierungsanforderungen und eine Platzierungsstrategie auf Syste-
mebene für Laufzeitmaßnahmen zur Vermeidung potentiell katastrophaler
Folgen von Timing-Abhängigkeiten, die nicht aus dem Entwurf eliminiert
werden. Ihre Anwendbarkeit wird in Experimenten und Fallstudien gezeigt.
Allerdings werden alle vorgeschlagenen Laufzeitmaßnahmen sowie sehr
strenge Implementierungsanforderungen für moderne eingebettete Sys-
teme aufgrund der Komplexität des Systems immer teurer im Entwurf-
saufwand. Daher befasst sich der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit eher mit dem
Entwurfsaspekt als mit dem Analyseaspekt von eingebetteten Systemen und
schlägt ein Entwurfsparadigma für vorhersagbares Timing vor, das auf der
System-Level Logical Execution Time (SL-LET) basiert. Basierend auf einem
Timing-Entwurfsmodell in SL-LET können die vorgeschlagenen Metho-
den aus dem ersten Teil nun angewandt werden, um die Qualität eines
Entwurfs zu verbessern – die Behandlung von Timing-Fehlern kann nun
von den Laufzeitmethoden und von den Implementierungsanforderungen,
die diese garantieren sollen, getrennt werden. In dieser Arbeit wird daher
Timing Diversity als ein Thema der Timing-Vorhersage in der Ausführung
eingeführt, das Timing-Fehler behandelt, ohne dass sie in der implemen-
tierten Anwendung behandelt werden müssen. Anhand einer Fallstudie aus
dem Automobilbereich (3D-Umfeldwahrnehmung) wird die Anwendbarkeit
von Timing-Diversität demonstriert, um ein vorhersagbares Ende-zu-Ende-
Timing zu gewährleisten und gleichzeitig in der Lage zu sein, bestimmte
Arten von Timing-Fehlern zu maskieren.
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Challenges for Design and
Operation
1.1 The Artifact
So what is the artifact in times of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the dawn of
connected automated vehicles? For an engineer the most generic explanation
probably is, the artifact is the thing being built. Consequently, every thing is
first described by a model. In a very broad sense this claim is universally
true, even if you consider yourself a hands-on person that rather crafts
and tinkers. There is always the thought of what you build – not to every
last detail – but the initial thought is there. It is part of human ingenuity,
according to Lee in [Lee17]. From a scientific point of view, Lee and Sirjani
[LS18] refer to these models as engineering models. They specify the design
intent and hence are a specification. But the thing has another angle to it,
and that is what has actually been built. Models that try to describe this are
referred to by Lee as scientific models. “What has actually been built” is also
the internal and external behavior of the thing. Hence, scientific models try
to analyse an existing thing and describe and understand its behaviors in
every detail, while the engineering model(s) have the purpose of conveying
a specific intent. Hence, multiple engineering models for the same thing
exist. Consider a microchip: While the engineer responsible for the package
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only has to know which taps from the wafer have to be connected to which
pin, she or he does not need to know the exact location of every transistor
on the chip; in fact this would even be counterproductive. However, the
engineers which design the lithography masks do require this information.
Hence, engineering models are often layered as illustrated by Fig. 1.1, where





Figure 1.1: Example of layered engineering models: Model A is an abstraction
of Model B
For the field of computing, electronic design automation (EDA) emerged
and brought forward model verification tools to ensure soundness of model
abstractions and concretion. While these EDA tools reduce the factor of
human error significantly they are unable to ensure certain properties or
the absence of a certain property. One such property is safety. Generically
speaking, safety is the property of the absence of harm. Harm can be caused
by certain behaviors of a system, consequently it is necessary to have an
understanding of the behavior of a system. This results in the need of the
scientific modelling of the artifact as engineering models can only specify
the intended behavior, but not unintended behaviors.
An inevitable (side) effect in system design is that the hardware architecture
and software architecture chosen during the engineering efforts define the
possible behavior space of the resulting system. Fig. 1.2 shows an abstract
exemplary behavior space, that w.l.g. represents the space of possible behav-
iors as a two-dimensional space. In this possible behavior space typically
only a very narrow area resembles the design goal. This is the area which is
described by the specification. However, the resulting behavior space of an
artifact can not be simply selected. It is rather the result of the design and
implementation process. The resulting challenge for the design and imple-
mentation efforts is to build the system such that it only exhibits behavior




1. Coming up with an unambiguous and correct (function) specifications
as well as implementing it.
2. Integrating hardware and software into one artifact that matches the
requirements in the specification.
The first one is predominantly an issue of languages with unambiguous se-
mantics and rigorous design efforts for individual components – combined
with the challenge of translating often natural language requirements and
human intent into these languages. The second one, the integration chal-
lenge, has to deal with the issue that the composition of sub-systems does
not lead to violations in the properties of individual components and hence
of the system as a whole. To prevent the latter, designers have to ensure that
the integration does not lead to interference between subsystems due to







Figure 1.2: Possible behavior space of a design artifact with diffrent regions.
It is evident to anybody who has ever implemented a system, that the borders
of any region in Fig. 1.2 are fuzzy. Reasons for this are, that specifications in
the first place might be imprecise as they are often in natural language and
not in a more formal language. Another reason, is that the consequences of
design decisions on the resulting system behavior are not always obvious.
A particular instance of this challenge is the integration of functionally
unrelated software on a common execution platform. Here, side effects
from the execution of one component can lead to unintended behavior in
the other. Note that this is not restricted to functional requirements but
particularly extends to extra-functional requirements as well. This is the case
especially for complex products that are comprised of many sub-systems.
At the heart of design methods is the goal to know the area boundary of
behavior regions, like in Fig. 1.2, better and sharper. Efforts in the fields
of rigorous design and design with the aid of formal verification as proposed
by [Sif18] certainly improve the situation but are to this day not the “silver
bullet”.
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As a striking example, consider embedded systems in aviation. Besides the
ARINC 653 standard [ARI19] for resource sharing in time and space which
can be resource inefficient, the trend towards more rigour in the design
has left the aviation industry in a difficult position. Certification bodies
practically banned computing architectures that are able to deliver the re-
quired computing power for future applications, due to their unpredictability
[Cer14].
Similarly, the automotive industry currently experiences a huge demand in
computation power for future SAE level 3+ vehicles [Int18a]. In contrast to
the aviation industry, however, rigorous certification by certification bodies
is not required – instead the ECE homologation process is in place. While
at the same time less rigour in the design is prevalent, complexity of the
runtime software paramounts with the introduction of the AUTOSAR Adap-
tive Platform and heterogeneous multi-core system-on-chips (SoCs). These
boundary conditions lead to a situation where the issue of timing predictabil-
ity and the necessity of predictable timing for safety of the system are either
neglected or deliberately overlooked.
1.1.1 The Necessity of Safety
One of many products that has been in a constant revolution since the
introduction of computing are cars. While cars traditionally have been a
mechanical product, first electronics where introduced in the late 1960s
for injection control [Sim]. Soon more complex electronically controlled
functions where introduced, such as anti-lock breaking in the early 1970s
[Kuh]. Like anti-lock breaking more and more feature-rich and complex
but on the other hand also safety-critical functions in the form of driver
assistance systems have emerged, e.g. traction control and its descendant
electronic stability control which is nowadays mandatory for new cars in
the Single European Market. It is envisioned that the trend towards more
and more automation will fully take the driving task away from the human
driver with SAE level 5 vehicles [Int18a]. With the introduction of Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the constant strive for more autonomy
on higher SAE levels the challenge to design safe systems is present. W.r.t.
understanding the behavior of the system this creates a challenge on a much
larger scale. It not only requires that non-functional properties of software,
like execution time have to be understood, but also functional properties for
tasks like environment perception, object detection and classification. Here
14
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the scope is limited to the extra-functional properties and their influence
on the safety of the system.
Commonly, safety is defined as the absence of unreasonable risks, whereas
unreasonable risks are shall be interpreted in a “certain context and according to
valid societal moral concepts” [Int18b, clause 3.175]. Risk is a combination of the
probability of the occurrence of harm to people or the environment, and the
severity of that harm [Int18b, clause 3.127]. To better cope with systems that
involve multiple risks of different likelihoods, the common safety standards
discretize risk. This is for instance done in the general IEC 61508 [The10,
part 3] from which ISO 26262 for road vehicles below 3.5 t is a derivative
[Int18b, part 3]. Depending on the operational mode of a system, either
demand-based or in continuous operation, the probability of occurrence
is measured in probability of failure per hour (PFH) or the probability of
failure on demand. As assessment of small likelihoods is generally difficult
for human designers, the probabilities are discretized into individual safety
levels. ISO 26262 does not provide normative nor informative mapping of
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) to Safety Integrity Level (SIL), but
rather generally defines risk as the product of expected loss in case of accident
times the probability of the accident occurring – this is similar to IEC 61508
[The10]. This can be also read as:
Risk = Severity× (Exposure× Likelihood) (1.1)
As already mentioned, small likelihoods are hard to quantify and grasp for
humans. Hence, ISO 26262 expresses them in discrete classes of Controlla-
bility for an average human driver. Hence, it yields:
Risk = Severity× (Exposure× Controllability) (1.2)
Based on the resulting risk, the necessary level of risk reduction can be
determined to meet the socially accepted risk level for the design to be seen
as “safe”. To which rigour the risk reduction has to be conducted, is hence
captured in the ASIL. The standard in Part 3 provides a table (Table 4) to
compute this based on severity, exposure and controllability classes. It is
depicted in Fig. 1.3. The process determines the ASIL of a top-level safety
requirement (i.e. the safety goal [Int18b, Part 1, Clause 3.138]) as a result of
the hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) which reduces the risk to
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a socially accepted level – the necessary risk reduction is described by the
ASIL. Fig. 1.4 illustrates this flow.
Figure 1.3: ASILs according to Part 3 of ISO 26262 according to Eq. (1.2)
The fundamental concept behind safety standards like ISO 26262
in the automotive domain or IEC 61508 for any kind of electri-
cal/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related system for which
no particular domain specific standard applies is that any safety-related
system must work correctly or fail in a predictable (safe) way. Correctness of
a system in this context is the adherence to a specification. Establishing
this correctness, however requires that a system’s behavior can be described
predictably. In that sense, predictability of all possible behaviors becomes
a necessity of design for safety-related systems. Avoiding uncertainty of
behavior either in fault free cases (nominal operation) as well as under fault
situations becomes one of the greatest design challenges. Since also the
function behavior domain becomes more and more complicated along with
the specification the of potential functional failures, initiatives are under
way to limit the safety scope to Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF).
This initiative has already resulted in a publicly available specification
[Int19], however, it has not matured into normative standardization yet.
1.1.2 Example
In the following an example for a state-of-the-art ADAS system from an
automated research vehicle will illustrate the already mentioned problems





In which situations might the hazard occur?
Controllability:







Necessary Risk Reduction 















Figure 1.4: The yellow path illustrates how the HARA process determines a
potential risk: The ASIL assigned on the safety goal [Int18b, Part 1, clause
3.138] which is the result of the HARA, defines the necessary rigour with
which functional safety requirements need to reduce the risk such that a
socially accepted risk level is achieved (Figure inspired by [FAH14])
function, while Fig. 1.6 shows a possible implementation in three tasks
τ2, τ3, τ5 on two separate electronic control units (ECUs).
An inertial measurement unit (IMU) provides motion data, which is fed to a
proper-motion estimation and control algorithm. The control algorithm
computes the steering angles, which are used for the control of the actuation.
The software driver collecting the data from the IMU is implemented in τ2.
Task τ3 samples the IMU data (indicated by the dashed line) and performs
proper-motion estimation, while the control of actuation is implemented in
τ5. For this example, we assume that data passing from τ3 to τ5 also activates
τ5 (solid line).
Typical safety-relevant timing properties are the response time of individual
tasks, end-to-end latencies, and the maximum age of data communicated
along a task chain. Such bounds can be determined by functional testing
of the control algorithm, e.g. with SIMULINK models containing delay and
hold elements. A HARA process for our example has determined a maximum
tolerable overshoot over the reference value of 0.1 m [SBM16]. In the given
implementation the maximum data age between τ2 and τ3 and the end-to-
end latency from the activation of τ3 to the termination of a subsequent
job of τ4 must not exceed given bounds to prevent this. This can be shown
17
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Figure 1.5: Schematic sketch of a lateral control function, realized by three








Figure 1.6: Example system with two resources scheduled under static-
priority preemptive scheduling, with priorities descending from τ1 to τ6. τ5
is activated by the termination of τ3. The dashed line indicates sampling of
data by τ3 from τ2. The orange tasks τi implement the software blocks ρi
from the previous figure.
18
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by functional testing of the lateral controller in SIMULINK. Fig. 1.7 shows
two scenarios: The blue line shows the behavior of the controller, if its
implementation matches the execution behavior expected by SIMULINK.
The pink dashed line, however shows the behavior of the controller if the
input data from the IMU is a sample cycle too old. This causes an overshoot
over the margin of 0.1 m as specified by the functional safety goal.













Lateral Deviation with Monitor
Lateral Deviation with Timing Error
Max. Tolerable O vershoot
Figure 1.7: Possible lateral deviation under timing errors of the vehicle and
maximum tolerable overshoot according to [SBM16]
The data age, also known as freshness, is the maximum distance between
a read event of τ3 and the adjacent preceding write event of τ2. Hence, the
timing behavior of the implementation is not a non-functional property but an
extra-functional property. This extra-functional property is characterized by
the fact that violations can cause an alteration in the function. In the concrete
example here, the control will not respond as expected by its designer due
to the way it is implemented in the shared platform.
As the target platform is shared with tasks (τ1, τ4 and τ6) that implement
other functions, these tasks can influence the timing behavior of the tasks
implementing the lateral control chain. Let us assume that the task τ1 and
τ4 implement functions without safety requirements and τ6 a safety-relevant
but less critical function than the chain under consideration. Due to the as-
sumed static-priority preemptive (SPP) scheduling in the example [AUT19b]
, both timing requirements transitively depend on the behavior of τ1 and τ4
respectively. E.g. τ1’s executions preempt τ2 and τ3, and consequently influ-
ence the response times of τ3 and the times when τ2 writes data and τ3 reads
data. Consequently, the safety of the lateral guidance function implemented
by τ2, τ3 and τ5 is not only dependent on their own (timing) behavior but
also on τ1’s and τ4’s.
For much simpler lane keeping assistant (LKA) systems of SAE level 2-3
vehicles, lateral control is already rated as an ASIL-D function [BYRLB18],
due to the expectable misuse by the driver, e.g. through lacking oversight
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over the technical system. Hence, we can conclude that in a conditionally or
fully automated vehicle the functional safety requirement will be similar, due
to the absence of the human driver. However, there exists a huge difference
w.r.t. failure handling. While in the concept for non-automated vehicles
[BYRLB18][WHLS16] the human driver can intervene, this is no option in
automation scenarios. As a consequence the timing behavior also becomes
safety critical, as no safety mechanism like the human driver is present that
can turn the behavior into a safe-failure. Due to this impact and the paradigm
change it entails in the design of these systems, we revisit this example in
the remainder of this thesis where appropriate. This challenge is also fuelled
by the fact that the computing hardware (e.g. performance-platforms with
dedicated accelerators) as well as the software middleware (e.g. AUTOSAR
AP, hypervisors/virtual machines) become ever more complex.
1.2 The Process
Functional safety is not a property that a system, i.e. the artifact, either
has or not. It is rather an emergent property that has its roots already in
the architecture of a design and the formulation of the requirements for
it. This fundamental thoughts are also reflected in the established safety
standards like ISO 26262 or IEC 61508 [Int18b] [The10]. In both a significant
proportion is dedicated to how the design (incl. requirements formulation
and tracing) and implementation process has to be structured and how this
process shall prevent design faults. The underlying general process is the
V-model. We shall see that this development model in its original form is
becoming less and less suitable for upcoming performance architectures
with limited (timing) predictability and operating systems with dynamic
process behavior.
1.2.1 The V-Model and its Process
The general process intended by the V-model depicted in Fig. 1.8 is a top-
down development flow. It starts with a concept phase that defines the base
parameters that the system under development shall fulfill and yields into a
requirements and architecture definition phase at the top of the descending
branch of the V. The steps atop the left V-branch are the initial steps of the
design phase. W.r.t. functional safety, all the functional aspects are clarified
and defined here. Note, that functional in the understanding of e.g. ISO
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26262 means implementation agnostic. It is later in the process, when the
subsystems and implementation artifacts are devised that so called technical
(safety) requirements are devised and formulated. The functional and technical
requirements play a very important role in the understanding of the standard,
and they are subject to two important process measures: verification and
validation. The two can be distinguished if we look at the questions they ask
in relation to the requirements:
• Verification: Is the requirement fulfilled?














Checking the designed and implemented system according to this is what
happens atop the right branch of the V. If a mismatch occurs the process has
to jump back to the opposite side of the V, to refine requirements and/or
the architecture definition and go through the V again. The traversal of the
V includes the already mentioned detailed subsystem design on the lower
left branch of the V, the implementation of hardware and software at the tip
of both branches, and subsystem integration tests on the lower right branch.
Fig. 1.9 shows how the V-model process looks like if a time dimension is
added to it. Without automation costly detours and longer time to market
are the consequence. Particularly for timing requirements that – as we have
already motivated in the previous section – must find their way into safety
concepts.
1.2.2 State of the Art in Functional Safety Verification
Functional safety is a prerequisite to qualify products for the market, as
e.g. statutory for the Single European Market [PC10]. To narrow the focus
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due to failed verification
Figure 1.9: What is actually happening in a V-model process: The process is
never a V but has a lot of iterations
we concentrate on automotive domain here. Although we have outlined that
the aviation domain has processes which seem to require more rigour - they
effectively face similar problems. However, the volume and market impact
are smaller than for automotive. The state of the art for functional safety
processes in the automotive domain is marked by ISO 26262 [Int18b] which
provides detailed normative requirements for the process.
The (safety) process begins with a concept phase, that starts even before the
V from underlying V-model. As part of this concept phase, a HARA for each
function under consideration is performed and the level of required risk
reduction is determined based on the yellow flow in Fig. 1.4 that determines
the acceptable risk based on societal concepts (cf. Eq. (1.2)). A work product
of this process is the amount of necessary risk reduction which is already
“measured” with an ASIL. Based on these risks, items that “implement a
function or part of the function at the vehicle level, to which ISO 26262 is
applied” [Int18b, Part 1, clause 3.82] are defined. Depending on which risks
they either carry or mitigate, functional safety requirements for the items are
derived and quantified with ASILs. Note that although the item is referred
to as an implementation of a function, it is still an abstract, i.e. concrete
code and hardware agnostic description – it is just less abstract than a pure
function description. How the ASIL for an item is going to be achieved is
described in a functional safety concept that details design measures based
on the assigned ASILs. From this abstract functional safety concept, concrete
technical safety requirements need to be derived based on the design of the
concrete implementation. These technical safety requirements inherit the
ASIL of the functional safety requirement that they implement, if no risk
reduction methods can be applied in the design. In the past it typically was
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not necessary to specify technical safety requirements on timing, since only a
safety function to detect misbehavior was necessary and the function’s service
could be discontinued, e.g. by handing over control to the driver immediately.
However, as we have seen in the example of the lateral controller in Fig. 1.7
such requirements will be necessary for future SAE level 3+ vehicles. Besides
specifying the requirements, the process laid out in ISO 26262 specifies
quite an extensive number of process requirements, especially if software is
subject to ASILs [Int18b, Part 6].
For verifying requirements as well as validating them the design process
for hardware, software, and the system level proposes a number of methods
to reduce design uncertainty and underspecification. The two foremost and
renown are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), whereas the FMEA often comes in the form of a Failure Mode
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). FTA is a top-down, deductive design
review method that tries to identify causes of failures originating from a
system failure condition [Int06]. The resulting fault tree is thereby typically
connected by boolean logic operators, that may allow quantification of the
failure event at the top. On the contrary, FMEA is an inductive technique
that is used to identify ways a system can fail based on root failure classes
of single components [The18]. Both FMEA and FTA are methods that are
used for concurrent design review to identify the best ways to reduce risk
or to validate a requirement, i.e. check whether it must be replaced with a
different one.
However, let us review how the process description from the standard ad-
dresses the safety challenge and compare it to how typical engineering
projects for safety related systems proceed. ISO 26262 to a large extent acts
as if every safety related design is being done from scratch since it is orga-
nized strictly top-down. 1 A particular point here is that hardware on which
a function shall be implemented is already predetermined at the start of
the project, e.g. due to evolution of a legacy product. Furthermore, large
parts of the software, like the operating system (OS) and the Run Time En-
vironment (RTE) might also already be fixed, e.g. due to long-term supply
contracts, etc. Last but most important, parts of cause-effect chains that are
integrated from a legacy product are already fixed and can only be changed
under high investment costs. A fact due to which industrial practice refrains
1The safety element out of context (SEooC) concept is a clear exception from this – however,
in order to certify something as a SEooC a document that describes the boundary conditions
under which the SEooC part can be used without recertification is necessary. For complex
behavior such as timing this is very hard to achieve as it is dependent on other components of
the system (c.f. the other tasks in the lateral controller example from Fig. 1.6).
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from changing or redeveloping legacy parts but adapting new developments
in such a way that they are compatible to legacy parts. While in the end the
normative requirements of standards like ISO 26262 are still fulfilled, it is
not necessarily the best engineering solution w.r.t. it.
1.2.3 Current challenges for the Process: Mixed-Criticality
and Continuous Integration
The current state of the art of the process reveals a number of shortcom-
ings. First and foremost, it has difficulties handling mixed-critical designs,
especially if they are integrated on modern highly-integrated computing
architectures. These architectures introduce a range of challenges for which
the safety process needs to argue freedom from interference [Int18b, Part 1,
Clause 3.62]. In designs where only a limited number of functions with the
same criticality, i.e. safety impact, are integrated on a single platform, the
design can be specifically tailored towards their needs. In complex architec-
tures, isolation mechanisms between the multiple tenants of the platform
must be devised in such a fashion that freedom from interference can be
guaranteed. If we consider the timing aspect and its safety implications,
we can observe that an extensive number of publications in this area are
available. [BD19] provides the most recent overview. However, there exists a
substantial misinterpretation of the freedom from interference requirement
in the mixed-criticality (MC) research community. The common misconcep-
tion in these works is that a higher level of criticality is allowed to influence a
lower level while still operating within the specification. However, as e.g. laid
out in [EN16] “absence of cascading failures” [Int18b, Part 1, clause 3.62] is
a property that works both ways, i.e. also the lower critical component can
expect it from a higher critical one. Hence, based on the ASIL level for timing
requirements, ways to limit timing failures appropriately are necessary.
Second, the process suffers from the complexity of the artifact itself. Designs,
e.g. automated driving, reach into behavioral regions with higher and higher
complexity, which requires more computational performance that comes
with higher complexity. This is especially true for software dominated
systems. Requirements engineering experts such as [Nan12] conclude that:
Almost all accidents with serious consequences in which software was




As we have seen, extensive parts of safety standards deal with requirements
validation, i.e. to check whether the right requirements all the way down to
the technical level have been formulated. But the challenge of complexity
can not be tamed by this approach. Even worse, studies such as [MG17]
show that most practitioners tend to use FTA and FMEA in practically basic
form. The authors conclude, that only rarely new methods that leverage
automation are used, although the systems become software dominated.
Third, the company structure still has a significant impact on how complex
systems are structured in their technical realization. This phenomenon has
already been observed in the late 1960s by [Con68] but is still partially true
today. It can be observed in the architecture of on-board vehicle networks
over the last decades. While originally a single bus was sufficient to connect
all ECUs and hence functions of a car, where needed, soon multiple buses
connected via a gateway for separate departments evolved. Gateways soon be-
came a major engineering challenge and required sophisticated methods to
package and handle traffic with ever-increasing amounts of data to exchange
[TSAE16a][KRST11]. Intended solutions to this are service-oriented design,
where the resource on which a piece of software executes can be arbitrarily
determined [WLB+18]. However, this increases the mixed-criticality require-
ments as a giant bouquet of services has to be handled. The service-oriented
design is extended by the idea of a zone-architecture. In this approach a set
of high-performance “compute servers” are distributed throughout the car
[MBB18]. Yet, it also comes with high mixed-criticality requirements, as all
software consolidated on the zone controllers are subject to the freedom
from interference constraint mandated by the safety standard.
The fourth challenge is that the complexity of the artifact does not scale in
the similar order than the performance of analysis methods to overcome
design uncertainty and to detect underspecification. As the prime methods
for this are FMEA and FTA the same amount of designers can not handle the
increasing complexity well if the methods are not improved for challenges
like safety-relevant timing requirements. Consider the FMEA sheet shown
in Table 1.1 – which has the same principle elements as mandated by [The18].
The sheet holds a conceptual FMEA for the timing of a cause-effect chain,
where the data-age along the cause-effect chain is critical to a safe operation
of the function. What is under consideration here, are both – the design
and the operation of the cause-effect chain. For the design aspect a worst-
case design approach is considered. For the potential failure effect that the
function exits the envelope of safe behavior, several potential causes can be
determined. These causes all relate to the specification that describes the
timing behavior of parts of a system. However, the factors that influence
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the timing behavior on the system level are not composable, meaning that
the timing behavior of one task can not be assessed in isolation but always
requires to investigate the composition to reason about its resulting timing
behavior. Especially, for end-to-end properties [SE09a][TJJG19]. Hence, this
abstract FMEA must be instantiated and performed for each cause-effect
chain in a system after any change that has an impact on a specification
parameter that has an influence on timing. This procedure gets out of hand
very quickly if no automation is in place.
1.2.4 The Research Unit Controlling Concurrent Change
The Research Unit Controlling Concurrent Change (CCC) was funded by
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) from 2013 until 2019 at TU Braun-
schweig. In nine subprojects, research was conducted around the idea of an



















Figure 1.10: Design and integration flow originally envisoned by the CCC
project
This process was originally envisioned as a split of the classic V-Model pro-
cess from Fig. 1.8 at the bottom tip, into a lab-based phase that provides
ready to integrate components and an automated in-field phase which in-
tegrates these components into a system. The project had two application
sub-projects for demonstration and including the perspective of critical
systems: space robots [DAF+19][MDA+19] and automated driving [MNSE19].
To perform in-field updates (or changes in general) an architecture has
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Table 1.1: Conceptual FMEA for timing of cause-effect chains
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been devised that bisects the system into a model domain and an execution






















Figure 1.11: CCC system architecture, with the model domain on the left
(red) and the execution domain on the right (green). The componets which
are subject to change are depicted in gray. [SNM+17]
The model domain, basically consists of an entity referred to as Multi-Change
Controller (MCC), which configures the execution domain. The MCC hosts
the models describing the system, as well as descriptions of lab-implemented
components that can be added to the system. Through analysis of the al-
ready existing configuration and descriptions of requested changes the MCC
generates new configurations respecting boundary conditions like security,
safety and availability, as well as optimizations of the configuration. I was
involved with the subproject that dealt with safety concerns in the flow and
architecture. While previous work already investigated the use of monitor-
ing and enforcement at run-time, a system-level coordination has not been
reported before. CCC changed this. Furthermore, the points already raised
in the previous two sections are an initial result of the safety and availability
subproject. The work in this subproject culminated in the research questions
that follow in the next section and led to the results of this thesis.
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1.3 Resulting Research Questions
Based on the challenges for artifact and process in safety related system,
the research questions for this thesis can be formulated. The focus is on
systems with functions in which the timing of cause-effect chains is safety
critical, i.e. generates technical safety requirements as a variation in the
timing can lead to an alteration of the function. While race conditions
have been a field of interest in computer science for a long time, to the
best of knowledge the aspect of timing as technical safety requirements in
the context of safety standards has not been thoroughly investigated before.
State-of-the-art safety processes follow an argumentation for these functions,
where a fail-safe approach is taken since the timing safety issue can not be
tamed successfully. Further, the aim here is to enable mixed-criticality
workloads on consolidated platforms in such a way that the assurance of the
timing of end-to-end cause-effect chains can be raised to their respective
safety level. Here, the goal is that either the risk of the resulting failure is
sufficiently low or that fail-operational behavior can be achieved.
The basic assumption for functions is that in any case the function is correct
and fault free, if the timing is correct, i.e. the approaches presented here do
not improve the situation for functional failures. They only tackle the issue
of the extra-functional property of their timing, which must be correct to
deliver correct service.
Question 1: How can hidden timing dependencies of a design be detected,
quantified, and in a multi-layered design model be brought to the attention
of the function design team or the team that manages functional safety?
Question 2: How can the design process for mixed-critical systems be sup-
ported such that technical safety requirements on timing can be quantified
and automatically generated where they are necessary? This specifically tar-
gets mixed-critical systems, where only a portion of the cause-effect chains
has extra-functional and safety critical timing requirements but is timing
wise influenced by other tasks in the system (cf. Fig. 1.6). How must timing
safety requirements be allocated in these cases?
Question 3: How can timing engineering decouple dependencies of critical
cause-effect chains from other tasks and chains if interferes can not be
qualified up to the level that is necessary to argue the independence of the
critical chain from the interferes. How can the use of such mechanisms be
coordinated at the system level?
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Question 1 is addressed by cross-layer timing-dependence analysis which
is covered in the next chapter. Questions 2 and 3 are both investigated in
Chapter 3, whereas Section 3.1 answers Question 2 and Section 3.2 answers
Question 3 based on the system model introduced in Section 2.1.Based
on these results, intermediate conclusions are drawn in Chapter 4 and the
research questions are extended. As the conclusions in Section 4.1 show that,
in the terms of [LS18], the state-of-the art bounded execution time (BET)
timing model is a good scientific model but not a suitable engineering model
for timing of data, the following research questions are added:
Question 4: How can data-centric effect chains’ timing safety requirements
be specified, verified and validated?
Question 5: Is there another solution to the problem of needing ever more
engineering effort to enable timing-safe fail-operational systems?
The latter two questions are addressed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respec-
tively. Chapter 4 introduces system-level logical execution time (SL-LET) as
an engineering model for timing and Chapter 5 proposes timing diversity as
a mechanism to achieve timing safety based on the engineering knowledge
captured in SL-LET models. An overall conclusion covering the findings of






To address the raised research questions, Section 2.1 first introduces the
cross-layer model that is used throughout this thesis. The model is later
extended in Section 4.3. Section 2.2 presents the basic flow for a dependency
analysis to identify the dependencies on other layers of the cross-layer model
(CLM) which are abstracted on higher ones. The remainder of the chapter
focuses specifically on timing dependencies and shows how to solve the
challenge of identifying timing dependencies for an application like the
lateral controller from the introduction in Section 2.6. Section 2.4 and
Section 2.5 introduce the data structure and analysis methodology. The
chapter concludes with an overview of the related work in Section 2.7 which
is split into related work on modelling approaches and work related to
dependency analyses.
2.1 Cross-Layer System-Model
The literature reports also fairly recent cross-layer modelling approaches to
design and develop dependable and embedded systems. Here, a stripped
down custom model is chosen for intelligibility and simplicity. The model
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described here has a strong focus on timing aspects and timing behavior of
systems – a factor often not covered in established models, at least not to the
full extent of the state of research in the real-time domain. Nevertheless, the
model embraced here follows similar guidelines as design languages like
EAST-ADL [Ass13], AADL [AAD17] or EEA-ADL [Mat10] and borrows model
elements from them. Related work on these meta-models is presented in
Section 2.7.
Basic principles for model development are also proposed in ISO/IEC
42010:2011 Systems- and software engineering [Int11]. ISO/IEC 42010 proposes
different views on a system by a number of domain-specific models. A
viewpoint (or aspect) in systems engineering is thereby a convention on
how to look at a system. The viewpoint’s information can be described in
individual models, which are referred to as layers in this thesis. A particular
advantage is, that aspects such as functionality, hardware, and software can
be conveniently described in expert-grade models. This allows experts to
describe design relevant issues and specify architectural viewpoint specific
requirements. In [Int11] different architectural viewpoints are connected
through correspondence rules between models of individual architectural
views. Correspondences allow to describe that model elements from one
model, i.e. an architecture viewpoint, can be instances in another model.
Correspondence rules describe valid correspondences between individual
architecture viewpoints, and hence checking correspondence rules thereby
ensures consistency of models describing different architecture views. To
simplify the terminology, the terms architecture view and architecture
model are used interchangeably.
Although, different architectural models structure systems engineering ef-
forts, they often do not capture an aspect – such as timing – in a single model.
As an example consider timing of dataflow: While the dataflow itself might
be specified in a model-layer, with elements that produce and consume data,
the model does not specify the timing behavior of the system. The timing of
the execution behavior is specified in a different model. Hence, there are in-
terdependencies between the two models for certain timing aspects, e.g. the
latency of data. The requirement is annotated with the model element for
the data – checking satisfaction of such a requirement, however, requires to
traverse the dependencies between models and putting information from
different models into the context of an analysis. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.1
for a data-age requirement. Avoiding design faults in aspects like timing
hence requires good navigation helpers in the fog of abstraction created
by different models. While the dependency analysis in Section 2.5 is the
navigation instrument, the CLM defines the structure and syntax of the map.
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In case of the example in Fig. 2.1, the task model and the resource model
concertize the timing behavior, however, it is abstracted in the software
model.
The scientific goal here is not to create “the best map”, i.e. the best model
framework where each and every aspect has its dedicated layer. This would
only result in consistency challenges between layers. The goal here is, to
utilize the structure within and between layers to analyze an aspect with
information scattered across layers. In the case of this thesis, this aspect is
timing in general. Dependency analysis’ intent thereby is to identify which
model information might influence the aspect.
Fig. 2.1 sketches the structure of the CLM introduced in the following in
more detail. This structure follows the principle of abstraction and concre-
tion as described by Lee et al. [LS18][Lee17] (cf. Fig. 1.1). In the figure, the
timing requirement, i.e. the important aspect, is annotated in the software
model. Yet the actual timing behavior is described in the task model in
conjunction with the resource model. However, as can be seen in the figure,
many other inter and intra model dependencies transitively influence the
model elements which implement the requirement under investigation.
How this issue is systematically addressed is described in Section 2.2.
It shall also be note here, that for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) the CLM is
embedded in a model of the physical environment, with which it interacts.
This interaction can be perceived, i.e. modeled, in different ways. One
approach, that is shown in Fig. 2.1, is to express the coupling through the
functional model (i.e. through the functional intent) and the physical model
of the system itself, e.g. the sensors and actuators modelled in the hardware
model. Physics and the “physical world” dictate (functional) requirements,
e.g. the maximum tolerable overshoot of a controller as shown in Fig. 1.7,
however, they can also introduce dependencies as discussed in [MSE+18b]
and [ME15].
For the purpose of describing systems in this document, the scope of ar-
chitectural views is limited to four models (cf. Fig. 2.1) that are introduced
in the following. Furthermore, we express correspondences (for concretion
and abstraction) by so called mappings from one element in model A to one
or multiple model elements in model B (cf. Fig. 1.1). Each model can in prin-
ciple be treated as a graph with multiple edge and node types. We illustrate
this on the four chosen model layers, which are relevant in the scope of this
thesis: a logical function model, software model, task model, and a resource
model. While each model internally describes dependencies, the inter-model
mappings, e.g. to shared elements, also describe dependencies. Revealing
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requirement intra model mapping inter model mapping
Figure 2.1: Cross-Layer Model Structure where mappings between elements
of different layers fulfill the role of abstraction and concretion as described
by [LS18]
them and propagating the consequences to the system-level context is part
of the dependency analysis described in Section 2.5 and following.
2.1.1 Models
2.1.1.1 Function Model
Particularly in the automotive domain, it is common to structure the design
of a vehicle into individual vehicle-level functions. A function thereby is a
rather high-level and logical abstraction of functionality at the vehicle level.
For instance to carry out the driving task, lateral guidance and longitudinal
guidance of the vehicle are necessary. It is obvious that the level of abstraction
or detail on the logical function level may vary depending on the use case for
the function model. In principle, the main application of the function model
is to structure the development process, and to attribute responsibility for




Definition 2.1.1: Function Model
A function model is a graph FG = (F , ↪→) where the nodes in F
describe the functions, and ↪→ is the set of edges that describe func-
tional interactions.
The function model hence allows the designer to specify intended func-
tions and their (intended) interactions to achieve the desired behavior at the
system level. A particular application of this model is for structuring the de-
velopment process e.g. the definition of vehicle level functions to enable the
development according to safety standards. In the automotive domain, safety
goals are defined for individual functions, and functional safety concepts are
derived based on the definition of the defined (vehicle-level) functions. It has
to be noted that a function is still an implementation agnostic design artifact.
Hence, it does not imply any particular implementation or constraint on
the implementation yet. The same holds for the functional safety concept
[Int18b, part 1, clause 3.65] which specifies functional safety requirements
based on safety goals derived in a hazard and risk analysis.
2.1.1.2 Software Model
In the course of the design process, it is decided which functionality is
implemented where and how. While some parts of a function are carried out
in hardware, others are implemented in software. The latter are described
by a software model.
Definition 2.1.2: Software Model
A software model is a directed graph SG = (B ∪ L, w−→ ∪ r−→) where
the union set B ∪ L represents the vertices and w−→ ∪ r−→ the set of
directed edges. B is the set of software blocks and L is the set of
data labels which semantically identify data exchanged by software
blocks. w−→ and r−→ define precedence relations between software
blocks and labels and vice versa, denoting writing and reading of
labels by software blocks. Each L ∈ L can have at most one producer,
i.e. there exists at most one (bi, Lj) ∈
w−→ ∀Lj ∈ L.
In essence, the software model is a simple data flow model that describes
which data labels are produced and consumed by which software block. In
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its structure it is similar to the notion of SIMULINK models commonly used
in control engineering. The software model does not express any form of
timing behavior, however it allows annotating requirements on the timing
along a data flow.
Definition 2.1.3: Timing Requirements on the data flow in the soft-
ware model
(a) the backward distance dagei,j which is defined as the maximum
time between a read event of bj and the preceding write event
of bi on a common label (data age), and
(b) the forward distance dreai,j which defines the maximum time
between a write event to a label by bi and its subsequent read
by bj (reaction-time).
Figure 2.2: Software Model
As an example Fig. 2.2 shows a software model implementing the functional
chain from Fig. 1.5 in more detail.
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2.1.1.3 Bounded Execution Time Task Model
The timing behavior of a system is described by observable events in time.
It is assumed that the workload which a system executes over time can be
structured into recurring tasks. The concrete instance of a task is referred
to as a job, which consumes a certain amount of execution time. Hence, an
activation trace can be recorded from the execution of a system, that records
how much execution time a job requests.
Definition 2.1.4: Activation Trace
An activation trace of a task τi is a function
σi : N → R+ × R+
where σi(n) = (t, C) denote that the n-th event occurs at time t and
requires a processing time C on the resource the task is mapped to.
Like the activation, also the termination of a particular piece of workload, is
an observable event in time, captured by the termination trace:
Definition 2.1.5: Termination Trace
An termination trace of a task τi is a function
ωi : N → R+
where ωi(n) = t denotes the time when the n-th activation of τi is
completed.
Note that for an event n with σi(n) = (t0, C) and ωi(n) = t1 it is not
necessarily the case that t0 + C = t1, as the execution resource might be
shared. Hence, for each job τi,n the response time can be computed by:
Ri = ωi(n)− σi(n) (2.1)
These concrete execution traces can be abstracted by the BET model. In this
model, the primary assumption is that computational workload is structured
such that upper and lower bounds on the needed resources to execute the
workload can be provided. As the model assumes that the consumed service
from a resource is execution time, lower and upper bounds, referred to as
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best-case execution time (BCET) C−i and worst-case execution time (WCET)
C+i , on the execution time in any possible trace σi are estimated:
C−i |= σi , C
+
i |= σi (2.2)
A second assumption is that, tasks release workload according to a pattern
that can also be bounded, referred to as an event model. The events in this
case are the release of workload, i.e. the activation of a task which spawns a
job.
Definition 2.1.6: Event Model
An event model 〈δ+(n), δ−(n)〉 is defined by
δ+ : N+ → R+0
δ− : N+ → R+0
where δ+ returns an upper bound and δ− a lower bound on the time
interval between the first and the last event of any sequence of n event
arrivals.
Event models as well es execution time bounds are properties of a task τi in
the BET model. Based on Definition 2.1.4 to Definition 2.1.6 we can formally
define a BET task:
Definition 2.1.7: BET-Task














model abstractions of concrete execution traces that capture the
maximum/minimum time interval between n consecutive activation
events for all n.
The BCET and the WCET describe upper/lower bounds on the execution
times C in σ, while the two-tuple of 〈δ+(n), δ−(n)〉 constitutes an event
model that upper/lower bounds the arrival times in σ. Commonly, it is
assumed that both, execution time estimates and event models, are conser-
vative estimates, and hence also the timing model is conservative. In this
thesis WCETs / BCETs C−i /C
+
i are not necessarily conservative estimates
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in the sense of [WGR+09][Wil18]. Whenever, a timing parameter such as C−i
or C+i are a conservative estimate, they are explicitly referenced as such.
Definition 2.1.8: BET-Task Job
A concrete instance of a task τi, i.e. an activation, is referred to as a
job, with τi,j denoting the j-th instance of τi.
To describe interactions between tasks, i.e. whenever the termination event of
one task becomes the activation event of another one, the event dependencies
can be captured by a graph structure:
Definition 2.1.9: Task Graph
A task graph is a tuple T G = (T ,→) with T representing the set
of tasks,→ defining a directed precedence relation between tasks
such that output/completion events become activation events of the
succeding one.
Together with the resource model and the mapping between the two models
the task graph forms the timing model to bound timing behavior.
Note that the task graph does not necessarily capture the timing behavior
of data flow as there are two fundamentally different forms of cause-effect
chains.. Timing behavior of data flow is only described by the model if an
event dependency also implies data flow, as it is e.g. the case when CAN
buses or Ethernet is modelled. In contrast to that, implicit communication
between (event) independent tasks is not captured by the model, e.g. via
shared memory as it is commonly done in AUTOSAR classic systems. How
particularly cause-effect chains of the latter type are captured in the CLM is
detailed in Definition 2.1.12 further on.
2.1.1.4 Resource Model / Physical Model
Further typical models of a cross-layer model are a systematic description of
hardware resources in the system and a physical model of the environment
the system operates in. For both model types extensive modelling is possible,
however, we restrict the scope here to a few properties of the resource model
used in the remainder. Note that these restrictions do not limit the generality
of the approach.
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The resource model embraced here is very simplistic. It consists of a set
of resources as nodes and edges that describe connections between the
resources.
Definition 2.1.10: Resouce Graph
A resource graph is a tupleRG = (R̂, Con−−→) with R̂ = R∪C represent-
ing the sets of processing resourcesR and communication resources
C , and Con−−→ defining the connections/data paths between resources.
Resources can have a number of properties. The first one being that resources
provide a certain service, e.g. communication resources like a switch port
provide “communication service” while processing resources like a CPU
provide processing service. This service is consumed by the tasks mapped to
the resources by the resource allocation function ρ. The way service is divided
among multiple tasks mapped to a resource is governed by the scheduling
policy. Consequently, the scheduling policy is the second important attribute.
The third property used in this thesis are possible fault patterns of a resource.
This can be expressed, e.g. by an error rate for the resource and whether an
error permanently damages a resource and causes it to fail or whether the
error is transient and correct state and operation can be restored, e.g. by
corrective actions upon detection.
Physical properties of resources and the environment they operate in the
scope of a cross-layer model and dependency analysis are e.g. described in
[MDA+19]. However, such properties are out of scope for the remainder of
this work and are omitted for brevity.
2.1.2 Mappings between Models
In order to form a CLM, the different architectural views expressed by the
model graphs must be put into relation. The bidirectional mappings, to
express a model correspondence, between two architectural models X and
Y follows a semantic. While one direction in the presented CLM is the
direction in which elements from X map to an element in Y in the sense of
implemented by/on, the backward direction from Y to X can be interpreted as
hosts or provides for. This semantic of the mapping edges will become crucial
for the general dependency analysis flow in Section 2.2. W.r.t. syntactic
properties the mapping between a model X and a model Y is bipartite:
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Lemma 2.1.11: Bipartite Mapping
A mapping from an architecture model X to an architecture model
Y is a bipartite graph MXY = (VX ,VY, EXY ∪ EYX), where VX is the
node set of model X and VY is the node set of model Y; EXY ∪ EYX is
the set of bidirectional edges such that ∀ei,j = (vi, vj) ∈ EXY ∃ej,i =
(vj, vi) ∈ EYX .
In the following, this is substantiated for the mappings that we assume in
the presented CLM.
2.1.2.1 Mapping between Function Model and Software Model
The abstract functions f ∈ F map to labels L ∈ L and software blocks
b ∈ B. Thereby it is common that a single function fa maps to multiple
software blocks and labels that implement the function. The edges towards
the software model EFL∪B are interpreted as an implementation. Conversely,
the edges in EL∪BF can be read as a label or software block is part of a function.
2.1.2.2 Mapping between Software Model and Task Timing Model
The link between the data flow in the software model and the timing behavior
described by the task timing model are mapping relations between software
blocks and tasks. In the graph syntax of the CLM, these mapping relations
are bidirectional arcs. The semantic of a mapping arc in EB∪LT can be read
as “a software block/label is implemented in the task it maps to”. In the
opposite direction ETB∪L, the edges create a correspondence between the
timing behavior a task describes with the software blocks and labels. A task
as the timing instantiation now either describes the timing behavior of the
software blocks that are implemented by the task or the timing behavior of a
transmission of a label across a task event chain. Hence, the mapping allows
to describe the timing behavior of the data flow modeled by the software
model. The assumption made here is that each job of a task that maps to a
software block which produces a label, creates a label instance. It is assumed
that this happens with a task’s output event. Refinements of this mapping
assumption are possible. For instance if the software blocks are runnable
entities as described by AUTOSAR. In this case, creation events of the label
instances can occur before the output event of the task. [AHE16] presents a
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timing analysis for this setup. Similar to the analysis presented in [AHE16]
the creation events of label instances can be mapped to the response times
for each runnable entity. Note: Here we restrict to situations where the
creation event is the termination event of a task.
Further, a register based communication is assumed in the timing model,
implying that label instances are not buffered.
For labels, two mapping options exist. First, labels can be unmapped. This
implies that creation of their instances as well as reading them happens on
the same timing resource as the producing task. The reading task in this
case simply samples the current label instance. Hence, which label instance
is being read by a particular job τi,j depends on its activation trace and the
termination trace of the task producing the label instance.
Second, labels can map to more complex timing model structures. These
structures are chains of tasks with event precedence in the timing graph
T G . To account for middleware that influences the timing, four possible
mappings of a label on a task chain exist:
• task chains w/o sampling
• task chains w/ source sampling
• task chains w/ sink sampling
• task chains w/ source and sink sampling
Sampling is required if either the producing task, i.e. the task implementing
the producing software block, the reading task, which is the task implement-
ing a reading software block, or both are not the source and/or the sink of
the task chain. In these cases, sampling-based communication between the
tasks is assumed.
Fig. 2.3 shows examples of the four possible mapping options. Mapping a
label to a task chain is for instance applied if a label is communicated via
an Ethernet stream. In the timing model, the stream consists of multiple
event dependent tasks on the resources that model the traversed switch ports
where arbitration takes place. If middleware is used, e.g. a network stack,
its timing behavior can be captured by a separate task. Depending on the
implementation, either source, sink or both may or may not use a network
stack.
The “unrolling” of the timing behavior of the data flow defined in the soft-
ware model yields another perspective on a system: The timing path of data
in a system. While an alternating chain of software blocks and labels is only
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Figure 2.3: Four mapping options of a software model label to task chains
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an abstract and implementation agnostic representation of the data flow,
the mapping result also covers timing behavior of the implementation. The
mapping from the software model to the timing model results in (timing)
cause-effect chains for the system.
Definition 2.1.12: BET cause-effect chain
A cause-effect chain ξi = (τ0, τ1, ..., τn) is an ordered set of vertices
from T G such that it maps to a walk w = (v1, v1, ..., vn) in SG with
v1 mapping to τ0 and vn mapping to τn.
At run time, instances of cause-effect chains are generated.
Definition 2.1.13: BET cause-effect chain instance
An instance of a cause-effect chain ξi,j = (τ0,a, τ1,b, ..., τn,z) is a sequence
of jobs with the property that a succeeding job τi,l reads data from its
predecessor τi−1,k. The communication can either be explicit by event
dependence if ∃(τi,l , τi−1,k) ∈→ or sampling based if @(τi,l , τi−1,k) ∈
→.
Note that these sequences are not necessarily deterministic in the BET
timing model, as for each producing task, the time when a label instance is
produced jitters between the best-case response time (BCRT) and worst-case
response time (WCRT). Alike the time a label instance is read can not be
precisely predetermined in the BET model. Again only intervals in which a
particular job reads data can be computed. This two effects combined leads
to the problem that concrete timings of data flow are undecidable in the
BET model. However, similar to the response time, possible intervals of
data age can be computed as shown by [BDM+17][SMT+18][FRNJ08].
Based on the notion of cause-effect chains, the data-age requirements speci-
fied in the software model in Definition 2.1.3 can now be expressed in the
timing model. Since label read and write events are directly mapped to
events in the timing model, the definition can be interpreted analogously,
i.e. on the read and write events in cause-effect chains. Section 2.3 introduces
how bounds on these requirements can be computed by applying formal
analysis.
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2.1.2.3 Mapping between Task Graph and Resource Graph
In order to form a complete timing model, the tasks in the task graph must
be related to resources in the resource graph. The mapping direction from
tasks to resources captured by the edges in ETR̂ can be read as: a task τi mapped
to a resource Resj is implemented on Resj.
The edges in the opposite direction E R̂T are interpreted as: a resource Resi
provides service to all tasks mapped to it. Beyond Lemma 2.1.11 the mapping
relation is further constrained:
Lemma 2.1.14: Task Mapping
The mapping of tasks to resources is constrained such that
ρ ⊆ T × R̂
is a right-total relation.
ρ(τi) = Resj hence allocates a task τi to exactly one resource Resj that
provides execution time to it according to the resource’s scheduling policy.
This completes the BET timing model. In summary, it consists of the task
graph T G , the set of resources R̂, and the resource allocation function ρ.
Formal analysis techniques like compositional performance analysis (CPA)
[HHJ+05] allow computing worst and best-case bounds on the response
time over all possible traces. Therefore, knowledge about the scheduling
policy of each resource is necessary. The WCRT for a task τi is denoted
by R+i and the BCRT by R
−
i . A more detailed description of how BCRTs
and WCRTs can be computed from the specifications of the timing model
follows in Section 2.3.
2.2 Hidden Dependency Identification
The first step for dependency analysis is to identify dependencies. While
a dependency in the CLM can be any walk from a node vi to vj in the CLM
this simple notion neglects that a number of dependencies are actually
accepted or intended. The purpose of the dependency analysis is to identify
unintended dependencies that e.g. endanger assumptions made for the safety
argumentations. Intended dependencies between the architectural views are
for instance present if the other view details the implementation. Whether
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an implementation is shared e.g. with another function can be detected
in the second step – such sharing, e.g. of a software block or a common
sensor is the kind of dependencies the analysis should reveal. Hence, in a
first step we have to compose the set of model elements between which the
dependency is acceptable. Whether an element in a model Y implements
an element in model X, can be identified through the mappings with an
implements semantic. In the case of the presented CLM these are: E ′ =
EFB∪L ∪ EB∪LT ∪ ETR̂ . To identify the accepted implementation dependencies we
create an inter-model implementation view of the CLM:
Definition 2.2.1: Inter-Model Implementation View
The inter-model implementation view is a Graph CLM′ = (F ∪ B ∪
L∪ T ∪ R̂, E ′) containing all model elements, i.e. nodes of the CLM,
however the edges set is restricted to edges with an implements se-
mantic.
Algorithm 1 extracts the set of nodes between which acceptable dependencies
exist by depth-first search (DFS) from a set of source nodes. Suitable source
nodes are for instance the node(s) representing a single function or an
interconnected function cluster.
Algorithm 1: get_accepted_dependencies(CLM′, start_set)
Data:
CLM’ : Filtered CLM containing only "implementation" edges
start_set : Set of nodes from which mapping dependent elements are obtained
1 for s in start_set do





Besides obtaining the set of accepted dependencies by Algorithm 1, the
set can also be directly specified in a model-based development process.
Assume an organization where different departments are responsible for the
definition and implementation of functions. These efforts can be converged
in a joint model base which holds this information without the need of
having in-depth knowledge about the efforts of other teams. For instance
EEA-ADL supports such development efforts [Vec], [Mat10]. This allows
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dependency analysis to avoid costly FMEAs where teams must be brought
together [Int18b, Part 2].
Based on the set of model elements between which dependencies are ac-
cepted, the CLM can be explored for direct unintended dependencies. De-
pendencies in the initial sense are any path between nodes of the CLM. In
this form they have a transitive nature. In consequence, an enumeration of
all possible dependencies would suffer from the path enumeration problem
and a possibly unbounded runtime due to an unbounded number of paths.
Even restricting the problem to all simple paths, i.e. where a cycle is traversed
at most once, does not avoid the problem. Hence, we restrict the search in
the CLM to direct neighbours of elements that are in the set of accepted
dependencies. Algorithm 2 accomplishes this.
Algorithm 2: find_hidden_dependencies(CLM, accepted_dependencies)
Data:
CLM : cross-layer model with all inter- and intra-model edges
accepted_dependencies: Set of nodes between which accepted dependencies
exist
1 hidden_dependencies : Set
2 interference_nodes : Set
3 for n in accepted_dependencies do
4 for v in get_inbound_neighbours(CLM,n) do






11 return hidden_dependencies, dependence_nodes
The result of Algorithm 2 is a set of nodes at which interference from a
non-accepted dependency can be observed (dependence_nodes) and a set of
edges that led to the insertion of a node in dependence_nodes. In Fig. 2.4
a CLM of a system with two function fa and fb is shown. Blue filled nodes
show nodes that are accepted dependencies for fa according to Algorithm
1. Nodes with a red contour are the nodes identified by Algorithm 2 to
have hidden dependencies on the set of accepted dependencies returned by
Algorithm 1.
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Figure 2.4: CLM of an example system: Blue filled nodes are the accepted
dependencies of fb, model elements with a red contour are nodes with
unaccepted dependencies.
As the goal of a design is that it only contains acceptable dependencies, a
systematic strategy to investigate dependencies is necessary. Based on the
CLM a process with three steps is proposed:
1. Dependency Identification
2. Dependency Quantification
3. Validation of a Dependency
As we have seen, step one can be performed by Algorithms 1 and 2. The
rationale behind the second and third step is that if a dependency is present
but does not interfere with any requirement such that this is impaired,
although unintended by design, the dependency might be acceptable. The




W.r.t. the first type, it might be acceptable that the input to software blocks
ba1 and bb1 is from a joint source (bc1 that provides Lc1). The second type
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e.g. happens on Res2 that is shared by several tasks, however, not all of them
are accepted dependencies for fb.
Each type of dependency requires a suitable analysis to quantify it and
evaluate whether the obtained bound is either above or below an acceptance
threshold. Fig. 2.5 shows possible actions based on the analysis result. It is
noteworthy that there are cases, where a specific direct dependence might
be unbounded, but all the transitive dependency paths that traverse it can
be bounded sufficiently. In these cases it might be possible to accept a direct
dependence that is not bounded, as no unbounded effect can trigger it.
However, in such cases it has to be made sure that the element which has
a direct dependency does not fail in unsafe fashion and cause interference.
For the time being we assume that analyzing and quantifying dependence
is possible – in further sections we show how this can be done for timing
dependencies due to resource sharing. Assuming that an analysis reveals
that a dependency is acceptable we can store this information as an edge
property in the CLM. By modifying Algorithm 2 in line 5 to check for this
property, a direct dependency can be ignored in the search for unwanted
dependencies.
Theorem 2.2.2: Unintended Dependency Acceptance
If each dependency e = (vi, vj) on a set of acceptable depedencies A
with vj ∈ A is acceptable as its extent is below a given threshold no
further hidden dependencies exist in the CLM.
Proof 2.2.3:
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that a dependency in the
form of a node walk v0, v1, ..., vi, vj exists, then there must also be an
edge e = (vi, vj) where the dependency is not accepted. However, if
all edges e = (vi, vj) with vj ∈ A, vi /∈ A such a node walk cannot
exist.

As an example consider again the system in Fig. 2.4. We first have to consider
the dependencies on the software block bc1 and the label Lc1. The sharing
policy in this case is that the data provided by the sensor (Lc1) is simply
published by bc1 without any feedback. Since we assume that none of the
sinks is able to exert control over the common source and the software of
bc1 is implemented to fulfill the highest applicable requirements of either
fa and fb, we can conclude that the dependencies on the software block
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bc1 and the label Lc1 are acceptable. However, if we consider the resources
Res1, ResBus, Res2 from the resource model in Fig. 2.4 the situation becomes
more challenging. The resources provide service to the tasks, which are
mapped to them under a specified scheduling policy. Seen the other way
around, the mapping implies that a task’s timing behavior is dependent on
how much service it receives from the resource according to the scheduling
strategy. Yet, the time-sharing behavior and the effect of transitive timing
dependencies can be analyzed to quantify the degree of dependence. We
put a special focus on timing dependencies. Therefore, we now present how


























Figure 2.5: Taxonomy of Dependence for the Dependency Analysis Flow
2.3 Analyzing Timing Behavior
The timing behavior of entire systems can be analyzed through different
approaches. Here, we resort to the CPA framework due to its compositional
nature [HHJ+05]. In CPA the analysis consists of local and global analysis
steps. Based on the description of the workload and its parametrization
in the task model, several bounds on the timing behavior of a task can be
computed. This is done by the local scheduling analysis of a single resource.
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2.3.1 The Local Analysis Step
In the CPA framework each resource can be analyzed with a scheduling
policy specific analysis. Most of today’s analysis approaches emerged from
early single resource schedulability tests such as [LL73]. While early work
relied on strict periodic tasks and computed schedulability based on device
utilization, the focus later shifted towards the computation of response-time
bounds under more expressive event models such as periods with jitter
[TBW94], [Leh90],[JP86]. Contemporary analysis methods in the end general-
ized analysis approaches to arbitrary activation patterns [HHJ+05]. All event
model based methods have in common that their approach is to compute
the largest time interval in which a resource is actively computing jobs. This
concept is referred to in the literature as the busy period approach. For a
conservative analysis, it assumes that all tasks are activated such that they
generate the maximum load during the busy period. From all the jobs in the
busy period the analysis identifies the job with the longest/shortest response
time as the WCRT / BCRT of a task. A generalization jointly reported by
Diemer in [Die16] and Axer in [Axe16, Def. 10] defines the timing behavior
of a scheduler as a set of functions, consisting of the scheduling horizon
function H and the processing functions w+, w−. A general overview over
the concept is presented in [HAE17]. The processing time functions are
defined as:
Definition 2.3.1: Processing Time Functions
The maximum and minimum q-event processing time w+(q)/w−(q)
return lower and upper bounds on the time interval between the
arrival of the first event and the completion of the q-th event for any
q consecutive events of task assuming that all q but the first activation
arrive within the scheduling horizon of their predecessors.
Whereas the abstract scheduling horizon for any work conserving scheduler
is defined as:
Definition 2.3.2: Scheduling Horizon
The maximum q-event scheduling horizon H(q) of any sequence
of q events of a task τ is a right half-open interval starting with the
arrival of the first and ending just prior to the latest time when a
hypothetical q + 1-st activation would receive ε service.
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In [Axe16] it is further noted that “The notion of the scheduling horizon
tells us whether two events (or rather associated task executions) influence
each other timingwise. Naturally, if two events are spaced very far apart,
there is no influence. That is the execution of the first has no timing impact
on the production of the second. However, if two events arrive very closely
(i.e. burst), the processing of the second event is delayed by the first event.” In
consequence the processing time functions capture dependencies between
multiple activations of a task. This notion of intra-task dependencies also
allows to compute a maximum number of events q+ that must be considered
to obtain the WCRT, based on the definition of the busy period in [Axe16,
Def.13]. This leads to a number of bounds:
Lemma 2.3.3: Worst-Case Response Time Bound





Lemma 2.3.4: Best-Case Response Time Bound
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Lemma 2.3.5: Maximum Backlog of Events





i (q))− q + 1}
In Lemma 2.3.5 η+i (∆t) is the upper event arrival function, which is the
pseudo inverse function of δ−i (q). How the conversion can be performed is
e.g. given by [Axe16, Eq.3.14 - Eq.3.17] as a revised version of [Sch11, Eq. 3.5 -
3.8].
Furthermore, the reader is also referred to [Axe16, pages 49-50] for the proofs
of Lemma 2.3.3, Lemma 2.3.4 and Lemma 2.3.5.
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2.3.2 The Global Analysis Step
As tasks can be part of entire task chains in a task graph, important properties
of a task are not a-priori known, e.g. the event model. Due to the fact that
chains of event dependent task graphs may visit a resource twice, a simple
feed-forward analysis where the event model is simply propagated down-
stream is consequently impossible, since the computation of event models
and busy periods become dependent. However, an iterative solution of
the problem is possible. Fig. 2.6 shows the analysis flow of CPA that is
able to handle this problem. The method of choice in the CPA framework
as presented e.g. in [HHJ+05] is that initially unknown event models are
initialized with optimistic assumptions at the beginning of the iteration.
These event models are then used for the local resource analyzes which
consider a single resource in isolation. After the local analyzes for each
resource have converged, updated (output) event models are propagated to
dependent tasks according to the task graph. How output event models can
be computed based on the local analysis results is e.g. given by [Ric05] or
[SRIE08]. Either based on response-time jitter, i.e. the difference between
worst and best case response time, or in a more sophisticated version based
on the computed busy times. The latter leverages that not all out of the
q+ activations experience the WCRT. The iteration over the local analysis
step together with event model propagation in the global step is either
terminated if non-schedulability is determined in one of the local analysis
or if convergence is reached. The global step converges if the propagated














Figure 2.6: The CPA flow based on timing model and resource model. The
two steps local scheduling analysis and event model propagation are shown in
orange (Figure according to [HHJ+05]).
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After convergence, latencies along task chains spanning multiple resources
can be computed from the results. This is e.g. of interest if the latency of a
network communication is constrained by an end-to-end timing require-
ment. A straight forward approach is to sum up the WCRTs along a task
chain. Here, [Sch11] presents a more sophisticated approach than summing
up the individual response-times. Also, more scheduler specific effects can
be leveraged to better bound local response times of path elements and thus
end-to-end timing, e.g. in [ATED14] and [TAE15].
2.4 Timing Dependence Graphs
So far we have seen how dependencies on shared elements like computation
or communication resources can be identified by dependency analysis. More
precisely, the dependency identification in Section 2.2 reveals nodes in the
set of accepted dependencies at which the paths of interference “enter” the
sub-graph that is the set of accepted dependencies in the CLM. Furthermore,
the timing analysis methods from the previous section allows bounding
timing behavior based on a number of model assumptions and parameters
of the task model and the resource model.
The objective of timing dependency analysis is twofold. Besides analyzing
the degree of dependence it specifically has the intent of revealing the timing
dependencies of timing requirements formulated in the CLM. Such timing
dependencies between functionally uncorrelated parts of a system also man-
ifest in the timing model. Dependencies that, e.g. influence a maximum
data-age requirement or a maximum controller dead-time requirement can
be hidden on the timing layer. To systematically unravel such dependencies
on the timing layer, we introduce a data structure to formally capture the
dependencies. This data structure is referred to as the timing-dependence
graph (TDG). The idea and concept of the TDG was first published by me in
[ME18] and later refined in [MSE18a].
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Definition 2.4.1: Timing Dependence Graph
A Timing Dependence Graph is a graph T DG = (VTDG, ETDG) consist-
ing of nodes vi, vj ∈ V and edges ek ∈ E where each directed edge
ek = (vi, vj) describes that vj is dependent on vi. The set of nodes
V consists of task parameters p ∈ V Parameter and (intermediate) tim-
ing analysis results for a task r ∈ V Results. Particularly V Results is
dependent on the scheduling policy of the resource of a task ρ(τk).
The rationale behind the TDG is to capture dependencies between timing
and resource model parameters on the one hand and timing analysis results
on the other. Through a systematic understanding which changes, to either
a parameter or a result, influence other parameters or results, the hidden
dependencies become traceable paths in the TDG.
To convert parameters and results from the task model in nodes of the
respective type we define two conversion functions:
Definition 2.4.2: Conversion Functions
The parameter conversion function is a function:
ϑp : T × V Parameter 7→ VTDG
that maps each input parameter type p ∈ V Parameter for a task τi ∈ T
to a node va = ϑp(τi, p) with v ∈ VTDG and the results conversion
function
ϑr : T × V Results 7→ VTDG
that maps each result type r ∈ V Results for a task τi ∈ T to a node
vb = ϑr(τi, r).
In general, four steps are necessary to construct the TDG. These are indi-
cated by color in the TDG construction example in Fig. 2.7. First, for each
task in the task graph, the TDG is populated with the nodes describing its
parameters and results according to the conversion functions. In Fig. 2.7
result nodes are filled in light yellow and parameter nodes are filled in dark
blue. In the second step, all explicit timing dependencies from the task
graph between tasks on different resources are added as edges in the TDG.
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Task event dependencies on the same resource can be handled by specific
scheduling analysis as e.g. described by [SE16] and are handled by step three.
Theorem 2.4.3: TDG Edges for Event Model Propagation
For each pair of dependent tasks e = (τa, τb) ∈ ET G in the task
graph T G with ρ(τa) 6= ρ(τb) dependecy edges ek = (vi, vj) and
el = (vm, vn) are added in the TDG such that:
vi = ϑr(τa, δ−out) ∧ vj = ϑp(τb, δ
−
in)




The dependencies follow the rationale for the global analysis step of
CPA as provided in [Ric05].

The example in Fig. 2.7 depicts ek and el for tasks τa, τb in bold red.
This is followed by the third step which deals with the dependencies on each
resource and contains two sub-steps. It adds dependency edges according
to the construction of the busy times (w+/w−), which is scheduler specific,
and the computation of response times (R+/R−) according to Lemma 2.3.3.
The edges for construction of the busy times are shown in black in Fig. 2.7
and correspond to Theorem 2.4.13, the edges for computing the worst-case
response time are shown in green. Note that the BCRT nodes and edges are
omitted in the figure for clarity, since the BCRT nodes do not have outgoing
dependency edges. For the WCRT dependency edges are added to the TDG
as follows:
Theorem 2.4.5: TDG Edges for WCRT computation
According to Lemma 2.3.3 edges e = (vk, vl) are added to the TDG:
∀ vk ∈ {ϑr(τi, w+), ϑp(τi, δ−i,in)} : vl = ϑr(τi, R
+)
Proof 2.4.6:
The dependencies follow the equation in Lemma 2.3.3. A proof for
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Theorem 2.4.7: TDG Edges for BCRT computation
According to Lemma 2.3.4 an edge e = (vk, vl) is added to the TDG:
vk = ϑp(τi, C−) ∧ vl = ϑr(τi, R−)
Proof 2.4.8:
The proof is trivial, as events of a task can never be processed faster
than the best-case execution time of the task.

The second part of the third step must be carried out for each resource
individually, respecting its scheduling analysis. As particularly the function
w+ is scheduler specific, transformations for each scheduling policy are
necessary. This will be detailed for different policies in the following. Finally,
the fourth step deals with capturing the dependencies that influence the
computation of the output event model, based on the resource-analysis
results and the applied propagation strategy to bound them. W.l.g. we assume
busy-window propagation as described by Theorems 1 - 3 in [SRIE08]. The
corresponding dependencies are shown in purple in Fig. 2.7.
Theorem 2.4.9: TDG Edges for Output Event Models
For the nodes vl = ϑr(τi, δ−out) and vn = ϑr(τi, δ
+
out) edges ea =
(vk, vl) and eb = (vm, vn) are added:
∀ vk ∈ {ϑr(τi, w+), ϑp(τi, δ−in), ϑr(τi, R
−)}
∀ vm ∈ {ϑr(τi, w+, ϑr(τi, R−), ϑp(τi, δ+in)}
Proof 2.4.10:
The proof idea for the dependencies of δ−i,out is that “the distance
between any n events at the output can never be smaller than the
minimum time between the production of an event m and the pro-
duction time of an event q that has been produced n − 1 events
earlier”. This is proven in Theorem 1 and 2 in [SRIE08].
The proof for δ+i,out follows a similar rationale, however with the
difference that the 0-th event cannot be produced before w−i (1) =
R−i . The full proof can be found in [Sch11].

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In the following we now elaborate on the dependencies different schedulers
introduce between tasks based on the processing time functions of different
schedulers. The processing time functions are necessary to compute timing
bounds based on the theorems introduced in Section 2.3.
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EM Propagation (Thm 3.25)
BCRT Computation (Thm 3.29)
Output Event Model 
Computation (Thm 3.31)
Scheduler Speci�ic (Thm 3.35)
𝜏_a (R⁺)
𝜏_b (R⁺)
WCRT Computation (Thm 3.27)
Legend:
Figure 2.7: Transformation of task and resource graph (top) to its TDG
(bottom). The task and resource graph contains three tasks on two resources
scheduled by SPP. τc has a higher priority than τa. The legend on the top
right explains which theorems cause wich edges.
2.4.1 SPP
We demonstrate which dependencies a SPP scheduler introduces. In this
policy, each task has a priority level assigned. In this policy, at any given time,
the active jobs of the task with the highest priority is allowed to execute. The
jobs are processed in the order of their activation.
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Lemma 2.4.11: Processing Time Function for SPP
The maximum multiple-event processing time for a SPP scheduler (ne-
glecting context switch overhead) is upper bounded by:










• hp(i) being the set of all higher priority tasks mapped to the
same resource as τi
• C+i , C
+
j being the WCET of task τi, τj respectively
• η+j,in(∆t) being the maximum number of events of a task τj in
any half-open interval of time ∆t
Proof 2.4.12:
For a detailed proof, the reader is refered to [TBW94] or [Sch11]. The
proof idea is that on each priority level i the “own” q · C+i must be
processed plus the accumulated workload of all higher priority task.

Although w+ appears on both sides of the equation, it can be solved as a
recurrence relation [JP86]. The mathematical properties behind this are
in-depth discussed in related work such as [Sch11][TBW94][Leh90].
From Lemma 2.4.11 we can conclude that the processing times of a task τi
depends on its own WCET C+i as well as all C
+
j and activation patterns δ
−
j,in
of all tasks τj ∈ hp(i) Note that δ−i,in is the corresponding function to η
+
i,in
[Sch11, Eq. 3.5. - 3.8] – it is used interchangeably with η+i,in .
Theorem 2.4.13: TDG Edges for SPP
According to Lemma 2.4.11 for each task τi on a resource with SPP
scheduling, edges e = (vk, vl) are inserted in the TDG
vk = ϑp(τi, C+) ∧ vl = ϑr(τi, w+) (2.4)
∀j ∈ hp(i) : vk = ϑp(τj, C+) ∧ vl = ϑr(τi, w+) (2.5)
∀j ∈ hp(i) : vk = ϑp(τj, δ−in) ∧ vl = ϑr(τi, w
+) (2.6)
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Proof 2.4.14:
For each term on the right side of Eq. (2.3) an edge to the node
representing the left-hand side is added thus capturing all the de-
pendencies.

This procedure is applied for all tasks on the resource, finally adding all
timing dependencies on the resource. The dependencies captured by this
step are illustrated by the solid black edges in Fig. 2.7.
The processing time calculation given in Lemma 2.4.11 is the baseline bound
for SPP schedulers. It is, however, possible to model and analyze more
complex setups. Particularly, shared resource blocking can be considered. As
[NSE09] and [SNE09] elaborate, Eq. (2.3) can be modified to consider blocking
times. The additional terms also capture dependencies and are inserted in
the TDG according to the rationale of Theorem 2.4.13. They are omitted here
for clarity. Exemplarily, the following static-priority non-preemptive (SPNP)
case demonstrates how blocking is covered in the TDG structure.
2.4.2 SPNP
Besides the common SPP scheduling, also SPNP scheduling is widely spread.
The main difference between SPP and SPNP is that once a job receives service,
it runs until completion. No preemption, i.e. context switches, can appear
within one job. For instance bus arbitration of Controller Area Network (CAN)
follows this scheduling scheme as well as the arbitration in Ethernet switch
ports if IEEE 802.11Q priorities are used. Besides being common for message
scheduling, SPNP is also a supported scheduling mode of the AUTOSAR
Classic OS [AUT19b].
SPNP’s processing time function is given by:
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Lemma 2.4.15: Maximum Processing Time Function for SPNP
The maximum multiple-event processing time for a SPNP scheduler is
upper bounded by:












• hp(i) being the set of all higher priority tasks mapped to the
same resource
• C+i , C
+
j being the WCET of task τi, τj respectively
• η+j,in(∆t) being the maximum number of events of a task τj in
any half-open interval of time ∆t
• tcycle is a resource dependent constant that denotes the bittime
or cycletime to consider boundary effects
• B+i = max∀j∈lep(i) C
+
j is the maximum blocking a task can
experience by lower and equal priority tasks (lep(i))
Proof 2.4.16:
A proof for Lemma 2.4.15 is e.g. provided in [DBBL07] which analyzes
CAN.

Due to the additional blocking term B+ in Eq. (2.7) we add it as another
possible result node type in the TDG. Apart from that, the dependencies in
Lemma 2.4.15 are similar to the ones in Lemma 2.4.11:
Theorem 2.4.17: TDG Edges for SPNP
According to Lemma 2.4.15 for each task τi on a resource with SPNP
scheduling, edges e = (vk, vl) are inserted in the TDG
∀j ∈ hp(i) : vk = ϑp(τj, C+), vl = ϑr(τi, w+) (2.8)
∀j ∈ hp(i) : vk = ϑp(τj, δ−in), vl = ϑr(τi, w
+) (2.9)
vk = ϑp(τi, C+), vl = ϑr(τi, w+) (2.10)
∀j ∈ lep(i) : vk = ϑp(τj, C+), vl = ϑr(τi, B+) (2.11)
vk = ϑr(τi, B+), vl = ϑp(τi, w+) (2.12)
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Proof 2.4.18:
The proof how task parameters influence the processing times in
SPNP is provided in [DBBL07] for Eq. (2.7). For each term on the
right side of Eq. (2.7) an edge to the node representing the left-hand
side is added thus capturing all the dependencies. Eq. (2.11) and
Eq. (2.12) capture the dependencies for computing the blocking B+i
as specified in the remainder of Lemma 2.4.15.

2.4.3 Adding further Timing Parameters to a TDG
Up to this point only the dependencies for the output event model and
the WCRT have been added to the TDG, since they are the most common
bound for a task and are integral part of the CPA analysis methodology.
However, there exists an extensive amount of work, how, based on the CPA
methodology, further more application specific bounds can be computed.
The definition of the CLM already introduced data-age requirements for
cause-effect chains in the software model. Whether such requirements can be
fulfilled by a BET implementation, can be checked by the analysis presented
in [SMT+18]. Hence, another result node type for data age and reaction
time for sampling-based task communication on a resource can be added to
the TDG node set. Based on Equations 4 and 5 from [SMT+18] dependency
edges for the bounds of data-age and reaction-time can be added.
2.5 Timing Dependency Analysis of Systems
The TDG itself captures dependencies between parameters of the timing
model. This allows to study (timing) dependencies between functionally
unrelated parts of a system that we can find by path analysis in the CLM.
Consider again the example in Fig. 2.4. Via the mechanism of the TDG, the
timing dependencies on all three resources (indicated in red in Fig. 2.4) that
constitute a dependency between fa and fb can be studied for any possible
scheduling algorithm with all possible scheduling parameter assignments.
Through the TDGs for different configurations (e.g. priority assignments)
the transitive dependencies become transparent.
Dependency analysis can now be embedded into the design process proposed
by safety standards such as ISO 26262 or the more generic IEC 61508 as an
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inductive system assessment. Particularly in the phase of the technical safety
concept [Int18b, Part 4] that ensures the adherence of the implementation to
the functional safety concept, this method can be useful.
For an application where the timing has a critical influence on functional
correctness (cp. Section 1.1) the technical safety concept must include require-
ments on timing properties such as response times, data ages, or reaction
times. An ASIL requirement on such a parameter denotes that violating the
timing property results in a failure which can endanger the safety of the
system. There are two aspects to such an ASIL assignment in the technical
safety concept: First, the level of residual risk of failure that is tolerated for
the requirement, and second that freedom from interference from lower
levels must be ensured. The reason for the latter being that freedom from
interference is defined as the absence of cascading failure [Int18b, Part1 ,
Clause 1.49]. Since by definition of SILs / ASILs, failures for lower ASILs are
more likely to occur, cascading failure from lower to higher levels must be
prevented.
We therefore introduce the property of strict non-interference w.r.t. timing:
Definition 2.5.1: Timing Independence
Two timing parameters represented by nodes va, vb ∈ V are strictly
non-interfering if there exists no node walk w = (va, · · · , vb) within
T DG .
However, it becomes evident in already small examples, that this property is
hard to achieve (cf. Fig. 2.7). At this stage the quantification step in the timing
dependency flow becomes necessary. Therefore, the requirements as well as
the model parameters require a quantification. As safety requirements are
basically the accepted occurrence probability of a particular risk or failure
they are numerically hard to capture. Hence, many safety standards resort
to discritization, e.g. ISO 26262 in the QM level and ASIL A up to ASIL
D, IEC 61508 in SIL 1 to SIL 4, or DO-178C with Design Assurance Level
(DAL) ranging from E (lowest) up to A (highest). While terminology and
proposed methods differ in the details, most safety standards are in many
ways coherent in their motivation and how a sufficient level of functional
safety can be achieved. We therefore abstract from a particular definition
of ASIL / SIL requirements definition and resort to the general notion of a
confidence requirement for timing parameters:
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Definition 2.5.2: Confidence Requirement
The confidence requirement is a non-negative integer value, where
higher values indicate more stringent requirements, and zero de-
notes no safety-relevant requirements (i.e. best effort/quality man-
aged (QM)) for timing parameters. The confidence requirement of a
TDG node vi is denoted by Γreq(vi):
Γreq : VTDG → N+0
This definition is compatible with the conception of a safety integrity level
in [Int18b] and [The10], as well as the concept of DAL in DO-178C/ED-12C
for airborne software systems. Note that DALs are ordered from A (highest)
to E (lowest), this can also be mapped to Definition 2.5.2 with Level E being
represented by a confidence requirement of 0.
W.r.t. the implementation of safety critical software, standards like ISO 26262
or IEC 61508 dictate certain process measures for design and implemen-
tation, increasing the level of care in the process with the required SIL.
We thus assume that the efforts of obtaining real-time parameters like the
WCET / BCET also increases with this process. This also reflects the first
purpose of an ASIL in the technical safety concept: reducing the level of
residual risk. In this case the risk is that a wrongful specification via a de-
pendency influences timing parameters with more stringent requirements,
e.g. a (computed) response time bound.
Again to abstract from a specific safety standard and process we measure the
level of quality as the confidence into a parameter of the cross-layer model.
Definition 2.5.3: Timing Parameter Confidence
The confidence into a timing parameter is a non-negative integer
that discretizes the likelihood that a parameter will violate expected
model behavior at run-time. It scales identical to the confidence
requirement from Definition 2.5.2.
We assume that the confidence can only be specified if a timing parameter can
be analyzed in isolation, i.e. it does not depend on any other timing parameter.
These parameters are referred to as input parameters and can be obtained
from the specification of the designer in the CLM. As input parameters do
not depend on any other parameter, they can be easily identified in a TDG.
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The set of input parameters I are all nodes which do not have a predecessor
in T DG :
I =
{
vi : @ (vj, vi) ∈ ETDG with vj, vi ∈ VTDG
}
(2.13)
Typically, the input parameter in I are BCET and WCET as well as input
event models of non-event dependent tasks.
Note that this notion of confidence into a timing parameter substantially
differs from the way MC scheduling annotates execution time bounds. In the
MC scheduling model, the theory assumes that the WCET bound changes
with the operation mode of the system at runtime, i.e. in which criticality
mode a task is scheduled. While Vestals initial paper on the MC model
in [Ves07] assumes more than two modes of criticality, most work on MC
scheduling only considers two modes - high and low criticality [BD19]. The
crucial difference is that the confidence into a parameter annotates the
rigour with which the parameter was obtained. The confidence is also a
likelihood 1 that expresses the (discretized) probability of misspecification,
i.e. how likely it is that a parameter specification will be violated at run-
time. The confidence is derived from the quality of a validation process
as needed to meet the design requirements of a safety-critical function.
Therefore, the required confidence and, hence, the selected value depends
on the function criticality which never changes at runtime. This definition
follows the argumentation put forth in [EBTLR12]. On the other hand, MC
scheduling requires the designer to specify WCET bounds for each task per
criticality level of the system. In the analyses and scheduler designs presented
in the literature these values are used dependent on the current criticality
mode of the system, which turns value selection into a dynamic scheduling
decision [BD19]. This also implies that response-time bounds depend on
the operation-mode change sequences of a system.
The notion of a specified confidence into input parameters and the depen-
dencies in the TDG can subsequently be used for an interference analysis.
Therefore, we first introduce a confidence function that allows to derive the
confidence of an arbitrary TDG node. The rationale guiding this is that the
analysis must be conservative in nature, i.e. whenever a parameter depends
on more than one other parameter it receives the lowest among its prede-
cessors in the TDG. This is in line with [Int18b, Part 4, Clause 7.4.2] and
1Note that in this thesis probability and likelihood are not distinguished in the sense that
probability only refers to aleatoric uncertainties. Since no Bayesian statistical analysis and
hypothesis test on parameters is done in this thesis, the terms are used interchangeably.
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[Int18b, Part 3, Clause 6.4.2.2] that always the highest ASIL takes precedence.
If for a dependency in a TDG no “evidence of coexistence” of two safety re-
quirements exists [Int18b, Part 4, Clause 7.4.2.2], the conservative assumption
that the lowest confidence will dominate is appropriate. This results in the
following recursive definition:
Definition 2.5.4: Confidence Propagation Function
The Confidence Function:






Γ(vj)|(vj, vi) ∈ E
}
if vi /∈ I
the specified value for vi if vi ∈ I
returns for every node vi ∈ V a non-negative integer value that
represents the maximum achievable confidence into the parameter
or result the node represents.
Assigning a confidence to every node of the TDG allows to compare a TDG’s
confidence value with the specified confidence requirements (cp. Defini-
tion 2.5.2). Besides the very strict Definition 2.5.1 of strict non-interference,
we now introduce two different forms of timing dependence on a node as a
result of dependency paths:
Definition 2.5.5: Timing Dependence
A timing parameter vb is exposed to
• bounded timing dependence if: Γ(vb) < Γreq(vb)
• unbounded timing dependence if: Γ(vb) ≥ Γreq(vb)
The two forms of dependence are a direct result of the recursive property
of the confidence propagation function. Due to the recursive and hence
transitive assignment of a confidence value, any direct neighbor va of a node
vb under consideration has the lowest possible confidence by construction.
Hence, we know that there exists no node walk w = (vi, ..., vb) in T DG
such that Γ(vi) < Γ(vb), because if the walk w would exist Γ(vb) ≤ Γ(vi).
As a result, bounded timing dependence for a particular parameter is the
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guarantee that only timing parameters with the required degree of rigour
can influence a timing parameter. Fig. 2.8 shows the possible options how a
timing dependency can be treated in the overall dependency analysis in the
CLM.














Figure 2.8: Possible options for timing dependencies
2.6 Case Study and Experiments
2.6.1 Case Study: Lateral Vehicle Control
We consider the lateral controller of a (conditionally) automated research
vehicle [Ber15]. For tractability, Fig. 2.9 shows a CLM where the software
model is reduced to the essentials of a single cause-effect chain from iner-
tial measurements to the lateral controller. Here, the IMU block bundles
inertial sensor data evaluation and pose estimation which is implemented
in τa2. It provides proper-motion and pose estimation to the lateral control
algorithm implemented in τa3. It computes steering angles, which are used
by the control actuation. In this implementation, τa3 samples the pose and
acceleration data from τa2 and sends them via a network to the steering
actuator control which is implemented in τb2, residing on resource Resb.
Tasks displayed in white in Fig. 2.9 implement other software blocks and
may cause unwanted dependencies.
2.6.1.1 Safety Goals
Since the steering function is intended for an automated vehicle, the typical
safety-relevant timing properties are the response time of the individual
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Figure 2.9: CLM for an implementation of the lateral controller example. The
two resources Resa, Resb under static-priority preemptive scheduling with
priorities descending from τa1 to τa4 and τb1 to τb3. The communication
resources are assumed to be Ethernet switch ports under static-priority
non-preemptive scheduling with priorities descending from τnw1 to τnw3.
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tasks, end-to-end latencies and the maximum age of data communicated
along the task chain. To identify concrete properties, the ISO 26262 process is
applied: It requires the definition of items that implement a certain function
at the vehicle level, a functional safety concept [Int18b, Part 3] to ensure the
safety of the items, and a technical safety concept [Int18b, Part 4] that ensures
the adherence of the implementation to the functional safety concept. We
address this by collecting information on functions and items in FG at
the vehicle level. The mappings of the function model [SBM16] provides
concrete safety goals for the lateral guidance control of a highly automated
vehicle [Ber15]. One of these safety goals (which is the result of an hazard
analysis and risk assessment (HARA) process) specifies, that the maximum
tolerable overshoot over the reference value is 0.1 m.
The timing bounds in this example can be determined by functional test-
ing of the control algorithm, e.g. with SIMULINK models containing delay
and hold elements. These bounds can be propagated via the mapping in-
formation to the tasks as model elements in the task model. In the given
implementation the maximum data age between τa2 and τa3 and the end-to-
end latency from the activation of τa3 to the termination of a subsequent job
of τb2 must not exceed given bounds to prevent this. In Fig. 2.10 the pink
dashed line depicts the response of the controller under timing errors. An
overshoot between 0.5 s and 1 s over the safety goal (depicted as a red line) is
clearly visible.













Lateral Deviation with Monitor
Lateral Deviation with Timing Error
Max. Tolerable O vershoot
Figure 2.10: Possible lateral deviation under timing errors of the vehicle and
maximum tolerable overshoot according to [SBM16]
2.6.1.2 Dependency Analysis
The ISO process now requires to investigate an element’s implementation
[Int18b, Part 1, 1.32] – i.e. the tasks running the function. Here we can observe,
that τa1, τa4, τb1 as well as the network communication in τnw1 and τnw2 are
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not part of the lateral guidance implementation but share resources with
the implementation. Since, the implementation is “shared within a system
or among systems of a network” [Int18b, Part 1, 1.129],dependence has to be
assumed, unless required independence can be proved.
For the case study we assume that the two resources Resa, Resb are scheduled
under static-priority preemptive scheduling with priorities descending from
τa1 to τa4 and τb1 to τb3. The communication resources are assumed to be
Ethernet switch ports under static-priority non-preemptive scheduling with
priorities descending from τnw1 to τnw3.
With this information, we can generate the TDG for the CLM in Fig. 2.9
but observe that no timing independence according to Definition 2.5.1 can
be shown, since paths between nodes belonging to the implementation
and timing parameters of other tasks exist in the TDG. Hence, it is only
possible to validate the system under bounded dependence according to the
taxonomy in Fig. 2.5 and specified in Definition 2.5.5. Note that the bounded
dependence check only investigates whether a dependency can in principle
be accepted – it however, does not check whether all timing requirements,
e.g. WCRTs are met. This is a further quantification step that is necessary.
2.6.1.3 Observations
Through manual analysis of the TDG we can identify the timing parameters
of all higher priority tasks as the ones that must receive an equal or higher
confidence value for their timing parameters in order to avoid unbounded
timing dependence according to Definition 2.5.5. More precisely, τa1, τb1 and
τnw1. Since τnw3 can induce lower priority blocking due to the SPNP schedul-
ing in the network, its WCET parameter also must receive a higher or equal
confidence than the implementation of the lateral control cause-effect chain.
Another design option is to assign priorities according to criticality. While
this assignment scheme would lead to better results w.r.t. bounded depen-
dence, it can significantly deteriorate the response-time performance of a
system which is achieved through rate monotonic (RM) priority assignment
[LSD89] [BG03].
While the presented timing dependency analysis method to check for
bounded dependence, allows to check any possible combination of platform
mapping, priority assignment, and confidence values it does not enable the
designer to systematically specify requirements such that it is feasible under
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at least bounded timing dependence. This is part of research question 2 and 3
of this thesis and addressed in the following chapter.
However, the TDG and the timing dependency analysis method allows to per-
form a systematic and automated FMEA as introduced in Table 1.1. For both
process steps design and operation the potential causes that can trigger the fail-
ure mode can be automatically identified, based on the CLM of the system.
As we have seen here, these are all the execution time and event model specifi-
cations that transitively influence a timing requirement like a response time
or data-age. Since, such requirements constitute end-to-end requirements
this impact is studied as well. Furthermore, the mapping relations of the
CLM allow to reflect all the identified causes on the functional and system
level, either triggering redesign, sharpening of specifications/requirements
or the introduction of a safety mechanism.
2.7 Related Work
2.7.1 Cross-Layer Modelling
The CLM introduced in this chapter follows the basic principle of correspon-
dence rules between different architecture models from ISO/IEC 42010:2011
[Int11], where different layers address different viewpoints on the system.
Commonly, the architecture of a system is expressed by architecture descrip-
tion languages (ADLs), which are meta-models with different layers of their
own. Such meta-models exist in a wide range of flavors, each addressing
peculiarities of domains such as avionics or automotive, but in principle
follow common principles that are reflected in the CLM presented in Sec-
tion 2.1. Inspired by the needs of the avionics domain, AADL was developed
as a language to specify avionics and generally dependable systems as part
of US funded projects [FGH06][AAD17]. It can be seen as the counterpart
to EAST-ADL 1 which was developed and extended in the course of several
European projects from 2001 to 2013 [Ass13]. W.r.t. industrial partners it
was mainly supported by automotive Original Equipement Manufactur-
ers (OEMs) and Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. EAST-ADL features model layers
for the vehicle, functional, and detailed functional level to describe imple-
mentation agnostic properties. Its implementation layer, however, relies
on AUTOSAR elements and as such is able to express timing requirements
1www.east-adl.info
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[AUT19a] but not the actual timing behavior of the implementation. Fur-
thermore, a coupling of the EAST-ADL implementation level to the Rubus
Component Model exists that allows to separately model control and data
flow, which is advantageous for clear specification [BCC+17]. EAST-ADL
has also been applied as a modelling basis for functional safety analysis
techniques and tools [BDT10] [CDF+14]. It allows functional ASIL allocation
with the HiP-HOPS tool 1 which is demonstrated on an anti-lock braking use
case. However, the tools and modelling are unable to capture requirements
such as timing as technical safety requirements. Their advantage is rather
functional safety analysis, traceability and consistency management [CDF+14].
Another representative of automotive ADLs is the EEA-ADL [Mat10], which
has a number of similarities with EAST-ADL. It was incorporated into the
architecture-modelling and requirements-tracing tool Preevision, which
was later acquired by Vector Informatik and is developed as part of Vector’s
Preevision product line [Vec]. All the automotive meta-models have in some
form a relation to the AUTOSAR meta model [AUT20] as it is the de facto
standard for automotive software. However, as already mentioned AUTOSAR
provides a number of liberties for implementers and as such mainly formu-
lates requirements and not the behavior of the implementation. This gap is
closed by the presented CLM for timing properties and behavior.
2.7.2 Dependency Analysis on CLMs
W.r.t. cross-layer dependency analysis to reveal hidden dependencies across
model layers [BB18] and [BBK19] present approaches that are function centric
but do not cover extra-functional properties such as the timing, which is
in focus of this thesis. The authors investigate how design parameters of
the functional architecture, in the case of [BB18] state-charts, and physical
parameters are interdependent. In the concrete use case they investigate
the hidden dependency on the current consumption of the hardware of an
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) function. Similar work is conducted for a
buck converter in [BBK19]. Both leverage Preevision / EEA-ADL as a design
description and model physical properties which are not captured in EEA-
ADL in a Ptolemy II model [EJL+03] [Lee09].
Other authors address the identification of potentially harmful dependen-
cies as a design space exploration (DSE) problem. [SVZ15] sees the problem




sis mechanisms proposed for the employed AUTOFOCUS3 framework 1
[VEH14] try to circumvent timing dependencies by exclusively targeting
time-triggered systems. The time-division multiplex (TDM) avoids timing
dependence, as for TDM scheduling non-interference can be proven. Yet,
the time-triggered scheduling and communication results in inefficient re-
source use and suffers from the problem that for a multitude of applications
on a platform sufficient time slots must be assigned. Furthermore, it is
not compliant to the AUTOSAR Classic platform [AUT19b] which features
SPP scheduling on execution resources. In the field of DSE for multi and
manycore systems authors aim for application isolation on these shared
platforms through suitable mappings of the applications on the execution
platform. Such platforms typically consist of a number of tiles connected by
a network-on-chip (NoC); each tile posses one or more cores to process work-
load. A tile can also host further peripherals such as memory, accelerators or
memory interfaces [TAED13]. For instance [PSWT19] presents an approach
for finding mappings that can leverage multiple inter-application isolation
schemes on the platform. Other authors, for which [PSWT19] also provides
an overview, limit their scope to only one isolation scheme for the entire
mapping problem. The three inter-application isolation schemes typically
considered are:
• core sharing: where timing isolation properties are only based on
conservative WCRT analysis
• core reservation: which also provides spatial isolation from other
applications on a core, however, interference on peripherals of the tile
exist
• tile reservation: which raises spatial isolation of concurrent applica-
tions to tile level and enables the largest reduction in the worst-case
timing interferences
Yet, as we can observe from the description of these mechanisms, we can
see that core sharing effectively has the problems that are investigated as
part of the cross-layer dependency analysis for timing, i.e. a shared resource
that makes timing mutually dependent unless proven otherwise. Current
WCET analysis tools can not deliver this proof for any kind of core architec-
ture [WEE+08]. While the other two seem to be able to execute exclusively
on cores and hence do not experience timing interference, this is a false
assumption. The timing behavior of both is still dependent on inter- and
intra-tile communication, e.g. on-tile buses or the NoC, for which [PSWT19]
1https://af3.fortiss.org/
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and others use timing analysis (such as e.g. [RE15]) to argue isolation. How-
ever, this form of isolation must not be confused with bounded dependence
from Definition 2.5.5 as the isolation property requires sufficient confidence
into the parameters. While WCETs can be bounded accurately in network
transmissions, as they correspond to the duration of bittimes, event-models,
i.e. the access patterns are the primal source of uncertainty in the timing
analysis. On the tiles’ cores the challenge of obtaining WCETs with sufficient
confidence remains [WEE+08][Wil18]. It has to be noted here, that [PSWT19]
only takes one shared resource into account which is the set of processing
resources. Other global effects like access to dynamic random access mem-
ory (DRAM) are either neglected or abstracted in the NoC’s timing analysis,
as in the case of shaping mechanisms for off-tile memory access.
SDRAM accesses are managed by special controllers – their timing behavior,
i.e. the worst-case time it takes to serve a memory request from controller
to the DRAM, together with the timing behavior of the rest of the mem-
ory hierarchy (caches, etc.) significantly influences whether sharing such a
resource can performed safely. Safe in this context is that it happens with
bounded dependence. For the effects of SDRAM access in real-time systems
the authors of [GHPP18] provide a survey comparing nine different publica-
tions reporting on designs of memory controllers for real-time systems. The
surveyed work is of interest, as standard off-the-shelf embedded platforms
might provide no bound on DRAM access latency at all [WKP13]. However,
the conclusion from [GHPP18] is that no universally preferable memory
controller design for real-time systems exists. Rather, the authors suggest
makeing the choice application specific 1. This implies that a technique is
necessary to identity the need for a more rigorous specification, specifically if
workloads of different timing criticality are mixed. Such a tool can be found
in dependency analysis, if its CLM is extended to cover also memory accesses
in a separate model 2 rather than abstracting it, as it is the state-of-the-art
in task-level response-time analysis.
The same claim can be made for basically any shared (stateful) resource in
a design, as the state when a task accesses the resource influences the ex-
ecution behavior. The question always is: Is the state predictable or can
it at least be bounded in order to bound the timing influence? So far
this section has mainly considered shared resources as part of an SoC –
however also more macroscopic shared resources play an important role
1In this context application refers to the composition of functions and software executed on
the particular hardware their desired memory configuration and necessary analytical guarantees.
2This is possible, since the CLM’s design is flexible w.r.t. the models. An additional model
only requires the specification of abstraction and concretization mappings.
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in whether end-to-end cause-effect chains are sufficiently independent
of harmful interference. As the last representative of such a shared re-
source, in-vehicle networks are discussed. In-vehicle networks can con-
sist of multiple interconnect technologies (CAN, LIN, FlexRay, Ethernet,
…) with numerous gateways between them. While the real-time commu-
nity has studied many of the technologies w.r.t. their timing behavior
[DBBL07][NNEB12][NNEB12][TE16b][TAE15][TSAE16b], and even suggested
dynamic resource broking (which is able to provide guarantees) under chang-
ing workloads [Kos20][KSE20], the necessity of determining whether the
specification quality actually allows claiming bounded interference remains.
Assessing the specification quality to qualify the mechanism is first intro-
duced with timing dependency analysis on top of these mechanisms. This
corresponds to the demands made by [EN16], that in order to argue “suffi-
cient independence”, the mechanism and hence also the data fed to it need
to be sufficiently qualified.
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Mixed-critical workloads make design and integration a challenging task
for hardware-software co-designers – especially for today’s Level 2 and Level
3+ vehicles. This criticality is in the literature often interpreted as the safety
relevance of a (timing) requirement. Further, some authors assume that the
number of criticality level can be limited to a high and a low criticality level,
especially in the context of scheduling theory. There is even the assumption
that the higher criticality level can interfere with the lower level in order
to carry out its task in normal operation. [BD19] provides an extensive
overview over this work. It becomes evident from safety standards that such
a behavior is not straightforwardly covered by the design rules of safety
standards. Hence, contrarily to the works summarized in [BD19], in [EN16]
the authors argue that standards define separation in both ways, meaning
that at any criticality level the timing should not be affected by (timing)
errors in the other criticality level. A fact that is clearly not considered when
scheduling algorithms are allowed to drop low-criticality tasks in favor of
high-criticality ones in normal operation mode.
A particular conclusion from [EN16] is that the mechanism which integrates
software with different criticality must be qualified to the highest applicable
level – especially if it is the mechanism that should guarantee sufficient inde-
pendence. For MC scheduling as presented in [BD19], the scheduler is such a
mechanism according to [EN16]. The research presented here is an extension
77
CHAPTER 3. FROM VERIFICATION TO SYNTHESIS
of this argumentation, in the sense that it quantifies the (in)dependence
(cf. Definition 2.5.5).
[EN16] motivates that “usually, safety-critical functions are subject to timing
requirements”. However, technical safety requirements, e.g. an ASIL, on
timing requirements and how they originate are rarely discussed in the
literature. Furthermore, contemporary safety cases often lead to designs
where the violation of a timing requirement does not contribute to hazard.
E.g. in the “E-Gas Konzept” which is a safety concept for combustion engine
passenger cars to prevent unintended vehicle acceleration, no timings in
the functional layer are considered safety relevant, as it is assumed that
timing violations only lead to effects captured by the functional monitoring
level (“funktionalen Überwachungsebene”) [EGA13]. This is only possible due to
the assumption of long fault-tolerant time intervals (FTTIs) [Int18b, Part 1,
Clause 3.58] that are significantly longer than the control period, e.g. in the
case of “EGAS” the time duration from error detection to start of a reaction
is in the order of 500 ms, whereas the control period of the software realizing
the function (“Ebene 1”) is in the order of a few ms. However, with the advert
of higher automation levels, the time to transition into emergency operation
becomes more crucial [Int18b, Part 1, Figure 5], as vehicles must be brought
to a risk minimal stop. Hence, it can be expected that the transition times
into safety operation also receive timing requirements that are subject to a
technical ASIL.
While timing dependence and confidence analysis can be valuable tools to
asses requirement satisfaction, they also require that confidence require-
ments (in representation of a technical safety requirement) are known for the
analysis (cf. Section 2.5). For illustration, we again consider the initial exam-
ple of a lateral controller of a (conditionally) automated vehicle. In the case
study in Section 2.6.1 we have seen that under a given priority assignment
and given confidence requirements only a simple binary verification decision
is possible: acceptable or not acceptable under bounded dependence. For
the implementation of a safety goal, a systematic derivation of confidence
requirements on timing parameters of foreign software is necessary or that
methods to increase the confidence of parameters is necessary (if critical
software depends on it according to the TDG).
Hence, in the following we address the design flow from a different per-
spective: First, a mechanism to synthesise confidence requirements for all
specified timing parameters based on safety requirements of timing require-
ments is proposed. Second, we address the question of how the design
flow can handle situations where either additional confidence requirements
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cannot be imposed or otherwise guaranteed. The former being the case
when software is already implemented or the hardware and OS/middleware
platform is already chosen, the latter in situations where no sufficiently
conservative WCET estimation tool is available for the intended hardware-
software platform. This is especially a problem, as the platform is often
an unalterable constraint in industrial practice, e.g. due to supply chain
decisions.
3.1 Synthesis of Implementation Requirements
In this section the question of up to which level of confidence an input
parameter must be obtained is addressed. This is a synthesis step, since it
generates a requirement on the necessary level of confidence of an input
parameter. This is interesting, since quite an extensive number of publica-
tions cling to the misconception that a functional safety requirement’s ASIL
resembles time criticality of a software component. However, this is not
necessarily the case, as not every safety critical function is also time critical.
Section 2.5 has elaborated how timing dependencies of a system can be
formally captured in a data structure, namely the TDG. In this graph nodes
are timing parameters and each edge denotes the timing dependence of
the target on the source of the edge. Further it has been shown how timing
requirements such as a WCRT or data-age requirement can be added to a
TDG. By investigating the TDG with confidence analysis, nodes in the TDG
with a mismatch of achievable confidence and confidence requirement can
be identified. More precisely, the dependency which leads to an insufficient
confidence in a model parameter can be identified. The result are parameters
which lead to an “illegal” influence in terms of safety. However, this requires
that every node, or at least every root (TDG nodes with in-degree of zero),
has a confidence value in its specification. Often in a design, designers do
not know how the timing parameters of “their” software need to be qualified.
Here the presented confidence assignment algorithm can help, by exploiting
the knowledge of timing dependencies.
Let us now assume that confidence values can be freely assigned and this
way become a requirement for the specification of the parameter. First,
note that the confidence imposed only reflects how faithful the parameter
is w.r.t. the rest of the model (in the sense of a scientific model according
to [LS18]. Confidence as it is presented here can not easily cover effects
beyond the model, e.g. hardware failures that would alter the structure of the
79
CHAPTER 3. FROM VERIFICATION TO SYNTHESIS
model. Nevertheless, safety engineering requires that for higher criticality
such failures must be taken into account. These can be mapped either on
parameter behavior, e.g. certain types of hardware errors can be abstracted
by longer execution times, or require an additional model. Second, note
that if the parameter is dependent on the implementation, it also becomes a
requirement on the implementation. For instance to what degree of rigour
a WCET parameter must be determined. For this purpose, we only assume
that the TDG nodes of (timing) requirements have confidence requirements
assigned. These are present in case the particular timing requirement has
an implication on (functional) safety as they are derived as technical safety
requirement.
Originating from the TDG nodes with confidence requirements, we now
backtrack through the graph to initial timing parameters and assign them
the highest confidence requirement to which a path exists in the TDG.
In Algorithm 3 this is done by reversing all edges in a TDG T DG and
performing either breadth-first search (BFS) or DFS from each requirement
and upon visiting a node assigning it the maximum of either an already
present confidence requirement or the value of the confidence requirement
of the source of the search, i.e. the timing requirement node. By selecting
the maximum, a conservative requirements assignment is achieved, as a
higher confidence implies a lower probability of specification error. This is
in accordance with clause 7.4.2.2 part 4 of ISO26262 [Int18b].
Algorithm 3: assign_conf_reqs(T DG , requirement_nodes)
Data:
requirement_nodes : the nodes carrying a confidence requirement
T DG : The TDG to work on
1 reverse_edges(T DG ) ;
2 for n in requirement_nodes do
3 confidence_req = get_conf_req(n) ;
4 for k in dfs(T DG , n) do
5 cur_confidence_req = get_conf_req(k) ;
6 new_confidence_req = max(cur_conf_req, confidence_req) ;
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Theorem 3.1.1
When Algorithm 3 terminates it has assigned the maximum con-
fidence necessary to each node reachable from a requirement in
requirement_nodes.
Proof 3.1.2:
This simple proof consists of two steps. First of the inner loop that
visits all reachable nodes from one timing requirement node in the
TDG and second that for the outer loop a conservative assignment of
confidence requirements is made. The proof for the inner loop is by
induction. The function dfs in line 4 explores the graph recursively.
Upon the first visit a node is marked. The recursion terminates and
does not return any more nodes because ever call to the recursion it
to an unmarked node, and each recursion call marks a node. For k
reachable nodes there are k calls to the recursion before it stops.
Suppose that a node w is reachable from n and is not marked when
dfs terminates. Since w is reachable there is a path n, v0, v1, ..., vl with
vl = w from n to w, and a first node vi that is not marked. However,
this is in contradiction since the recursion function marks vi−1 and
would have examined vi via the edge (vi−1, vi). Consequently, dfs
visits every node reachable from n.
The proof for the outer loop is now trivial. The outer loop visits every
TDG node reachable from every node in requirement_nodes. Upon
visiting, it assigns the maximum confidence requirement. Even if
a node is visited multiple times due to calls to dfs from multiple
origins, the order from which a node w is visited is irrelevant to the
maximum operation.

TDG nodes in the unreversed graph that have an in-degree of zero, i.e. are
roots, are specifiable timing parameters. All of these nodes have received a
confidence requirement if a timing requirement in the TDG depends on it,
since the search algorithm (cf. line 4) yields all nodes discovered from the
node representing the timing requirement.
The confidence requirements on the input parameters now specifies the
degree of conservatism up to which the input parameter must be known for
a timing analysis like CPA. In that sense, the confidence is interpreted as a
probability of failure of the specification. Since the TDG is constructed based
on symbolic evaluation of the busy window, which accumulates the inter-
81
CHAPTER 3. FROM VERIFICATION TO SYNTHESIS
ference, its edges are the possible propagation paths of such a specification
failure. CPA and other analysis methodologies on the other hand assume
conservative bounds on its input values, i.e. that they are never exceeded.
The interpretation of the confidence requirement as a failure probability,
however, allows more flexibility in the specification and verification of the
system. It allows performing specification in a less rigorous manner, as it is
now permissible to specify timing parameters not entirely conservative but
with a certain margin of error. Whether this probabilistic error can have an
effect on a timing bound such as response time, can be determined by the
path analysis in the TDG. Assume that a timing parameter n of a now given
confidence Γn only influences parameters with similar or lower confidence.
In this case it is permissible that the error of parameter n influences its
dependent parameters due to their lower confidence, as the equal or lower
confidence means that its error probability is equal or higher than the one of
n.
3.1.1 Case Study
As an example consider the partial CLM in Fig. 3.1 which is an extension
of the example from Fig. 2.9 in which the lateral controller is integrated
on a shared platform. The focus here is on an additional function f , which
for simplicity is assumed to be implemented by a single software block in
τb4. For safe control performance, the WCRT of τb4 is critical. The system
under consideration features two computation resources and communica-
tion resources, e.g. two CPUs and an Ethernet network. For computation
SPP scheduling is assumed while the communication resources schedule ac-
cording to the SPNP policy. Further the example assumes that the task with
the requirement under consideration resides on the second resource on an
intermediate priority, e.g. due to RM priority assignment. A communication
stream originates on the first resource towards the second resource, however
it is unrelated to the function implemented in τb4. This communication
stream competes with two other traffic streams for a switch port. The com-
peting tasks on the switch port Com2 are τnw1 and τnw3. For illustration no
other requirements besides the WCRT of τb4 is assumed to have a confidence
requirement.
The resulting graph of Algorithm 3 is shown in Fig. 3.2. Note that the figure
does not depict the TDG as introduced before but with reversed edges that
show the propagation of the requirement as described in this section.
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Figure 3.1: CLM for an example system with two computation resources and
two communication resources
While it is not obvious from the structural representation of the system in the
CLM that a network stream interfering via scheduling has an impact on the
timing requirements of f , it becomes obvious from the result of Algorithm
3. The timing parameters of τnw1 that specify its maximum length, i.e. the
WCET for network frames, and activation pattern on the switches output
port scheduler now would receive a confidence requirement. Besides both
network stream – interfering either due to higher priority or due to lower
priority blocking – not only tasks executing on the same resource as τb4 can
interfere with τb4 but also tasks from Resa that can influence the network
stream although they are functionally unrelated to τb4 and the function f it
implements. Algorithm 3 discovers all these parameters systematically, as
can be seen in Fig. 3.2.
By applying the algorithm to each node with a confidence requirement the
(specifieable) timing parameters receive a confidence requirement such that
confidence analysis would not reveal a mismatch for the function under
investigation. For correct operation the requirement nodes in the input list
of Algorithm 3 must be in ascending order of the confidence requirements.
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Figure 3.2: TDG with reversed edges for the example system depicted in
Fig. 3.1. Colored nodes receive the confidence requirement from the WCRT
requirement of τ4.
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3.2 Enforcing Properties at Runtime
In situations where bounded timing dependence or timing independence
cannot be substantiated by the confidence analysis, design measures are nec-
essary. The first option is to increase the confidence into the relevant input
parameters that cause the deterioration of the confidence below a confidence
requirement by improving the qualification process of the parameter as re-
quired by the confidence requirement synthesis method presented above
in Section 3.1. In industrial scale designs this can, however, be complicated
due to the distributed development process across several suppliers. Other
reasons are that code development process and e.g. WCET quantification
have already been done when the software is integrated into a specific ECU
and timing dependence and confidence analysis is conducted as part of
the integration process. The second option is to redesign e.g. the task al-
location to ECUs and execution cores. While possibly practical for smaller
designs it puts enormous stress on other involved system designers, as com-
munication relations change and might additionally interfere with other
concerns. E.g. certain software must be executed on resources with the re-
spective peripherals, i.e. are not arbitrarily relocatable. The third option is
to use monitors to conform run-time behavior to expected model behavior.
A monitor raises the confidence into the parameter, by enforcing behavior
of a parameter. In conjunction with the rest of the model, it guarantees valid
and acceptable function behavior. The general idea of this third option and
how it can be realized is first described in [MSE18a].
In the following we elaborate on different options for monitoring from
related work, and their drawbacks and assets.
3.2.1 Related Work – Monitor Types
In the literature three basic types of monitors can be identified to enforce
model behavior: The first type are execution-time monitors that enforce
properties on execution time. They either prevent exceeding an upper bound
such as the WCET or can hold back events, enforcing premature release of
an event before the BCET. Basic WCET monitoring is e.g. described in the
AUTOSAR OS specification [AUT19b, Chapter 7.7.2]. The second group of
monitor types are event model monitors. These resort to enforcing standard
event models as they are described for CPA. [NMA+12] comprehensively
describes monitoring for arbitrary event models, while other approaches
(e.g. [WL96]) limit their scope to periodic event models. Note that periodic
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event models are a subset of arbitrary event models. The last group are tech-
niques that directly monitor the induced workload of a task, i.e. they combine
execution time and event model monitoring. [NAME13],[NQEL13],[HCBK12]
are representatives for this class of strategies. The latter can also be used to
conform the convex-hull of an event-arrival curve to a model specification.
However, this implies unnecessary conservatism that has also to be consid-
ered in the analysis and prevents slack usage by best-effort tasks. None of
these related works elaborate on how to apply the respective techniques in
the system-level context, i.e. a coordination where to monitor in designs with
multiple resources. Neukirchner in [Neu14] partially lifts this restriction,
however, assumes that every task that potentially interferes is equipped with
a monitor.
Although single monitors can be instantiated with manageable overhead,
instantiating a multitude on one resource or across a distributed system
can quickly consume valuable system resources, e.g. exclusive timers for
monitors. On embedded platforms these can be a scarce resource and thus
monitors might quickly consume a system’s resources. Consequently, strate-
gies where each and every timing parameter is monitored (as in principle
proposed by [Neu14]), quickly becomes too expensive in terms of resource
usage.
Furthermore, enforcing all timing parameters also prevents efficient slack us-
age. More precisely, it prevents best-effort applications to consume spurious
workload if monitors enforce optimistically modelled worst-case behavior.
3.2.2 Effects of Monitor Use
The primal effect of a monitor that enforces a defined run-time behavior
is that it increases the level of confidence. We only consider monitoring
techniques that do not produce false negatives (cf. previous section). Conse-
quently, a monitor will ultimately lift the confidence level of the parameter
it monitors and enforces. We therefore modify the confidence function from
Definition 2.5.4 if monitors are present:
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Γ(vj)|(vj, vi) ∈ E
}
if vi /∈ I
specified value for vi if vi ∈ I
and not
monitored
confidence of the monitor if vi is monitored
(3.1)
A monitor primarily has an effect on the value it enforces, the modified
confidence function conveys the transitive effect on the timing dependencies.
Remember that a low confidence in a parameter implies a higher likelihood
of a specification fault and that in consequence the run-time behavior of this
parameter might deviate from expected model behavior. Since a monitor
enforces a specified value, it reduces the ability of a timing fault to cascade
at run time. It can already be studied in the second example that it is not
imperative to monitor all possible timing parameters to achieve satisfaction
of confidence requirements. Assume that the WCRT of τa has a confidence
requirement of 3 and the WCRT of τb of 2. Based on the specified confidences
of input parameters, it is easy to conclude, that solely by monitoring and
enforcing the WCET C+c of τc is sufficient to fulfill the two confidence
requirements.
3.2.3 Placement Strategies for Monitors
In the case of the lateral controller example from Section 2.6.1 the ideal
placement of monitors is straightforward, as the TDG is humanly tractable.
However, for a general application of monitoring in the design flow of
distributed systems, a systematic strategy is necessary. In the following, two
approaches are presented to systematically place monitors in a distributed
system in order to fulfill all confidence requirements of the system. The
first presented strategy is a greedy approach, that places monitors on all
timing parameters without predecessors that the strategy discovers and have
a lesser confidence than required. The second strategy is based on a min-cut
of timing dependency (sub-) graphs.
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3.2.3.1 Greedy Timing Monitor Synthesis Strategy
In the design of such a strategy one must consider that not all types of nodes
in a TDG can be monitored. In case of the greedy approach we will only
target nodes for monitor synthesis that are input nodes. Since for all input
types ({C+, C−, δ+in, δ
−
in}) monitor implementations are available, this fact
does not restrain this strategy.
Based on the confidence analysis of the timing dependence graph we can
determine for every constraint of the system all input parameters it depends
on. More precisely, for every node vi in the TDG with a confidence require-
ment we can construct the reachability graph T DGreach(vi) and determine all
roots, i.e. nodes with an in-degree of 0, of it. This yields all input parameter
nodes which transitively influence the confidence of the constraint under
investigation. We refer to these nodes as the influencing input nodes. We sub-
sequently compare the confidence values of these nodes with the confidence
requirement of the constraint under investigation. For each input node
that is interfering with the constraint node in the strict sense we generate
a monitor and lift the node’s confidence to the highest possible level. We
perform this for all specified constraints, i.e. their corresponding nodes in
the TDG.
Theorem 3.2.1: Greedy Monitor Placement
After this procedure the confidence requirement Γreq(va) of a node
va is fulfilled.
Proof 3.2.2:
The proof is by contradiction: Assume there exists a node vi ∈ V reach
with Γ(vi) < Γreq(va). In this case a path from vi to va exists propa-
gating the confidence value according to the confidence function
reaching va.
However, in cases where vi is an input parameter it has received
a monitor contradicting the assumption, or it is a node within
T DGreach. In the latter case it must receive its confidence value
through evaluation of the confidence function from the reachable
input nodes. By construction of T DGreach(va) and T DGreach(vi),
T DGreach(vi)’s nodes are a subset of T DGreach(va) and have received
monitors if their confidence is below Γreq(va). In consequence a
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node vi with Γ(vi) < Γreq(va) that could still influence Γ(va) cannot
exist.

3.2.3.2 Min-cut based Timing Monitor Synthesis Strategy
The TDG effectively turns the interference problem into a reachability prob-
lem, where lower confidence “flows” along the dependence edges in T DG
towards other nodes. A monitor is able to cut such a flow, as it alters the
result of the confidence function for the particular node(s) it enforces. In
order to configure a networked system such that the number of monitored
parameters is small, a min-cut of the dependency graph is necessary. Ap-
plying a minimum-cut to a TDG, however, has three prerequisites: First,
the flows that actually taint a confidence requirement need to be identified.
Second, in these flows, the graph must be reduced to nodes of types that
can be monitored, as for instance for a maximum busy-window node w+ no
monitoring and enforcement techniques are known. This reduction step,
however, must preserve the structure of flow relations. Third, a capacity
formulation for the edges of the reduced graph is necessary.
We address the problem by an iterative approach, addressing confidence
requirement violations in descending order of the confidence requirement
level. For each confidence requirement level i in the system, we collect all
constraint nodes with a confidence requirement mismatch inMi:
Mi =
{
va : Γ(va) < Γreq(va) = i
}
with va ∈ V (3.2)
By construction, all paths that can influence the confidence of the con-
straints inMi are contained in the reachability graphs T DGreach(cj) of the
mismatching constraints cj ∈ Mi. To construct the flow network we merge
these reachability graphs into a single one T DGreachi and remove all nodes
where the interference is bounded w.r.t. the confidence level i. I.e. only nodes
with a confidence less than level i remain in the subgraph T DGreachi,red ⊆ T DG .
However, T DGreachi,red still contains nodes for which no monitors and enforce-
ment techniques are known. We therefore eliminate nodes for which no
monitor is known from the graph, while preserving all dependence relations
(edge relations) from T DGreachi by adding appropriate edges. This is achieved
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by Algorithm 4. It takes T DGreachi,red as well as a list of nodes for which no mon-
itor type is known as an input. Node types for which no monitors are known
are e.g. the nodes representing the multiple-event processing time (cf. Def-
inition 2.3.1) for different schedulers, such as SPP (cf. Lemma 2.4.11) and
SPNP (cf. Lemma 2.4.15). These nodes can be found by trivial iteration over
T DGreachi,red . In essence, Algorithm 4 links all predecessors of a removed node
to its successors preserving the transitive dependence relations (cf. Lines
5 to 7). I.e. if a node is removed from the graph, all predecessors of the
removed node are linked to its successors preserving the transitive depen-
dence relations. The (again) reduced graph is returned by Algorithm 4 as
T DGreachi,mon.
Algorithm 4: reduce_to_monitorable(T DGreachi,red , non_monitorable_nodes)
Data:
non_monitorable_nodes : the nodes for which no monitor type is available
T DGreachi,red : The reachability graph for confidence level i
1 T DGreachi,mon = T DG
reach
i,red ;
2 for n in non_monitorable_nodes do
3 predecessors = T DGreachi,mon.predecessors(n) ;
4 successors = T DGreachi,mon.successors(n) ;
5 for p in predecessors do
6 for s in successors do
7 T DGreachi,mon.add_edge(p,s) ;
8 end
9 end
10 T DGreachi,mon.remove_node(n) ;
; /* implies the removal of all edges from and to node n */
11 end
12 return T DGreachi,mon
For illustration, we consider the CLM from Fig. 3.3. It models a system with
a CAN bus and an ECU, that is reduced to the task graph and resource graph.
In this example, the WCRT R+5 of τ5 on the ECU ResECU has a confidence
requirement level of 1 all remaining tasks have no confidence requirements,
i.e. 0. The confidence values of input parameters can be found in Table 3.1.
They are chosen such that the event models of τ2 and τ1 transitively inter-
fere with R+5 , i.e. M1 contains only the TDG node of R
+
5 . The resulting
T DGreachi,red is shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 3.5. Since monitors are only
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known for event models and execution times (cf. Section 3.2.1), the set of
non-monitorable nodes for Algorithm 4 is the complementary set of nodes
representing event models and execution time bounds in the TDG. The
result of Algorithm 4 is shown in the middle column of Fig. 3.5.
Table 3.1: Confidence values for specified parameters. Note that τ4 is event










τ1 1 1 0 0
τ2 1 1 0 0
τ3 1 1 0 0
τ4 1 1 X X





Figure 3.3: Example CLM to illustrate the difference between the min-cut
and the greedy strategy. The blue-boxed task has a confidence requirement
on its WCRT.
The last step to perform a minimum s-t-cut that separates the confidence
requirement nodes cj ∈ Mi from the interfering nodes (strict sense), is a
suitable capacity formulation for the edges of T DGreachi,mon.
Our desired result from the s-t cut of T DGreachi,mon is minimum cardinality set
of nodes that require a monitor. Due to the duality of min-cut and max-flow
problems, a suitable flow formulation, i.e. capacity assignment to the edges,
is necessary. Since a monitor on a node turns all outgoing interference
to bounded interference and not just for a specific dependency edge, we
amortize placing a monitor into a specific node by setting the capacity of
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Figure 3.4: TDG of the min-cut example from Fig. 3.3. Blue indicates a
confidence level of 1, red a confidence level of 0.
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𝜏_2 (δ⁻ᵢₙ) 𝜏_1 (δ⁻ᵢₙ)
Figure 3.5: T DGreach1,red (left), the result of Algorithm 4 T DG
reach
1,mon (middle), and
T DGreach1,mon with already inserted pseudo nodes s and t (right)
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each outgoing edge to the node’s out degree. Due to the property of flow
preservation, i.e. the inbound flow to a node is equal to the outbound flow,
this guarantees that a maximal amount of flow can be outbound and that
the inbound capacity is the limit. Again, a maximum flow is dual to the
minimum s-t-cut of the network.
In order to apply e.g. the Edmonds-Karp algorithm [EK72], to determine the
minimum cut of the network a definition of the source s and sink t of the
flow is necessary. T DGreachi,mon by its construction has at least one leaf that is
a constraint with a violated confidence requirement. In order to define a
single sink for the flow network we add a pseudo node t to the flow network
and connect all the leaf nodes (out degree of 0) of T DGreachi,mon with t. Using the
leaf nodes is necessary, as the original constraint nodes cj ∈ Mi have been
removed by Algorithm 4, i.e. in the step from T DGreachi,red to T DG
reach
i,mon (which
contains only nodes for which monitors are available but preserves all the
interference paths from T DGreachi,red ). Since in T DG
reach
i,mon the nodes with an out
degree of 0 have been (transitively) connected to constraint nodes cj ∈ Mi
in T DGreachi,red this preserves the properties. To prevent that edges from the
former leaf nodes to t become the dominating edges for the maximum flow,
i.e. restrict the augmenting paths, their capacity is set to infinity. The input
parameters are treated similarly. The pseudo node s is added and connected
with all remaining input parameters in T DGreachi,mon and the capacity of these
edges is also set to infinity. For the example system from Fig. 3.3 this is
shown in Fig. 3.5 in the right column.
Based on the maximum-flow computation from [EK72] the minimum node
cut set can be determined. The nodes in this set – if removed – would
sever all paths from the input parameter nodes to the constraint nodes in
T DGreachi,mon. Consequently, monitors are added only for these nodes, resulting
in a minimum number of monitors. These monitors then prevent that a
node of lesser confidence can taint the confidence requirement of a timing
constraint. As the flow network is constructed such that no other node of
lesser confidence (strict interference) in T DG can reach any constraint in
Mi the confidence requirement of all constraints inMi are fulfilled for level
i after inserting the monitors. Applied to the example system from Fig. 3.3,
this results in a monitor for τ4’s input event model, more precisely its δ−
function. For comparison, the greedy strategy would synthesise monitors
for τ1 and τ2’s δ− functions, as monitors are only placed on specified input
parameters by the greedy strategy.
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3.2.4 Experiments
To evaluate the effectiveness of both placement strategies we conduct a series
of experiments. The structure of the synthetically generated cause-effect
chains is derived from an automotive use case from a real-world research
vehicle [Ber15].
3.2.4.1 Experimental Setup
The network of the platform consists of four Ethernet switches that are
connected in a ring topology. Detailed insight into modeling Ethernet
networks based on a task and resource model can e.g. be found in [TSAE16c].
In principle, a switch is modeled as a set of communication resources, where
each communication resource models one output port. In consequence, the
incoming links to a switch are connected to each output port where frames
are queued. The arbitration and hence timing interference takes place there.
Each switch is connected to two execution resources as ECUs, i.e. eight in
total. The platform is depicted in Fig. 3.6. The ECU are scheduled under a
SPP strategy and IEEE802.1Q (fixed-priority non-preemptive) is used for the
network resources.
For each experiment we generate chains with a length of three to five software
blocks referred to as application chain. Between to adjacent software blocks
one label is transported. The length of a chain is chosen randomly from a
uniform distribution.
ECU ECU 
ECU ECU ECU ECU 
ECU ECU 
Figure 3.6: The platform to which cause-effect chains of specific length
are randomly mapped to for the experiments, consisting of four switches
connected in a ring topology with two ECUs connected to each switch
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For simplicity and intelligibility each software block on a resource is mapped
to an individual task. Communication of data dependent tasks on the same
execution resource is assumed to be sampling based. The execution resource
of the first task of a chain is chosen randomly based on uniform randomness.
The execution resources of subsequent tasks are chosen according to a
random distribution that favors higher distances between the execution
resources. I.e. the higher the distance, the higher the probability of selecting
a resource. The distance is measured in numbers of hops in the Ethernet
network, whereas a hop is each arbitration of a message at an output port.
Note that there is a probability, that the subsequent task resides on the same
resource as its predecessor.
In the highly likely cases where two software blocks/tasks with data dependen-
cies are mapped to different resources, tasks that handle the communication
are generated. We therefore insert a communication task that models the
communication stack on the sending and receiving ECU as depicted in
Fig. 2.3 for chains with two times sampling (top right). This is done for
every communication relation. The Ethernet frame sent over the network
is modeled as a task on each output port (switch and resources) with event
precedence between tasks. As the route for the frame, the shortest path
between sending and receiving ECU is selected. The application tasks as
well as the comm-stack tasks are triggered periodically by the system timer.
We perform sampling based label exchange between the communication
stack and the application task hosting the software block at both ends. Con-
sequently, we assume data-age constraints between the software block in the
execution task and the communication task and vice versa on the other end
of the communication. To complete the overall end-to-end delay for the
initial application chain we add response time constraints along the task
chain that carries the communication.
Note that except for the assumption that we assign every software block to an
individual task – which is only done for simplicity of the presentation – the
setup resembles the practices in the automotive domain. Therefore, intra
resource communication is performed sampling based and inter-resource
communication is handled by a communication stack (cf. [AUT19b]).
To perform timing dependence and confidence analysis it is necessary that
priorities and confidence values for the execution times and the initial event
models are assigned. Furthermore, for each constraint of an application
chain a confidence requirement is necessary. We refer to different assign-
ments of initial confidences, confidence requirements and priorities as a
variant of an application mapping. The confidence into the WCET of an
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Ethernet frame, i.e. the frame size, is constant for a stream. Similarly, an Eth-
ernet stream has the same priority on all Ethernet resources. Event Models
generated by a common timer receive the same confidence, i.e. for all tasks
on a resource the event model confidence is identical. The remaining pa-
rameters are chosen uniformly random. For monitor placement we assume
WCET / BCET monitors (e.g. [HCBK12, NAME13]) as well as event model
monitors (e.g. [HCBK12, NMA+12]). Consequently, the only TDG nodes for
which no monitor can be placed are for R+/R− and w+.
3.2.4.2 Results and Interpretation
One experiment analyses one variant with both strategies. Experiments are
conducted with an ascending number of application chains mapped to the
platform. For each number of chains 10 different variants are generated.
Furthermore, to investigate the impact of the mixture of mixed-critical and
hence mixed-confidence requirements, two different distributions of confidence
requirements are investigated. This is achieved by selecting different ran-
domness distributions for the confidence requirement assignment in variant
generation. The first distribution is a uniform distribution, i.e. confidence
requirements between 0 and 4 are equally likely. The second distribution fa-
vors lower confidence requirements and is shown in Table 3.2. The rationale
behind the second distribution is that realistic workloads only have a minor
proportion of software that is actually highly critical and a large proportion
that is mainly quality managed.
Table 3.2: Non-uniform distribution of confidence requirements
Confidence Requirement
Level 0 1 2 3 4
Proportion 50% 20% 10% 10% 10%
We first turn our view to the results of the uniform distribution. In Fig. 3.7 the
absolute number of generated monitors is shown as a boxplot, that depicts
the median, the quartiles, and whiskers to show the rest of the distribution.
Outliers are marked by diamonds. From the results in Fig. 3.7 we can observe
that for a smaller number of chains, the min-cut strategy has an advantage,
since in the median of synthesised monitors for less than 14 chains is always
lower. The same holds for the maximum number of monitors required to
achieve bounded interference. However, the min-cut is not necessarily to be
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Figure 3.7: Number of monitors for different numbers of cause-effect chains
assuming a uniform distribution of confidence requirements between 0 and
4 among the chains
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Figure 3.8: Number of monitors for different numbers of cause-effect chains
assuming a that 50% of the CE chains have the lowest confidence requirement
(confidence 0), 20 percent on confidence 1, and 10% on each confidence level
form 2 to 4
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favored since it has to be run per confidence requirement level that has to
be separated from lower levels. The greedy strategy on the other hand places
monitors on all input parameters that cause a confidence violation in one
run. Consequently, if only few high confidence requirements are present
this can lead to sub-optimal monitor placement. For instance if the min-cut
for the high confidence requirement generates a placement “inside” the
TDG and the min-cuts for next lower levels generate a placement similar to
the greedy strategy where only input parameters are monitored. This can be
observed in Fig. 3.9, for the uniform distribution of confidence requirements.
The deterioration of the average improvement with an increasing number
of chains is clearly visible in Fig. 3.9 that shows the relative improvement of
the min-cut over the greedy strategy. For 8 chains and above a clear trend
becomes evident that the median improvement stagnates around 6% to 8%.






















Figure 3.9: Relative Improvement of the min-cut strategy over the greedy
strategy for the two distributions of confidence requirements
We attribute this deterioration to the fact that with an increasing number
of cause-effect chains also the communication increases. This requires
significantly more isolation of the communication as well. Our conclusion
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is based on the fact that the majority of monitors generated with increasing
number of chains, monitors output event models of communication tasks.
I.e. the rate and pattern at which traffic can be injected into the network.
Moreover, the communication drastically increases with more chains. The
random process determining the placement of an execution task has a higher
likelihood (non-uniform distribution) that tasks with a data dependency are
mapped to most distant execution resource. Another point supporting this
is that for an increasing number of chains the median ratio of monitored
nodes vs. the total number of monitorable TDG nodes in the variant stays
fairly constant (cf. Fig. 3.10), plateauing at 20% to 23% for 9 chains and
above. We also conclude that consolidating the communication tasks into
a single one per resource could further reduce the number of necessary
monitors. Especially if this communication task monitors by design the
rate and pattern at which frames are injected into the network at a high
confidence. This could considerably contribute to a safe design w.r.t. safety
that is based on timing requirements.
Fig. 3.10 highlights how systematically respecting end-to-end requirements
improves the state-of-the-art, where all monitorable nodes would require
enforcement. The figure shows that both strategies can reduce the amount
of monitors compared to the state-of-the-art by more than 75%.
For the non-uniform distribution of confidence requirements from Table 3.2
we can observe in the results depicted in Fig. 3.8 that in total a smaller number
of monitors is necessary. This is to be expected as 50% of the chains do
not require isolation, i.e. bounded dependence, among them. This further
explains the extreme cases where no monitors needed to be synthesised at
all for 6 or fewer chains. However, the same trend, i.e. the min-cut strategy
requires fewer monitors, as for the uniform distribution can be observed
w.r.t. the median number of synthesised monitors. In fact, the improvement
ratio, i.e. the improvement in % of monitors synthesised by the min-cut
compared to the greedy strategy, is on average higher than for the uniform
distribution.
Evaluating the monitoring overhead further, is highly implementation de-
pendent. I.e. the cost associated with a monitor depends on the hardware
platform, OS and run time environment. While implementations in a small
RTOS can be done quite efficient w.r.t. code and memory usage [NMA+12],
implementations for microkernels can be much more challenging. What
really limits widespread use of monitoring is that most implementations
([NAME13],[NMA+12],[HCBK12]) require private hardware timers. Yet the
number of timers is often limited to 2 up to 5 per ECU – depending on
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concrete design – and the OSes typically need at least one. However, with a
75% reduction of monitors the number of required timers becomes realistic.
E.g. the industrial case study (engine management system) from the 2016
WATERS challenge contains a maximum of 8 tasks per core. Consequently,
a system-level monitoring scheme based on recent hardware platforms be-
comes feasible.































Figure 3.10: Ratio of synthesised monitors over monitorable TDG nodes
3.3 Summary
This chapter has approached the synthesis challenge for mixed-critical sys-
tems from two perspectives. The first one is the requirements engineering
perspective that is intended to tackle issues raised by [Nan12], where the
authors claim that a majority of safety-related serious consequences can be
avoided by better requirements engineering. The requirements engineer-
ing method presented in Section 3.1 synthesises confidence requirements
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on timing parameters in the BET model such as execution time bounds
(C+/C−) or event models (δ−/δ+). It derives them with the help of the
TDG data structure from safety requirements on timing analysis results
such as WCRTs or maximum data-age, available through the cross-layer
specification.
The second approach presented in this chapter builds on these assigned
confidence requirements that would ensure a sufficient isolation in the sense
that mutual interference is unlikely enough. The monitors instantiated in
this process, however, require a meaningful configuration. There are two
basic approaches how to handle the monitoring configuration:
The first one is to configure the monitors, exactly with the result from the
CPA / modular performance analysis (MPA) timing analysis. The values
obtained from there directly enforce the behavior observable in the model-
based analysis. This behavior is, according to the analysis, a still tolerable
one and hence correct behavior. However, it does not take into account that
minimal design faults may exist, e.g. through the abstraction in the models.
It might lead to premature termination of a task or deferring an activation
unnecessarily. The resulting question with respect to the extra-functional
timing requirements is rather, when is the intervention by the monitoring
actually necessary? This leads to the second approach to configure monitors
based on sensitivity analysis of the system. Based on the assumption that
the extra-functional requirements are exhaustively described for all tasks
in the system by a deadline, a number of approaches have been reported in
the literature for real-time systems. In case of finding monitoring bounds,
sensitivity analysis varies parameters of a system in order to find extreme
points at which requirements are violated. Already [PDB97] reported on how
the sensitivity bound of the worst-case execution time of a single task in
a system with strictly periodic workloads can be found. But the approach
assumes that only one task at a time would be allowed to exceed a parameter.
Hence, it was later succeeded by [BNB07] where the authors also assume a
strictly periodic task model, but present a solution in which a pareto front for
variations in either the execution-time or the periods of all tasks in the system
is computed. What make the problem challenging for CPA / MPA methods
are discontinuities in the response-time function. Therefore, [RJE05] and
[HJRE06] proposed a framework built around CPA that leverages binary
search and genetic algorithms to compute the pareto front. In contrast to
[BNB07], the authors in [RJE05] [HJRE06] are able to vary any kind of timing
parameter for each pareto front, i.e. execution time bounds, period and jitter.
[WTVL06] presents a similar approach for MPA.
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However, all of these approaches require the knowledge of deadlines for
each and every task in the system. While this assumption is reasonable for
the tasks with critical timing, not all tasks in a system necessarily have an
explicit deadline. In many cases, it is implicitly assumed that the deadline
equals the period. Nevertheless, tasks with a low timing criticality that run
as best-effort tasks often do not have an explicit deadline formulated as part
of their extra-functional requirements from the function implementer. An






The advent of higher-level driving functions according to the SAE taxon-
omy [Int18a] challenges development for E/E-Systems in two very particular
ways. First, for conventional non-automated vehicles with assistance systems
only (SAE Level 2), traditional safety concepts only require a safe state to
be reached. Hence, timing errors “only” trigger a transition into the safe
state, where the service is discontinued but no hazard is created. This is
commonly referred to as fail-safe behavior. Behavior like this can e.g. be ob-
served from lane-keeping assistance systems, where the system might even
suddenly disconnect and the driver has to take over immediately. However,
for performing the dynamic driving task in SAE-Level 3+ systems such a
development approach for safety is impossible, as continued service is re-
quired. In contrast to the fail-safe behavior, a fail-operational behavior of the
system is ultimately necessary for these systems. While it was sufficient to
detect a fault in fail-safe architectures and contain the effects such that no
hazard is caused by it, fail-operational either requires to completely mask
the fault or continue operation in emergency operation before ultimately
bringing the system into a safe state [Int18b, Part 1, Figure 5]. For SAE Level
3+ the emergency operation time can become extensive compared to the
execution frequency of control software, e.g. if the vehicle shall be brought to
a safe stop. A safe stop might potentially include driving for a few kilometers,
e.g. to exit a highway/autobahn.
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Hence, timing requirements inevitably become safety relevant and can not be
avoided by a fail-safe design for timing faults any more. Note that monitoring
and enforcement as presented in Chapter 3 is able to limit interference
caused by a timing fault, e.g. exceeding the execution time assumption or
the assumed event model. In consequence, it is able to prevent (cascading)
faults of the tasks that would be interfered with. However, monitoring and
enforcement can not recover the initially faulty job causing the interference.
E.g. if a job is terminated after exceeding its WCET it will not produce output
data. Consequently, fail-operational capabilities for such timing faults is the
next open challenge.
A further challenge is that higher-level automation functions dramatically
increase the need for computational power as software becomes ever more
complex. Especially for highly integrated systems with a high behavior com-
plexity as well as a high architecture complexity predictable timing behavior
is important to be able to design effect chains composable. Composability
is the property that the output behavior of one component is a compatible
input behavior for another. Particularly for timing this is challenging, as the
timing of e.g. one software component can not be assessed in isolation. How
a design can be achieved where timing is predictable, the safety assured, and
the safety properties are traceable such that a high degree of composability
can be achieved is the challenge, nevertheless it is a sub-challenge of the
second challenge.
In the following section, intermediate conclusions for the design and integra-
tion of such systems are drawn, taking into account the methods presented
in Chapter 3. Based on these conclusions the implications on the research
hypothesis are studied. A possible solution to the arising questions, based on
the logical execution time (LET) paradigm is presented further on. SL-LET
will be introduced as an abstraction of the BET model, introduced in Sec-
tion 2.1 and embraced for timing dependency analysis so far. This solution
also maintains the traceability of safety requirements across model-layers as
introduced before.
4.1 Intermediate Conclusions
Let us first consider the second challenge of increasing design and archi-
tecture complexity. Systems for SAE levels 3+ have high computational
requirements, as they e.g. have to process a 360 degree input for perceiv-
ing and interpreting their environment. This is substantially more than
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the state-of-the-art ADAS. For systematic redundancy, inputs of different
sensor types must be fused into a joint environment model. Hence, data
input inevitably has to be transported over in-vehicle networks and hence
the functions become distributed. While networks in isolation, i.e. without
considering execution and computation on end stations, can behave quite
deterministic. The consideration of ECUs which fulfill the demand for more
computational power make the system less and less predictable w.r.t. its
timing behavior. The variability of execution times grows with architectural
parameters, e.g. the cache-miss penalty, the costs for pipeline stalls and for
control-flow mispredictions [Wil18]. Particularly, the spread between the ob-
served average execution times and true conservative WCETs estimates com-
plicate the situation. Recently, also the trend towards consolidating multiple
ECUs into one ECU with computationally powerful multi-core processors
adds additional complexity. The trend for consolidation requires virtualiza-
tion techniques as they are nowadays state-of-the-art in cloud computing
and internet server-rental. While basically all the virtualization techniques
separate the virtual machines in terms of interference in their data, the
timing can substantially change when software is migrated into virtualized
systems. Further microarchitectural mechanisms like translation lookaside
buffers (TLBs), branch prediction, and paging together with memory man-
agement units (MMUs) are no recent developments, but they have hindered
the estimation of tight and truly conservative WCETs for more than two
decades now [WGR+09]. The challenge is that the common case – for which
the mechanisms are optimized – is often faster than the worst-case by a
considerable factor and hence the mechanisms lose their advantage for hard
real-time designs. For some mechanisms the decision whether the worst-
case can actually be observed, can not be answered by rigorously analysing
the software in isolation. As an example, one can consider caches. The
hit-and-miss behavior is not only dominated by the software currently using
the cache, but rather by the software running before and after running a
particular job, as well as the software running during preemption of that job.
Cache management techniques can help to improve bounds on the timing
behavior. With this goal and the intent to isolate tasks in multicore envi-
ronments, cache management mechanisms for real-time systems have been
studied since the introduction of caches. [GAM+15] provides an overview
of hardware and software mechanisms studied in the literature from 1990
to 2014. The authors of [GAM+15] conclude that: “[…] a certain level of
hardware support is necessary to provide strong isolation guarantees to
concurrently executing tasks[…]. Even when software-only implementation
is possible, such solutions are typically more cumbersome, more difficult to
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certify and/or add more overhead compared to hardware solutions.”. Until
today, such techniques have not made the necessary impact in closing the
spread between average observed execution time and WCET bounds.
This wide spread of possible core execution times (CETs) becomes a design
problem, when it comes to integration of real-time software. On the one
hand, the software under consideration typically executes around the median
CET, only in very rare cases extremely higher or lower CETs are observed.
On the other hand, a large gap between conservatively estimated worst-case
and actually possible worst-case in a given configuration has an impact on
verification of timing requirements. The management perspective, which
favors high resource utilization to save costs, will argue that the “free” utiliza-
tion between an over provisioned median CET and the overly conservative
worst-case estimate can be used for additional software. However, only using
conservatively estimated WCETs for CPA or MPA to verify latency require-
ments, will give truly conservative results (assuming the used event mod-
els/arrival curves are similarly conservative estimates) [HHJ+05][TCN00].
However, this will also result in higher values for computed response times,
which can easily result in violated latency requirements.
Obviously, one can argue that in the case where the latency requirements
of the system does not hold when assuming conservative estimates for the
CETs, the system must not be built. However, in practical testing such
systems basically do not fail, as the probability of the CETs assuming the
value of the conservative estimates all at once is almost negligible. A similar
situation arises for the formal bounding of event models. For variations
in the event model typical worst-case analysis (TWCA) [QBH+14] can be
applied to bound the effect. Similarly to variations in the event model,
the approach of TWCA (e.g. [HQE14],[Ham19],[XHK+15],[HEQ+17]) could
be used to encode the additional execution time (i.e. the time between typical
case and conservative worst case) as overload. However, the limitation to
this is also the accuracy to which the typical and overload behavior is known.
Hence, the estimate suffers from the same shortcoming as conventional CPA
when a non-conservative estimate on the WCET is used.
However, a quite extensive number of research in the fields of CPA and MPA
seems to have adopted the view that tight conservative WCETs exist [Wil18].
This is despite the fact, that even current research on contemporary pro-
cessor architectures can not decrease the gap between “worst-case testing”
and true conservative estimates. In fact, the biggest influence factor for
multicore architectures – the shared cache – increases even if recent WCET
timing analysis techniques are used [LGR+16]. A problem that is known
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for over a decade now [WEE+08]. Even modern hybrid approaches where
measurements are combined with static code and microarchitecture analysis
are unable to solve the problem to a degree where it would be accepted in
the industrial state of the art [KPWF19]. In conclusion, the design problem
of providing conservative timing guarantees to verify timing constraints
remains, if only static WCET analysis in combination with CPA or MPA
is used. This is due to the fact that CPA and MPA are unable to produce
conservative bounds if non-conservative WCET bounds are used for the com-
putations. Chapter 3 has shown a loophole out of this problem by enforcing
model behavior at run-time where e.g. WCETs are not conservatively known.
Synthesising monitors into a design, where designers are unsure about the
correctness of a WCET bound, tries to engineer around this problem. How-
ever, this development flow has a disadvantage w.r.t. composability of effect
chains. Composability in this context is the property that certain properties
of a system only depend on properties of a module. Composability is violated
if individual properties of one or more modules depend on the composition
of the systems [SSE05] [PS08].
The flow fails to provide early answers to two significant questions that
arise during design. First, the end-to-end latency of an effect chain (or sub-
chain) can not be easily determined, since this requires to spawn a complete
analysis in the BET model. Although the analysis could be part of a tool
supported continuous integration flow, the data necessary to parameterise
it is typically not available early in the design. Second, for the end-to-end
“age” of data at a consumer in an effect chain only upper and lower bounds
can be computed in the BET model. With the increasing gap between best
case and worst case, as well as the gap between average case and worst case,
the spread between the lower bound and the upper bound of the data age
becomes larger. Furthermore, the jitter between upper and lower bound on
the data age remains unknown, making it difficult to analyze the impact on
the function. If we for instance consider the lateral controller from Fig. 1.5,
the actual control quality depends on the jitter behavior of the data age.
The controller example, is just one representative of applications where the
data and the data’s timing is crucial. Particularly in the ADAS domain and
the conditional and highly automated domain, data-centric applications are
prevalent. These applications have in common, that not only their execution
behavior is of high interest but the timing of data that they process and
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• A Data centric specification is necessary that describes the system’s
properties based on response-times rather than necessary execution
times.
• Specify expected timing of data-flow and provide an implementation
strategy that ensures this.
Extensions to the Research Questions:
Question 4: How can data-centric effect chains’ timing safety requirements
be specified, verified and validated?
Question 5: Is there another solution to the problem of needing ever more
engineering effort to enable timing-safe fail-operational systems?
4.2 SL-LET as a new Design Paradigm
In the cross-layer model introduced in Section 2.1 the BET timing model
serves the dual purpose of implementation model and design model. An
implementation model in this context is a model that describes the run-time
(timing) behavior, whereas the design model rather describes the properties
desired by the designer. The BET model as introduced in Section 2.1 is
built around the concept of events, i.e. it formally captures behavior of
event streams (traces) and is well suited to compute corner-case behavior.
For instance the longest time from an activation event of a task with an
execution time between a best-case and a worst-case execution time estimate,
i.e. the worst-case response time (WCRT). Yet, applying the BET model often
requires to make a number of assumptions, such as that OS overhead is
abstracted in the WCET estimates. A particular limit of the model is that
data flow is not explicitly modeled in general. While data flow can be mapped
to an (explicit) event flow in certain situations, like in the analysis of Ethernet
or CAN networks, to compute data-ages and responses times of messages,
there is no general way of describing data flow in the BET model. Particularly
not if data is communicated sampling based, i.e. without explicit events in
the sense of the BET model like the activation or termination of a task.
However, as shown in Section 4.1, applications with increasing behavioral
complexity, are often data-centric and require deterministic and predictable
timing. A possible solution to the challenges formulated in Section 4.1 is to
separate the design model from the implementation model.
The system-level logical execution time (SL-LET) concept as a design model
allows applying methods to cope with both challenges formulated in Sec-
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tion 4.1. To better understand the advantage of SL-LET the property of
timing composability is introduced first:
Definition 4.2.1: Timing Composability
Composability is the property that (timing) requirements can be
verifyed soleyly on the specification of an individual component and
its interfaces.
This is a more stringent view on system design than the simpler property of
compositionally:
Definition 4.2.2: Timing Compositionality
Compositionality is the property that (timing) requirements can be
verfied based on (formal) rules from multiple component descrip-
tions and their parameters.
Obviously it has to be clarified what can be regarded as a component as it
is an abstract concept in the context of the CLM form Section 2.1. In the
proposed CLM more than one interpretation for a component is possible.
In the following a top-level view is adopted. From the top-level perspective,
a component in the CLM is either an application that consists of a set of
functions Fapp ⊂ F or a single function f ∈ F. As the focus here are timing
requirements, we resolve to which tasks the function(s) map in the CLM,
since the timing model represents the timing information. Hence, the
(timing) interface of an abstract component is the timing parameters of all
tasks belonging transitively to the component. In the example depicted in
Fig. 4.1 two functions are depicted, fa in orange and fb in blue. The colors
of the model elements of the software model as well as the timing model
indicate that they (transitively) map to either fa or fb. Let us focus of on the
(timing) requirements of fb. The function is implemented by two software
blocks, where bb1 produces data (Lb1) that is subsequently read by bb2. Let us
assume that this cause-effect chain has a data-age requirement dageb and as
design and implementation model for timing the BET model is used. If the
system in the example would exhibit composability, the requirement dageb
would be verifiable based on the parameters of the blue model elements in
Fig. 4.1 alone.
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Yet, as we have seen in Section 2.5 the timing in this example not only
depends on the timing parameters of all tasks on Res2. This can be revealed












































Figure 4.1: Example system with two functions, containing one cause-effect
chain each
A consequence of the separation of design and implementation model is that
it introduces another abstraction layer during system design. The abstraction
helps to gain flexibility without having to consider certain implementation
peculiarities already at design time. Obviously, this abstraction requires
that correspondence rules with the implementation model must be existent.
At the first glance, this looks like as if this step only introduces additional
complexity in the design process. In fact, the effect is to the contrary. In
the following, SL-LET will be introduced as the additional design model.
To maintain the correspondence between SL-LET and the implementation,
run-time mechanisms are necessary that ensure LETs [BE18]. What formal
requirements are necessary for an implementation following BET execution
semantics is shown in Section 4.5
4.2.1 The Design Principle of Logical Time
The idea behind logical execution time (LET) is that (physical) task execution
is abstracted into logical time. First ideas for such abstract programming
models date back to the Giotto language [HHK03]. The abstraction w.r.t.
reading and writing data, and performing computations on it, is that LET
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conceptually follows a strict read-execute-write behavior [KS12]. This divides
a task in three phases: First, inputs are read in the read phase, second,
processing/execution takes place, and the third phase writes the data such
that it can be read by other tasks after the end of the phase. The time for
all three phases combined is the LET. Fig. 4.2 depicts two jobs of a periodic
LET task, recurring every Pi. The read phases and write phase in LET,
however, are special and three assumptions are made: First the abstraction
assumes, that reading and writing happen in zero-time, i.e. that no time
is consumed for reading inputs and writing outputs. It reduces the read
phase and write phase to particular events in time. Second, the read phase
occurs instantaneously with the activation and output data is valid at the
end of the LET. The third assumption is a consequence: Execution happens
arbitrarily within the LET. No assumptions are made as to how the execution
is performed, e.g. whether preemption occurs or that the execution starts
directly after the read event. Note that this does not imply that a task has to
execute until the write event, the idea is merely that outputs of a particular
job are published to data-dependent tasks at the write event. It is, however,
assumed that published data remains valid until new data is published at
the next write event. Since publishing times, i.e. the write phase, as well as
reading times are known by design, composable deterministic data flow can
be designed. In the example in Fig. 4.2 any task consuming data from the
depicted task is known to read the data from the n-th job starting at n · Pi, if
its read event lies between n · Pi + LETi (inclusive) and (n + 1) · Pi + LETi
(exclusive). This holds even if its physical execution occurs after this time
interval. The timing of a data flow planned in this manner, is only dependent







(𝑛 + 1) ⋅ 𝑃𝑖 time
Preemption
Physical Execution
Figure 4.2: LET’s Read-Execute-Write Concept for a periodic LET task acti-
vated every P
Obviously, an implementation must be able to mimic the assumed read and
write behavior. Implementations like [BE18] have shown this for multicore
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platforms with shared memory by reducing the read and write events to
atomic pointer swaps, hence the zero-communication time assumption holds.
As such, it has already found its way into the AUTOSAR Timing Extensions
[AUT19a]. However, if communication over shared buses or networks such
as Ethernet is used the communication latency must be taken into account.
This is done by considering the communication as an LET task of its own,
and is the extension of the plain LET concept from [HHK03], [KS12] referred
to as SL-LET. SL-LET also takes into account that individual “plain LET is-
lands” can experience a synchronization error of their clocks that coordinate
the logical time. In the following this general idea of SL-LET is described
formally on the basis of [EKG18].
4.2.2 The SL-LET System Model
Section 2.1 has introduced the BET model as a model to formally describe
timing behavior of a system. As discussed in the previous section, we will
now introduce the SL-LET model as an alternative design model. How an
SL-LET design can be mapped to an implementation where the behavior
corresponds to BET behavior semantics is later introduced in Section 4.3.
The definitions provided in this section are based on the initial work of
[KS12] for plain LET and the system-level extensions for SL-LET in [EKG18].
Important deviations and extensions to these definitions are mentioned.
Definition 4.2.3: System Platform
The resource platform P is an extended version from Section 2.1.
The platform P = {R ∪ C ∪M, E } is a directed graph where the
set of nodes consists of three subsets: R is the set of all processing
resources, C the set of all communication resources, andM the set of
all memories. The set of all edges E connects the individual platform
elements.
LET tasks execute on processing resources and are defined as follows:
114
4.2. SL-LET AS A NEW DESIGN PARADIGM
Definition 4.2.4: LET-Task
A LET Task λi is a recurring task with period Pi and offset Oi. It
exhibits deterministic read and write behavior: For the j-th job λi,j
of the task, the inputs are read at R̂i,j = (j − 1) · Pi + Oi, and the
outputs are written at Dmini,j = R̂i,j + LETi. The time between the
read and the write event of data labels is referred to as the logical
execution time LETi of task λi. The output data interval in which
output data of a job λi,j is valid, is defined as Di,j = [Dmini,j ; D
max
i,j [.
Output data is valid until new data is produced by the next job, hence
Dmaxi,j = R̂i,j+1 + LETi = D
min
i,j+1.
Similarly to BET tasks, jobs are defined:
Definition 4.2.5: LET-Job
An instance of a LET task λi is referred to as a job, whereas the
j-th job is denoted by λi,j. Two instances λi,j and λi,k with j 6= k
are independent in their execution unless data dependencies are
explicitly modeled.
The Definition 4.2.4 is an extension to the one provided in [EKG18] which
defined LET tasks based on [KS12] and [HHK03]. Particularly, the activation
offset O is introduced here, which allows describing desired timing behavior
of dataflow such that data from a producing task is read by a subscrib-
ing/consuming task immediately after publication. The offset parameter
e.g. allows aligning tasks with identical periods back-to-back, i.e. that data
produced by the first directly becomes available to the successor without
delay. A similar concept was adopted by Martinez in [MSB18] and Becker
in [BDM+17] for analyzing systems with plain LETs. However, no formal
definition of LET tasks was provided and the LET was only used as a model
mechanism to describe an implementation property. The contribution in
this thesis is to use SL-LET as a design model, i.e. to formulate requirements
towards the implementation (cf. Section 1.1 and [LS18]). While for plain LET
tasks some publications implicitly assume that LETi ≤ Pi, this restriction
does not literally appear in e.g. [KS12] or [HHK03]. Kirsch and Sengupta in
their survey of programming paradigms [SK07], however, assume LETi = Pi.
Here, no restriction on the length of the LET is made, i.e. a LET greater
or smaller than the period is explicitly allowed. A side effect of this defini-
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tion is that it defines when the life-time Di,j of job’s output data begins or
ends, respectively. Nevertheless, the length of the data interval |Di| equals
the period Pi. This follows trivially from the data interval’s definition in
Definition 4.2.4:
∀ j : |Di,j| = Dmaxi,j − Dmini,j = (4.1)
= R̂i,j+1 + LETi − (R̂i,j + LETi) = (4.2)
= j · Pi + Oi − (j− 1)Pi −Oi = Pi (4.3)
A notable extension of this definition, compared to others in the context
of SL-LET is that it introduces a fixed but arbitrary zero-point in the time
domain and allows to explicitly address jobs and data dependencies between
jobs. This fact is an important property and revisited in the next section in
Definition 4.3.2 and Definition 4.3.3.
Data input and output is explicitly modelled in SL-LET:
Definition 4.2.6: LET-Label
A data element being read or written by LET tasks is referred to as a
data label i ∈ LLET . Each label has a unique writing task, but can be
read by multiple tasks. Further, each data label resides in a memory
mx ∈ M.
Data labels, like LET tasks, also have instances:
Definition 4.2.7: LET-Label Instance
A data label instance a,j is the instance produced by the j-th job of its
producing task, i.e. λi,j. A label instance is valid, i.e. can be read, only
during the data interval of the job producing it, i.e. Di,j. The label
instances reside in the memory, the label is mapped to.
Defining this becomes necessary, since Definition 4.2.4, like later on Defini-
tion 4.2.9, allows arbitrary values for the LET. As pointed out before, previous
definitions of LET and (SL-LET) did not reason on this fact, particularly not
for the case of LETi > Pi. An important consequence of the label concept
introduced here is that, any state of a task must also be encoded in a label,
if it shall be preserved across multiple jobs. Hidden state, i.e. data which is
not modeled, is prohibited in this (SL-LET) model.
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In the plain LET model, any number of LET tasks can communicate based
on the zero-communication time assumption, where a write and read event
can be instantaneous. All LET tasks for which this is possible execute in the
same time zone and read and write their labels from memories in this time
zone.
Definition 4.2.8: Time Zone
A time zone Za is a subgraph of the hardware platform. Within a time
zone the (plain) LET programming model is valid. Particularly read
and write operations to data labels in Za can be performed in a time
interval ∆t = 0.
To lift the limitations of the (plain) LET model, and to allow communication
with latencies, LET interconnect tasks are introduced.
Definition 4.2.9: LET Interconnect Task
A LET Interconnect Task Φi is defined as a generalized LET Task that
copies data labels from a memory in a source time zone mx ∈ Za
to a memory location in a remote time zone my ∈ Zb. It consumes
service on a composed resource, namely on all communication and
processing resources involved in the copying process between the
time zones Za and Zb.
Note that to account for longer or shorter transmission times, LETΦ ,i of
Φi is not restricted in general, e.g. to Pi, and might be significantly longer.
However, as shown in Eq. (4.3) the length of the data interval |Di| always
equals the period.
Note that ΛΦ denotes a set of interconnect tasks according to the above
definition, while Λλ denotes a set of LET tasks according to Definition 4.2.4.
An element λi ∈ Λ from the union set Λ = Λλ ∪ ΛΦ can be either an
interconnect or plain LET task. Extending [EN16], for both types of LET
tasks, read and write sequences of jobs are defined:
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Definition 4.2.10: LET Read Sequence






where σLETi (n) = R̂i,n denotes that the n-th job reads the input labels
valid at time R̂i,n.
Definition 4.2.11: LET Write Sequence






where ωLETi (n) = D
min
i,n denotes that the n-th job publishes its output
labels at time Dmini,n .
A particular aspect of an SL-LET description is that timing of data, i.e. the
time when tasks perform reads and writes, but not the actual execution itself
is time triggered. A consequence arising from that fact is that in each time
zone, task triggering must depend on a common clock source in order to
ensure synchronicity. While this can be achieved e.g. by a common timer for
all cores of a multiprocessor setup, perfect synchronization of clocks between
different ECUs is practically impossible. Hence, interconnect tasks not only
bridge between “islands” in which the (plain) LET programming is valid, but
also between different clock sources. To have a common understanding of
time, a synchronization between time zones is necessary in SL-LET designs.
Definition 4.2.12: Bounded Synchronization Error
A synchronization mechanism creates a global time base among all
time zones, whereas the local time is a local approximate of the global
time base. The maximum difference between any two approximates
of the global time must be bounded from above by a known limited
error ε.
Interconnect tasks and (plain) LET tasks can be combined in a joint graph
to express the deterministic data flow intended by SL-LET.
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Definition 4.2.13: LET Task Graph
A LET Task Graph is a directed graph LG = (Λ ∪ LLET , r⇁ ∪ w⇁),
where the set of vertices consits of the union set of all LET tasks and
interconnect Tasks Λ = Λλ ∪ΛΦ and the set of all data labels LLET ;
the set of edges is denoted by the union of the set all read access to
data labels r⇁ and the set of all write access to data labels w⇁.
Three left-total relations map the nodes of the LET task graph to the nodes
of the platform graph:
ρLETλ ⊆ Λλ ×R (4.4)
ρLETΦ ⊆ ΛΦ × R̂ with R̂ = R∪ C (4.5)
ρLET ⊆ LLET ×M (4.6)
Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.6) are required to be right-unique, i.e. each task and label
are mapped to exactly one resource or memory element respectively, hence
they can also be interpreted as functions. The mappings of Eq. (4.5) are
constrained such that for a fixed but arbitrary Φi ∈ ΛΦ the relation ρLETΦ
yields elements from R̂ such that there exists a walk in P that contains the
elements from R̂.
4.3 SL-LET as a Design Model in the CLM
To incorporate SL-LET as an additional model in the CLM, the SL-LET
model must be represented as a joint graph. Therefore, the platform graph,
the LET Task Graph, and the resource mappings are combined into one
graph LM to form the SL-LET design model.
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Definition 4.3.1: SL-LET design model
The SL-LET design model is a graph LM = (V, E), where
• V is the union set of the vertex sets of platform and LET task
graph, i.e.
V = Λ ∪R∪ C ∪M
• and E is the union set of edges of the system platform, the LET
task graph, and the edges defined by the resource mapping




E = r⇁ ∪ w⇁ ∪ρLETλ ∪ ρLETΦ ∪ ρLET
To impose constraints on a design described by the SL-LET design model,
cause-effect chains can be defined:
Definition 4.3.2: LET Cause-effect chains
A cause-effect chain C = (v1, ..., vn) is the vertex sequence of LET tasks
and/or interconnect tasks vi ∈ Λ in LG of a finite directed walk in
the LET graph, i.e. without the labels between tasks.
Note, that for notational simplicity cause-effect chains are in the following
often written in the form C = (λ1, ..., λn) with n ∈ N+ with the intention
that λi ∈ Λ, i.e. λi can be either an interconnect task according to Defini-
tion 4.2.9 or a “proper” LET task according to Definition 4.2.4 – despite the
fact, that the notation might suggest otherwise, i.e. λ is used for interconnect
tasks as well. An instance of a cause-effect chain describes concrete data-flow,
i.e. jobs of successors in C read labels produced by jobs of their predecessors.
Since tasks in SL-LET can be executed with different periods and LETs, more
than one instance of a chain Ci is possible. The exact number of instances
is determined by the number of possible data-paths via LET task instances.
Cause-effect chain instances are formally defined as:
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Definition 4.3.3: LET Cause-effect chain instance
The j-th instance Ci,j of a cause-effect chain Ci = (λa, ..., λa+k, ..., λb)
with k ∈ N+ is a data-flow ordered set of jobs of the tasks in Ci. It is
the result of the relation C from the ordered set {λa,x : x ∈ N+} of
jobs from λa and the ordered set {λb,x : x ∈ N+} of jobs from λb:
Ca,b : {λa,x : x ∈ N+} → {λb,x : x ∈ N+}
that maps jobs λa,n ∈ {λa,x : x ∈ N+} to elements from {λb,x :
x ∈ N+} if a data-flow from λa,n to the elements in {λb,x : x ∈ N+}
is possible, based on the read event times and data intervals of the
jobs from the tasks in Ci.
Note that, {λa,x : x ∈ N+} and {λb,x : x ∈ N+} are the sets of possible
jobs for λa and λb.
Theorem 4.3.4: Injectivity of LET cause-effect chain instances
The relation Ca,b is injective.
Proof 4.3.5:
First, consider two arbitrary but adjacent LET tasks λc, λd ∈ Ci.
Inorder for
Cc,d : {λc,x : x ∈ N+} → {λd,x : x ∈ N+} (4.7)
to be injective, it must hold for every λd,m ∈ {λd,x : x ∈ N+} that
there exists at most one λc,l ∈ {λc,x : x ∈ N+}. This is the case,
since:
i) data intervals of jobs of λc do not overlapp by construction
(cf. Definition 4.2.4), i.e. @ Dc,p, Dc,q : Dc,p ∩ Dc,q 6= ∅ for
p 6= q
ii) read events of jobs of λd can consequently only be part of
one data interval of λc’s instances: ∃! Dc,q : R̂d,r ∈ Dc,q. In
conseuence, there is a unique predecessor (which is an even
stronger property than required) to any fixed but arbitrary λd,r .
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Second, since the composition of injections like Eq. (4.7) is again an
injection, this follows for the entire cause-effect chain instance Ci,j
based on the initial job λa,n.

Theorem 4.3.4 and its proof is of importance, as it specifies an explicit,
deterministic and predictable timing of data-flow, i.e. SL-LET can be used
as an engineering model for the timing of data-flow. This is in contrast
to cause-effect chains in the BET model, as it is impossible to decide a-
priori which cause-effect chain instances are possible due to the lacking
injectivity property (cp. Definition 2.1.13). As an example for an SL-LET cause-
effect chain consider the chain from λa to λb depicted in Fig. 4.3, where λb
oversamples the label produced by λa in a 1 : 2 ratio. In this example, the
output of λa,1 is read by two jobs λb,3 and λb,4, i.e. C(λa,1) = {λb,3, λb,4}.
Hence, two instances exist which originate from λa,1:
Ci,1 = (λa,1, λb,3)




















Figure 4.3: Dataintervals of an LET effect chain from λa to λb with oversam-
pling
A consequence of the injective property of C is that in cause-effect chains
with undersampling, i.e. where the period of a label’s reading task is longer
than of its writing task, the result of C can be the empty set. This is due to
the fact that not all instances of the writing task’s labels are sampled.
Next, contraints on the latency of cause-effect chains are defined. Note that
computing them as exact bounds is shown in Section 4.6.1.
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Definition 4.3.6: Minimal/Maximal read-to-write latency
The minimal/maximal read-to-write latency R2W−i,k / R2W
+
i,k along a
cause-effect chain Ca from λi to λk is defined as the shortest/longest
traversal time of all possible cause-effect chain instances.
The maximal read-to-write latency in Definition 4.3.6 corresponds to the
notions of LatencyTimingConstraint from the AUTOSAR timing extensions in
clause 7.2 in [AUT19a]. Latency in AUTOSAR is defined as the time between
observable events and categorized into stimuli (as start events) and responses
(as end events). The LatencyTimingConstraint constrains the minimum and
maximum time between a stimulus and possible responses (reaction time),
as well es the time from a reaction to possible stimuli (data age). Note
that clause 7.3 (“Age Constraint”) of [AUT19a] does not apply, since the data
path, i.e. the cause-effect chain and its instances (cf. Definition 4.3.3) are
explicitly known in SL-LET – clause 7.3 is applied if the sender of data is not
explicitly known in an AUTOSAR model. The AUTOSAR Timing Extensions
have only an abstract specification which event can serve as stimulus and
response events in clause 6 (particularly Table 6.1) of [AUT19a]. Here the
following assumptions are made: As responses, the publication times Dmini,j ∀j
of possible data labels from task λi are assumed. For stimuli two types of
events can be distinguished in the correspondence: (i) the reading event of a
task, (ii) the production, i.e. the publication, of data itself. For the latter case
two situations have to be distinguished: (a) labels that are written by other
SL-LET tasks and (b) sporadically generated data. Fig. 4.4 shows cases (ii)(a)
and (ii)(b) and how the time between stimuli and responses can be computed.
In the figure, the write offset ∆w of two jobs λa,i, λb,j, is the time between
the earliest publication of data by λa,i and the subsequent read by λb,j. For
tasks with different rates and offsets from the period the minimum and
maximum over all jobs is given by:
∆−w = min{R̂b,j − Dmina,i } ∀i, j : R̂b,j ∈ Da,i (4.8)
∆+w = max{R̂b,j − Dmina,i } ∀i, j : R̂b,j ∈ Da,i (4.9)
This follows trivially, as the equations simply require that the subsequent
job λb,j actually reads from the preceding job λa,i. This is the case if the read
time is in the data interval of λb,j: R̂b,j ∈ Da,i. ∆−w /∆+w are simply lower and
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𝜆𝑎Case (ii)(a):
Case (ii)(b):
𝑙𝑎 𝜆𝑏 … 𝜆𝑐
𝑙𝑎 𝜆𝑏 … 𝜆𝑐
𝑅2𝑊+/ 𝑅2𝑊−Write Offset Δ𝑤
+ /Δ𝑤
−









Publishing time of 𝜆𝑐
Response: 
Publishing time of 𝜆𝑐
Figure 4.4: Computation of distance between stimulus and response depend-
ing on the assumptions on the event type
upper bounds on all possible instances. How these can be computed see
Section 4.6.1.
The maximum sampling delay ∆+s is determined by the period Pb of the
sampling task λb:
∆+s = Pb (4.10)
as this is the maximum time the physical event can actually occur before
sampling. The minimum sampling delay is 0, since sampling can happen
instantaneous with the physical event that is being sampled. Based on these
assumptions the correspondences are given in Table 4.1.




Case (i) - read
event









R2W+ R2W+ + ∆+w R2W+ +
∆+s
min. data age R2W− R2W+ + ∆−w R2W+ +
∆−s
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Case (i) - read
event




max. data age R2W+ R2W+ + ∆+w R2W+ +
∆+s
4.4 Discussion of SL-LET Model Properties
As pointed out, the SL-LET model introduced in Section 4.2.2 has many
ancestors. It is an extension and generalization of the plain LET idea in-
troduced in Giotto [HHK03] as a programming paradigm. Here, SL-LET
is used as a design model for timing behavior, particularly the timing of
dataflow. The general idea of introducing interconnect tasks to describe
communication, where the zero-time communication assumed in plain LET
is impossible, stems from [EKG18]. However, the SL-LET model introduced
in Section 4.2.2 also has some improvements, some of which are discussed
here.
Many other current research, picking up on the LET idea, treat LET / SL-LET
only as an implementation paradigm, for the execution of tasks. This mani-
fests e.g. in the industrial case study of a combustion engine control system
[HDK+17] where LET is only used to conform data output in a specific way
but not intended to be the design model of the timing behavior of the data-
flow. In doing so many aspects of planing the timing behavior, i.e. “how it
should behave”, is mixed with assumptions on how the system performs
execution. To illustrate this we focus on the connection of LET and period.
While most of the early works, e.g. [HHK03] or [KS12], do not explicitly for-
bid LETs larger than the period, it seems to be an implicit assumption in
many other works, to exploit benefits of the model, but in lieu of a clear
model specification. The gap of implicit assumptions, i.e. what is expected
by the SL-LET model and hence from the implementation, is closed by the
definitions in Section 4.2.2.
To illustrate this, Fig. 4.5 shows two cases for a task: Case 1 where LET > P
and case 2 where LET ≤ P. The second case, shows the behavior as it is
assumed in many works, e.g. [Bec20, Chapter 6], [MSB18], and [BDM+17].
Since LET ≤ P, there are no overlapping jobs, which has several implications
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for the implementation. First, the semantics of task local variables can be
neglected, as there can be no two or more jobs that concurrently try to access
this data. Second, the currently running job can always work on the same
memory pointer for internal data, and publish its results as the final phase
of the job, without having to worry about races, re-entrant code, suitable
task output buffering, etc. These situations, however, could arise in case 1
on the left of Fig. 4.5, with LET > P. In this case, jobs can overlap in their





















Case 1: Case 2:
Figure 4.5: Difference in job execution for the two cases: LET > P and
LET ≤ P
From an implementation perspective that focuses on a single task, limiting
LET ≤ P is convenient, as races are avoided and internal state, that influ-
ences the job results, does not have to be documented in the model. From
a modelling and specification perspective, this causes trouble, as parame-
ters, such as the LET in this case, abstract too much design information
(cf. Section 1.1). A change of the LET in this case is constrained by this
hidden knowledge, hence it seems that due to such reasons, previous work
has implicitly constrained LET ≤ P. However, specification of tasks with
LETs greater than the period can be reasonable, e.g. for applications where
short latencies are not of top priority and higher portability is desired. Since
the LET abstracts physical execution, such tasks can easily be ported to plat-
forms where the actual physical execution may take longer than the period,
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e.g. in the worst-case. Nevertheless, the dataflow specified in such a (SL-LET)
system stays predictable, and the task retains its composability properties
(cf. Definition 4.2.1).
In the SL-LET specification given in Section 4.2.2, implicit assumptions are
not necessary, even if data shall be preserved across jobs. In this case, the
data just has to be explicitly modeled as a label, as depicted in Fig. 4.6.
𝑙𝑖
𝜆𝑖
Figure 4.6: Feedback of state information for an SL-LET task λi through a
label to prevent hidden state of jobs
However, there is a restriction for tasks where state shall be preserved across
jobs, but LETi > P. For the task λi from Fig. 4.6 consider the following case:
LETi = q · Pi q > 1, q ∈ R+ (4.11)







Inserting the values from Definition 4.2.4 shows that ∀q > 1, q ∈ R+:
R̂i,j+1 < Dmini,j (4.13)
j · Pi + Oi < (j− 1 + q)Pi + Oi (4.14)
Hence, subsequent jobs can not read the state data, since the jobs are logically
overlapping. By solving Eq. (4.12) for an arbitrary subsequent job λi,j+n
instead of λi,j+1, the first job to which job data can be feed back, can be
computed based on a given q.
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The last notable improvement over [EKG18] named here is the introduction
of the offset parameter in Definition 4.2.4, which is e.g. also adopted in
[GKEQ21]. The offset Oi for a task λi has two effects w.r.t. specifying timing
behavior. First it implicitly creates a fixed but arbitrary zero-point in the time
domain, which allows addressing individual jobs, and allows to reason about
the dependencies of jobs different tasks. Second, and most notably from a
“user perspective”, the offset parameter allows to change data dependencies
in cause-effect chain instances by tuning the minimum/maximum read-to-
write latency. While, e.g. [GKEQ21] sees the offset as a parameter mainly as
an instrument to tune the read-to-write latency, its actual impact is on the
compositions of cause-effect chain instances. For illustration, Fig. 4.7 shows
two cases for a cause-effect chain C1 = (λa, λb) where both tasks execute
with the same period. Case 1 is shown on the left, where the offsets of both
tasks are Oa = Ob = 0, and a second case on the right, where the offset of λb
is set to Ob = LETa. In the second case on the right, the cause-effect chain
instance C1,1 = (λa,1, λb,1) is different from the one in case 1 on the left,

























𝐶1,1 = (𝜆𝑎,1, 𝜆𝑏,1)
Case 1:
𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑎 = 𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑏 , 𝑂𝑎 = 𝑂𝑏 = 0
Case 2:
𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑎 = 𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑏 , 𝑂𝑎 = 0,𝑂𝑏 = 𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑎
Read DataintervalLegend:
Figure 4.7: Reduction of the read-to-write latency by the introduction of the
offset parameter for a dataflow from λa to λb
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4.5 Mapping SL-LET to BET-based Execution
SL-LET bridges a gap that BET-based timing descriptions can not fill in
system design. It allows a predictable description of the timing of data-flow
along cause-effect chains, more precisely along the instances of cause-effect
chains. While in SL-LET cause-effect chain instances can be described at
design time by injective relations (cf. Theorem 4.3.4), this is impossible in
the BET model. As a consequence, a deterministic timing behavior of the
data-flow can not be provided in BET. This is due to the fact, that in BET
the read behavior of jobs is heavily influenced by the write behavior of the
preceding task in a cause-effect chain, which can not be explicitly specified
due to the response-time jitter. Depending on the jitter, multiple scenarios
exist from which job the succeeding task in the cause-effect chain reads data.
Even if a read-execute-write scheme as in LET and SL-LET is assumed for a
BET task τi, i.e. it makes a job-local copy of the data it reads, the time when
“the read” is actually performed can only be bounded to an interval. This read
interval conservatively spans from the activation of the job, as the earliest
time the read is performed, to the WCRT minus the BCET (R+i −C
−
i ), as the
latest possible time the job can perform the read. An injective relation that
defines cause-effect chains is hence impossible, as multiple possibilities for
data dependencies between jobs exist. In the BET model it is thus a-priori
not decidable how cause-effect chain instances look like, or at least shall
look like. SL-LET fills this gap.
However, SL-LET can not as straightforwardly be implemented as a BET
description of a system. Yet, it is possible to apply SL-LET as a design model
in systems, where physical execution follows a BET execution semantic.
This is due to the fact, that SL-LET makes no assumptions on the physical
execution. In the BET model the assumption is that the physical execution
of a single task τi requires a processing time between the BCET and the
WCET estimates. Scheduling effects such as preemption and blocking cause
a response time of every job τi,j that is between a BCRT and a WCRT bound.
Pragmatically, the response time bounds in BET can be used as an interface
to the LET paradigm, which requires that the computation of an (LET) task
λi is complete no later than the LETi. Hence, it is possible, to implement the
execution phase of λi as a BET task τi, if the WCRT is less or equal to the LET,
i.e. R+i ≤ LETi. Obviously, this assumes that a job τi,j reads the data intended
for the corresponding LET job λi,j. The property that data is read and
published at the time dictated by the SL-LET model must be supported by the
run-time software as the task itself is not able to guarantee it. The literature
describes different implementations how reading and publishing data to
129
CHAPTER 4. PREDICTABLE DESIGN ON COMPLEX PLATFORMS
readers can be achieved in the context of SL-LET / LET, e.g. to provide buffers
for computed results before they are allowed to be published according to
the SL-LET design model. [BE18] presents a lightweight approach based on
double-buffering, [HHM+16] discusses two approaches in the context of the
AUTOSAR Classic platform, whereas one of the approaches is based on the
E-Machine concept first reported by [Tem07] as an implementation of the
Giotto run-time mechanism [HHK03]. Note that these implementations,

















Figure 4.8: BET execution scheme of an LET task where the LET corresponds
to the period of the task
Fig. 4.8 shows two jobs of an LET task λa and how the SL-LET model corre-
sponds to the BET execution semantic. In the example, the physical execu-
tion of the LET task is performed with BET semantics, which implies, that
the jobs are activated at R̂a,i and require a processing time between a BCET
and WCET. Due to preemption by other tasks through scheduling, each job
has a response time between a BCRT and WCRT. These extreme cases are
depicted in Fig. 4.8, i.e. the WCRT and BCRT at times ta,1 for the first job
and ta,2 for the second job, respectively. In the BET model, a job’s results
would be available, i.e. published, as soon as the physical computation has
been completed. To comply with the SL-LET paradigm, the label instances,
i.e. the data, must not be published before Dmina,1 = R̂a,2 and D
min
a,2 = R̂a,3,
respectively. For a consuming task, this implies that between ta,1 and R̂a,2
(which is identical to Dmina,1 here due to LETa = Pa), the label instance from
job λa,0 has to be consumed. This circumstance has to be ensured by the
run-time software.
The correspondence between the LET of a task λi and the response-time
bounds of a BET task τi can be further generalized as an interface between
the BET implementation model and SL-LET as design model. Therefore,
we need to consider the correspondences between interconnect tasks as
well as normal LET tasks with the BET model in more detail. W.r.t. both
models, SL-LET’s resources Res ∈ R of a platform P directly correspond to
the resources from the BET model, meaning there exists a 1 to 1 mapping
between the two. The correspondence rule between SL-LET and BET tasks is
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that any LET task λi can correspond to a sequence of BET tasks (τj, . . . , τj+k)
where the sequence is a vertex walk implying event precedence in the BET
task graph (cf. Definition 2.1.9). The only limitation is that the BET task
chain must not cross any timezone boundary. In order to have a valid corre-
spondence, the end-to-end latency, i.e. the WCRT R+ of the BET task chain
must be less or equal to LETi of the LET task λi. The WCRT bound implies
activation and termination traces ωj+n(n)− σi(n) ≤ R+ ∀ n ∈ N+0 .
Interconnect tasks, as generalized LET tasks require special treatment in
this context, as they are specifically designed to cross timezone boundaries.
The correspondence rule for an interconnect tasks Φi is therefore identical
to that of a plain LET task, with the exception, that the chain may cross a
time zone boundary. To account for the synchronization error between time
zones, it is assumed that the synchronization error ε is part of LETi. Hence,
it is required that R+i + ε ≤ LETi.
Fig. 4.9 depicts the correspondence of a SL-LET cause-effect chain C =
(λi, Φj, λk) to a BET implementation, where Φj is implemented as an Ether-
net communication. In the example the communication resources Com1 and
Com2 correspond to switch output ports, while Res1 and Res2 are processing
resources. λi and λk are implemented as single tasks τi and τk, respectively,
while Φk is implemented as the task chain (τjTx, τj1, τj2, τjRx).
𝜆𝑘𝜙𝑗𝜆𝑖 𝑙1 𝑙2
𝑅𝑒𝑠1 𝑅𝑒𝑠1𝐶𝑜𝑚1 𝐶𝑜𝑚2𝑚1 𝑚2
𝜏𝑖 𝜏𝑗𝑇𝑥 𝜏𝑗1 𝜏𝑗2 𝜏𝑗𝑅𝑥 𝜏𝑘
Figure 4.9: Example for the correspondence of an LET cause-effect chain to
a BET chain
Model correspondence between SL-LET and BET model is formally ex-
pressed by a number of relations, which assigns properties from one model
to a property of the other and vice versa. First of all, model correspondence
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requires that events in the SL-LET model are assigned to observable events
in the BET model. This is defined on a per task basis:
Definition 4.5.1: Task Event Correspondence
An LET task or interconnect task λi ∈ Λ corresponds to a chain of
BET tasks w = (τa, . . . , τb), where w is a vertex walk in T G , through
relations:
maprdi = {(σLETi (n), σa(n))) | n ∈ N+0 }
mapwri = {(ωLETi (n), ωb(n)) | n ∈ N+0 }
where maprdi defines a read event correspondence between λi and τa, and
mapwri defines a write event correspondence between λi and τb.
Hence, a task event correspondence relates the read events from the SL-LET
model to activation events in the BET model, as well as publication events
in the SL-LET model to termination events in the BET model. Done for
all tasks in the SL-LET model, it results in correspondence for the entire
model:
Collorary 4.5.2: Model Correspondence
The correspondence for the entire model is achieved by mapping all









In order to form a valid correspondence, three requirements must be fulfilled.
First, it is assumed that the run-time environment buffers data, such that it
is available to consumers for the entire data interval of its producer. Based
on this assumption the chronological order of events must ensure that data
is read when the intended data are available and that output data is ready for
publication by the run-time before the data interval starts. It is assumed that
BET tasks consume input data with their activation and produce output data
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with their termination. This is referred to as read validity and write validity








valid events for 𝜏𝑎,1
𝐷a,1
𝑚𝑖𝑛




Figure 4.10: Valid chronological order of events for job τa, 1
For job τa,1 two possible activation events and two possible termination
events are shown. For the correspondence to be valid the activation event
σa(1) must occur after the read event, i.e. σa(1) ≥ R̂a,1 = σLETa (1). This only
holds for the event ∆t1 after R̂a,1, indicated in black in Fig. 4.10. The orange
activation event shown in orange, however, would reside in the previous data
interval Da,−1 and thus is invalid as the job could read the wrong data upon
its activation.
Formally read and write validity for all jobs are defined by:
Theorem 4.5.3: Read Validity
The chronological order of read events is valid for a task λi with read
event correspondence maprdi iff:
ta ≤ tb ∀ e = (ta, tb) ∈ maprdi
Theorem 4.5.4: Write Validity
The chronological order of write events is valid for a task λi with
write event correspondence mapwri iff:
ta ≥ tb ∀ e = (ta, tb) ∈ mapwri
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Assuming that the LET run-time software buffers data accordingly as e.g. de-
scribed in [BME16] to avoid that job j + 1 already overwrites data of job j
which are still published.
Hence, a SL-LET model and a BET model corresponds, iff read validity and
write validity can be proven for all task event correspondences in MAPrd and
MAPwr.
For illustration, let us consider the example from Fig. 4.9. The read corre-
spondences are given by:
maprdi = {σLETi (n), σi(n) | n ∈ N+0 } (4.15)
maprdjTx = {σLETj (n), σjTx(n) | n ∈ N+0 } (4.16)
maprdk = {σ
LET
k (n), σk(n) | n ∈ N
+
0 } (4.17)
and the write correspondences by:
mapwri = {ωLETi (n), ωi(n) | n ∈ N+0 } (4.18)
mapwrj = {ωLETj (n), ωjRx(n) | n ∈ N+0 } (4.19)
mapwrk = {ω
LET
k (n), ωk(n) | n ∈ N
+
0 } (4.20)
In the example, it is assumed that all resources are scheduled priority driven.
The priority (lower value indicates higher priority) and the event models are
provided in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Event models for the example system depicted in Fig. 4.9
BET Task Priority Event Model
τi 1 δ−(n) = (n− 1) · Pi
τjTx 2 δ−(n) = (n− 1) · Pj
τk 1 δ−(n) = (n− 1) · Pk
τj1, τj2 1 propagated (task is event
dependent on a predecessor)
τjRx 2 propagated (task is event
dependent on a predecessor)
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Let us focus on the write validity of Φj. Since the event model is an up-
per/lower bound on any activation trace:
(δ−jTx(n), δ
+
jTx(n)) |= σjTx (4.21)
we use its properties for the proof of write validity:
Proof 4.5.5:
In order to fulfill Theorem 4.5.4 it needs to be proven that for any
event in all possible traces:
ωLETj (n)
!
≥ ωjRx(n) ∀n ∈ N+0 (4.22)
holds. The time from activation of τjTx to the termination event of
the chain of τjRx can be expressed by the response time R(n) for any
n ∈ N+0 as:
R(n) = ωjRx(n)− σjTx(n) (4.23)
ωjRx(n) = σjTx(n) + R(n) (4.24)
Since the activation of τjTx is strictly periodic it follows:
ωjRx(n) = n · Pj + R(n) (4.25)
Furthermore, the response time can be upper bounded ∀n ∈ N+0
by the WCRT R+:
ωjRx(n) ≤ n · Pj + R+ (4.26)
Under the assumption that LET j ≥ R+ it follows:
ωjRx(n) ≤ n · Pj + LET j (4.27)
ωjRx(n) ≤ n · Pj + LET j = ωLETj (n) (4.28)
ωjRx(n) ≤ ωLETj (n) (4.29)

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Similarly, the proofs for write validity of λi and λk can be obtained, but are
omitted for brevity.
The read validity of Φj can be trivially proven due to the strictly periodic
event models:
Proof 4.5.6:
In order to fulfill Theorem 4.5.3 it needs to be proven that for any
event in all possible traces:
σLETj (n)
!
≤ σjTx(n) ∀n ∈ N+0 (4.30)




n · Pj ≤ n · Pj (4.31)

Similarly, the proofs for read validity of λi and λk can be obtained, but are
omitted for brevity.
In both proofs 4.5.5 and 4.5.6 we have seen that the assumption R+
!
≤ LET
holds is essential. However, the length of an LET interval is a design pa-
rameter that can be controlled by a system designer. Obviously, LETs can
not be chosen arbitrarily as the system has to fulfill other constraints as
well, e.g. data-age constraints along a given (functional) data path. Through
the cross-layer model such constraints can be transformed into constraints
in the SL-LET model as well. Hence, in the following subsection it is in-
vestigated how SL-LET designs can be verified such that the design meets
such constraints. Furthermore, also the dependencies of verified designs are
investigated. Since the verification results are only valid iff, the dependencies
that the design and the incurring correspondence entail are acceptable in the
sense of the safety concept. Again the focus is on timing dependencies and
what safety measures must be imposed on the design to accept the design as
safe w.r.t. top-level functional safety requirements.
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4.6 Verification and Validation of SL-LET Designs
4.6.1 Verification of End-to-End Latency Requirements in
SL-LET Designs
In contrast to the BET timing model, SL-LET allows computing end-to-end
latencies for a cause-effect chain in a composable manner (cf. Definition 4.2.1).
The analysis that is introduced here, is a generalized idea for timezone-local
cause-effect chains as already described by e.g. [BDM+18],[BDM+17], and
[MSB18] and also extended to LET tasks with offsets. The offset is used, such
that read events of a succeeding task in a cause-effect Ci coincide with the
beginning of a data interval. In these cases, the read-to-write latency can
be computed as the sum of the LETs of both tasks. For generalization to
the system-level idea of SL-LET, where interconnect tasks with an arbitrary
LET, form the bridge between different time zones, it needs to be considered
that an alignment of read event with the beginning of a data interval is
not always the case, i.e. that a reading task performs the read event at an
arbitrary point in the data interval. Note that, this extension works for all
offset combinations between interconnect tasks and normal LET tasks :
Φi → λj, λj → Φi, λi → λj and Φi → Φj.
Theorem 4.6.1: Computing Minimum/Maximum read-to-write la-
tency
The minimum/maximum read-to-write latency for a cause-effect
chain Ci = {λa, ..., λb} can be found among the cause-effect chain
instances where the jobs of λa reside in the same hyperperiod
(i.e. lcm(Pa, ..., Pb)) of all tasks in C.
Proof 4.6.2:
The hyperperiod as the least-common multiple of the periods of all
tasks in the cause-effect chain denotes the time intervall after which
the cause-effect chain instances start to repeat themselfs, merley
shifted in their job indices. Since cause-effect chains are formed
injectively it is further fact that for two jobs λa,i and λa,j with i 6= j,
the resulting set of reachable jobs is disjunct, i.e. C(λa,i) ∩ λa,j = ∅.
Hence, the maximum and minimum latency must be found in one
of the sets C(λa,i) ∀i : R̂a,i is in the same hyperperiod.

137





Hyperperiod 1 Hyperperiod 2
Figure 4.11: Reachability Graph for the LET effect chain depicted in Fig. 4.3
from λa to λb
More illustratively, the possible data propagation paths, i.e. cause-effect
chain instances, can be collected in the data propagation graph G(Cx) for a
cause-effect chain Cx. A node in G(Cx) represents a job of one of the tasks
λi ∈ Cx . A directed edge (λi,j, λk,l) then indicates data flow from λi,j to λk,l ,
i.e. R̂k,l ∈ Di,j.
4.6.1.1 Constructing Job Reachability Graphs
The data propagation graph of all neccessary cause-effect chain instances
according to Theorem 4.6.1 can be generated by a recursive approach. Algo-
rithm 5 is executed for all jobs λi,j of the first task in a cause-effect chain.
However, only the jobs lying in the first hyperperiod of the system must be
considered as initial jobs, since the activation sequence and thus the system’s
timing behavior repeats in the next hyperperiod. This is due to the fact that
in the SL-LET model interconnect tasks as well as normal LET tasks are
strictly periodic. Note that a job that is reading from λi,j might lie in the
next hyperperiod. Nevertheless, the data propagation path is considered.
As a consequence, all possible data propagation paths are then contained
within G(Cx).
In Algorithm 5 lines 1 to 3 determine whether the processed job is an in-
stance of the last task in the cause-effect chain. If this is the case no further
successors exist, and the recursion can terminate. Yet, if it is not, the jobs of
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Algorithm 5: process_job(C, λi,j)
1 λk ← get_successor(C, λi) ;
2 if λk = ∅ then
3 return
4 for λk,l in find_readers(λk, λi,j) do
5 add_edge(λi,j, λk,l ) ;
6 process_job(C, λk,l ) ;
7 end
the succeding task λk that potentially read from λi,j must be found. This is
achieved by find_readers() in line 4. The function returns all jobs λk,l such
that R̂k,l ∈ [Dmini,j ; Dmaxi,j (. All l ∈ N
+
0 with the first job l = 1 starting/reading
at time t = 0 can be found by the following equation:
Dmini,j ≤ R̂k,l < Dmaxi,j
(4.32)
(j− 1) · Pi + Oi + LETi ≤ (l − 1) · Pk + Ok < j · Pi + Oi + LETi
(4.33)
For each λk,l an edge from λi,j is inserted in the data propagation graph –
whereas λk,l or λi,j can be an interconnect task as well. The weight w of this
edge is set to the read-to-read distance R2R = R̂k,l − R̂i,j. This is necessary to
compute the end-to-end latency in the next step. Line 6 starts the recursion.
Since cause-effect chains are already acyclic graphs, also the resulting data
propagation graph of a cause-effect chain is cycle free.
4.6.1.2 Computation of Latencies
Since for each cause-effect chain Cx Algorithm 5 is executed for all initial
jobs in a hyperperiod, the data propagation graph G(Cx) contains all possible
data propagation paths starting in this hyperperiod, i.e. all cause-effect chain
instances. Due to the periodic nature of the system, G(Cx) also contains the
worst case. For each path in G(Cx) the read-to-write latency can be computed
by summing up the edge weights w (read-to-read latencies R2R) plus the
execution of the last task λn in Cx, i.e. LETn. Note that the read-to-read
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latency of adjacent tasks λi and λi+1 in Cx also contains the execution of λi,
i.e. LETi.
Due to the acyclic nature of the job reachability graph, the shortest and
longest read-to-read path based on the edge weights can conveniently be
found using standard graph algorithms [SW11]. The minimum and maxi-
mum read-to-write latency R2W−x and R2W+x are thus the shortest and the
longest path plus the additional LET of the last task in Cx respectively.
4.6.2 Timing Dependency Analysis and Monitoring Synthe-
sis for Validation of SL-LET in BET Execution Seman-
tics
So far it has been shown how SL-LET allows designing cause-effect chains
composable and how to verify design requirements like end-to-end latency
in the design model. Investigating only the SL-LET design model for (tim-
ing) dependencies as done in Chapter 2 shows that no timing dependencies
between chains in any LG exist. This is exactly the composability property
described by Definition 4.2.1 that is expected from SL-LET. However, we
have seen in Chapter 2 that abstraction of a system design can hide depen-
dencies. The abstraction that SL-LET performs w.r.t. the design, can be
overcome by taking the implementation model, i.e. the BET model into
account again. While, separating the two models at first might seem odd,
we shall see that it makes sense to separate concerns this way. The design
model fulfills the purpose of describing a predictable timing behavior and
verifying timing requirements imposed by the functional model on it. The
implementation model on the other hand, is better suited to describe the
timing behavior at run time. The model correspondence introduced in
Section 4.5 allows to connect the two, i.e. lift the abstraction in the (SL-LET)
model for dependency analysis purposes. This allows to investigate whether
the “guarantees” made by the verification of the design model hold in the
implementation. Following the design idea of cross-layer dependency anal-
ysis, it is possible to validate whether the assumptions the design model
imposes on the implementation are fulfilled in the implementation model.
Note, that the focus here is solely on the timing behavior, i.e. whether there
is (bounded) dependence on timing parameters of the BET implementation.
The implementation of SL-LET must still guarantee correctness of func-
tional properties of SL-LET, in order to guarantee the timing of the data-flow
along cause-effect chains. The existing approaches for communication can
be categorized into solutions which require explicit buffer management,
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as e.g. in [BE18] or one of the variants in [HHM+16], and implicit buffer
management. In the implicit variant, tasks must fulfill the necessary timing
behavior and provide the results to memory according to cause-effect chain
instance definitions. This avoids explicit synchronization and synchronizes
only implicitly via the expected run-time timing behavior, i.e. writing and
reading to appropriate memory locations depending on job sequence num-
bers. Such a solution is e.g. possible via AUTOSAR CP OSScheduleTables, as
hinted by [HHM+16]. In any case, a validation for the timing behavior of the
corresponding BET model through timing dependency analysis is valuable
as correct timing behavior is required for all communication methods –
implicit and explicit.
The proofs of both Theorem 4.5.3 and Theorem 4.5.4 require the assumption
that the WCRT of a BET chain is less or equal to the LET for a valid model
correspondence (cf. Section 4.5). Hence, WCRTs in the BET model become
the first object of investigation for the validation of an (SL-LET) design.
Dependency analysis here is used to identify and trace on which BET timing
parameters the guarantees in the SL-LET model depend. Seen from the
perspective of requirements tracing, the assumptions in a correspondence
proof become requirements in the implementation model, which in turn
also need verification.
Section 2.5 introduced how TDGs can be used to reveal the dependencies of
a timing requirement in BET semantics. Hence, validation of the SL-LET to
BET model correspondence in the form of a dependency analysis, consists
of four steps:
1. Importing the assumptions the LET-BET model correspondence
makes as requirements in the BET model
2. Verification of these requirements through suitable timing analysis
3. Timing dependency analysis of the results of the timing analysis
4. Confidence analysis of the timing dependencies
For illustration, consider the example depicted in Fig. 4.12, which extends
the example from Fig. 4.9 by a second cause-effect chain C2. In this example,
a predictable timing behavior of the data-flow along C1 = (λi, Φj, λk) is
the goal. Each LET chain implements a different functionality for which
freedom from interference is required. The first step sets the LETs of all
corresponding BET task chains as the deadline for the scheduling analysis
conducted on the BET model. Verifying that these deadlines are met is
the second step, which can be carried out e.g. by CPA. Let us consider the
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𝜆𝑘𝜙𝑗𝜆𝑖 𝑙1 𝑙2
𝑅𝑒𝑠1 𝑅𝑒𝑠1𝐶𝑜𝑚1 𝐶𝑜𝑚2𝑚1 𝑚2







𝜏𝑎 𝜏𝑏𝑇𝑥 𝜏𝑏1 𝜏𝑏2 𝜏𝑏𝑅𝑥 𝜏𝑐
𝜆𝑐𝜙𝑏𝜆𝑎 𝑙3 𝑙4
Figure 4.12: Example System with two LET cause-effect chains with corre-
sponding BET tasks
LET cause-effect chain C1 = (λi → Φj → λk). Computation resources
Resx are scheduled with SPP and communication resources Comy are sched-
uled with SPNP. The scheduling priorities for the BET tasks are chosen
such that all possible BET tasks interfere with the corresponding BET tasks
(i.e. ξ1 = (τi, τjTx, τj1, τj2, τjRx, τk) of C1. Further, assume that the timing
analysis computes WCRTs that are all less or equal to the required dead-
lines, i.e. the LETs. The resulting TDG (which is not shown here due to its
complexity and space reasons) reveals the timing dependencies between the
BET tasks that implement C1 and C2. As all the scheduling parameters are
chosen such that all BET tasks corresponding to C2 interfere with the BET
tasks of C1, consequently all WCRTs of C1 depend on values of execution
times and event models of the BET tasks of C2. In Section 2.5 it has been
shown that dependence can be acceptable as bounded timing dependence
(cf. Definition 2.5.5), if sufficient confidence exists into the timing parame-
ters on which a timing analysis result depends. Furthermore, in Section 3.2
techniques to increase the confidence of timing properties of the BET model
through run-time monitoring and enforcement have been presented. In
conclusion, timing dependency related issues arising from the BET imple-
mentation can be solved by the named methods and validation can be passed
successful.
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The original idea behind designing with SL-LET is that along cause-effect
chains the timing of the data-flow can be designed independent of other
chains sharing the same system platform. Accepting bounded dependence in
a BET implementation of an (SL-LET) design, the idea becomes feasible.
For a validation of bounded dependence, however, it is required that no
run-time faults occur which would cause that any timing parameter will
be exceeded beyond its specified bounds. Only under this assumption the
system specified by the CLM will exhibit run-time behavior that is compliant
with the behavior expected from the model. There is clear differentiation
between run-time faults, where the root cause occurs stochastically at run-
time, and a design fault, where the root cause is at design time, i.e. before
run-time. The design fault at hand is that insufficient model knowledge
results in a non-conservative WCET estimate and in consequence that a
bound which is specified in a timing parameter is violated at run-time.
Hence, it is not a run-time fault, although the effects (i.e. the error) manifest
at run-time.
To prevent either the design fault as a whole or to contain it at run-time under
the assumption that no further run-time faults appear, two approaches have
been introduced. Either to allocate safety requirements for safety process
measures to prevent the design fault by requiring more (and conservative)
knowledge about the system (cf. Section 3.1) , or to perform monitor synthesis
to enforce the model correspondence (cf. Section 3.2).
However, we have also seen in Section 3.3 that a successful and efficient
use of monitors heavily depends on well configured monitors. A well done
configuration requires knowing when deadlines or other extra-functional
timing requirements would be violated to reject such a configuration in
the course of the sensitivity analysis. In the related work on sensitivity
analysis presented in Section 3.3 we have seen that sensitivity analysis heavily
relies on deadlines for all tasks. While solely with the BET model as design
and implementation model this timing requirement was hard to provide
by function developers, this circumstance changes with the introduction
of SL-LET as design model. Even more troublesome is the circumstance
that the specification of a deadline might even be a “shared” requirement
between function engineer and integration engineer, as the deadline can
be used to “tune” the timing of the data-flow. With SL-LET specifying a
predictable data-flow is possible explicitly. Through the correspondence
rule with the BET model, deadlines in the form of the LET label-write time
become available for the sensitivity analysis in the BET model. An advantage
that response-time requirements that originate from the correspondence
have is, that they are specified for independent tasks. Sensitivity analysis
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is no longer dependent on timing bounds as “deadlines” that are based
on intervals for entire chains as e.g. [SMT+18], [BDM+16] and [BDM+17]
provide them if only maximum data-age requirements are specified for
BET cause-effect chains that communicate sampling based, i.e. without
event dependence in the BET model. In consequence, the LETs are a perfect
“deadline” specification, as they are also easy to use in the TDG based monitor
synthesis, while maintaining predictable data-flow if a suitable run-time
mechanism is in place. BET on the other hand can only maintain deadlines
without well predictable properties, i.e. cause-effect chain instances, of the
data-flow.
4.7 Conclusion
One can now ask what the gain of introducing a separate design model
and additional verification and validation is. The first gain is that certain
concerns have been separated in individual models and techniques.
Foremost, SL-LET is a perfect way of specifying the timing of data-flow,
even in complex cause-effect chains traversing multiple resources of a sys-
tem. This circumstance is impossible with BET-based timing description
of cause-effect chains. Although, it has to be noted that in order to provide
the predictable timing of data-flow, a faithful SL-LET implementation can
require additional run-time mechanisms to prevent deviations due to late
reads or early writes, as mentioned above.
Second, SL-LET is a requirements engineering tool for the dependency
identification and mitigation in the BET implementation model. It provides
clear requirement towards the BET model, while at the same time allowing
the function designer to work with composable timing. Particularly, it
provides discrete valued results of an end-to-end timing analysis to the
function developer, compared to intervals with undecidable behavior in
them.
The third benefit resulting from the separation of concerns is that it allows
a better understanding of errors and possible failures of a design – both
at run time and at design time. Understanding failures and error effects
ultimately can improve safety of the system, as it allows introducing or tune
counter measures (including safety process measures). Now the concrete
benefit is with rather complex types of errors. Avizienis et al. [ALRL04, Fig.8]
differentiate in their taxonomy that data can either be wrong, have incorrect
timing, or both. As an example, consider a cause-effect chain with sampling
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at different rates. If offsets are introduced to prevent peak load, longer
response times of jobs can easily cause errors of the last class, where due
to incorrect timing wrong data and thus incorrect service is produced. The
determinism of timing introduced with SL-LET prevents this error class in
the design model, i.e. at design time, while the TDG based validation limits
the probability that run-time behavior of this error class can occur. Note that
a faithful BET implementation must not only avoid late writes through the
validation of correspondence, i.e. LET ≤ R+, but also postpone early writes
to the publication time of a label according to the SL-LET model. The latter is
a property that is achievable with implementations as e.g. provided by [BE18],
but not the former. Nevertheless, the question remains, whether verification
and validation have become easier and how the safety process can gain
from the introduction of (SL-LET) in the cross-layer model for dependency
analysis. This is the focus of the next chapter Chapter 5. Particularly, whether
or how the assumption that no stochastic run-time faults occur, can be
relaxed and still ensure timing safety.
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Chapter 5
Timing Diversity as a Safety
Measure
So far the focus of this thesis has been to investigate how system designers
can apply more stringent design measures in a worst-case design, such
that dependencies do not result in destructive interference and ultimately
lead to catastrophic consequences. With the focus on timing behavior of a
system, all the measures have the intention of avoiding timing interference
which might lead to requirements violation. Whereas the interference on a
particular application can be self-interference, e.g. by exceeding a specified
WCET or arrival pattern specification, or external interference from another
application. In this quest for better verification and validation methods it has
become obvious, that ever-increasing engineering efforts in conventional
specification and analysis methods are insufficient.
The last chapter has introduced a novel design model that refrains from
the conventional specification of embedded software by actual execution
time demand and occurrence of that demand, in favor of a design specifi-
cation that focuses on a response-time based specification. This shift was
motivated not only by the fact that traditional execution time specification
for complex embedded software has become intractable but also because it
has significant benefits for specifying requirements that improve functional
behavior. While for instance the conventional analysis methods for data-age
are only able to verify that a certain lower and upper bound are maintained at
runtime, nothing can be said about the jitter and the typically observed data-
age [SMT+18][BDM+17][BDM+18]. In comparison to that, SL-LET shifts
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the focus from the actual timing of the execution to the timing of data.
The system’s specification, similarly to the executed functions, becomes
more data-centric. The previous section has furthermore shown how the
design model can be checked for requirements satisfaction (verification) and
how correspondence with an implementation model can be checked for
correct assumptions by dependency analysis (validation). These analyses are
conducted under the assumption that the system is fault free, i.e. that all pa-
rameters are correctly and conservatively defined. In this section, we lift this
restriction to a certain extent. However, the goal of ensuring timing safety
of the system persists. The restriction, that is lifted is that the specifications
in the implementation model do not need to be ultimately conservative.
What is assumed instead is that their average worst-case is sufficient to fulfill
the SL-LET paradigm, i.e. correspondence with the SL-LET model. This
creates a situation where timing errors can occur, e.g. in a worst-case situ-
ation that goes beyond the specified average worst-case. Resulting timing
errors are masked by timing diversity such that the original cause-effect chain
can execute as if no timing error had occurred. This allows more flexible
designs.
The flexibility gained by the assumption is extended to the concept of timing
diversity which allows to maintain the timing safety requirements on the
data. The next section first introduces the concept, while the subsequent
section discusses it from different angles: implementation, synthesis from
the initial design-model, and reliability under different fault assumptions.
An experiments and case study section shows how the concept increases
overall reliability and how the concept can be applied to a state-of-the art
environment perception function for automated vehicles. The environment
perception function is specifically chosen, as it is a hard or even impossible
challenge for the mechanisms used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Finally,
Section 5.4.2 presents how the concept can be exploited in the context of
ISO 26262 to reduce cost intensive process measures by systematically de-
composing requirements according to the concept.
5.1 The Idea of Timing Diversity
In finance, diversifying a portfolio is a measure to reduce the risk that the
entire investment gets lost by stretching the investments over multiple
stocks. The principle of stretching the risk of failure is also applied in timing
diversity. The idea of timing diversity assumes that two jobs of a specific
task executing the same workload will not exhibit identical execution time
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on complex architectures. Hence, the risk that both jobs are affected by a
timing error is lower than a timely execution of at least one the jobs. By
placing these jobs quasi parallel in time into independent timing channels
and selecting a channel which is “on time” w.r.t. the specification, the risk of
a timing failure can be mitigated. More precisely, at the end of the LET the
channel selection logic in Fig. 5.1 will select the channel which has finished










Figure 5.1: Timing Diversity scheme based on homogeneous redundancy
The scheme presented in Fig. 5.1 requires that both channels need to be at
least loosely synchronized, i.e. it must be possible to match data or events
going into the two channels to output events from the channels. Particularly
in entirely BET specified systems with sampling-based communication
synchronization poses a problem due to the large jitter between BCRT and
WCRT. By specifying and implementing the system based on a SL-LET
specification, this problem is solved, as timing of data is explicitly specified.
An additional synchronization mechanism but a label instance id is not
necessary.
One pillar of the timing diversity scheme is that on complex architectures,
the execution time strongly depends on the state of the hardware and soft-
ware execution platform (caches, branch prediction, memory mapping, ker-
nel state, etc.). This state is not only influenced by the application, i.e. the
task, itself but also by every other task executing on the resource and in
consequence the state is altered. Due to the vast number of alterations on
a comparatively short timescale compared to the overall execution of a job,
these are in a way unpredictable or at least undecidable in the available
models [CKM+19][DSA+13]. As an example, take a memory access through
a cache on an architecture that features an MMU. While the access which
might change the state of multiple caches in the hierarchy is in the order
of ns or a few clock cycles, overall execution of jobs is rather in the order of
ms [ARM13]. This idea follows the argumentation of [ALRL04] and [GM02],
which state that the behavior of a system or component is the result of the
underlying structure. The underlying structure in this case is the possible
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state space, whereas the resulting observable behavior is the execution time
behavior of a job. Timing diversity exploits this fact instead of combating it
with even more rigorous engineering methods. One assumed consequence
of this vast state space and possible transitions in it is that the probability
that two parallel instances exhibit the same execution time abnormality from
the average case due to platform effects is marginal, even if they operate on
the same input data. Referring to a timing error in timing channel 1 as ECh1
and in timing channel 2 as ECh2, this implies for the probabilities P of the
events:
P[ECh1 ∩ ECh2] = P[ECh1] · P[ECh2] (5.1)
which implies that timing errors ECh1 and ECh2 are assumed to be statistically
independent.
The possibility to mitigate an error in one channel allows to relax the con-
servatism in the specification of the individual channels compared to a
non-redundant setup under certain conditions. The performance of the
timing diversity approach in terms of timing reliability will be discussed
in detail later. But in general, it allows to relax the requirements in the
specification of the channels, e.g. by reducing the gap between conservative
WCET assumption and a value observable in measurement based testing.
The problem of non-conservative specification parameters in the design
process was already discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The proposed so-
lution there is to introduce the notion of confidence for system parameters,
like for instance the WCET parameter. The method has the goal of limiting
the timing interference to tasks with a sufficiently high confidence level, to
compute and bound the interference.
5.2 Related Work
For pure communication instead of computation a similar idea is the basis
of the redundancy feature in Avionics Full-Duplex Ethernet (AFDX) as the
implementation of ARINC664 Part 7 [Aer09]. In AFDX redundancy is man-
aged per virtual link implemented on two independent switched networks,
the A and B Networks. A packet transmitted over a redundant virtual link by
an End System is sent on both networks. Therefore, under normal operation,
each End System will receive two copies of a packet, if the packet is sent
on a duplicated link. The reception logic of the receiving End System is
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shown in Fig. 5.2. It follows a “first valid packet wins”, which avoids complex
synchronization mechanisms. Therefore, it uses one byte as a sequence
number. Compared to standard Ethernet, this sequence number resides
in the Ethernet payload before the Frame Check Sequence for each Virtual
Link to identify redundant copies of a packet. In essence, the idea of timing
diversity for computation is very similar to the redundancy idea of AFDX for
communication. Similar to timing diversity the end-to-end response time
of the same original packet varies in network A and B. The difference to the
SL-LET approach of timing diversity is that the Redundancy Management
unit of AFDX forwards a correctly received packet immediately and not a
predetermined point in time, as only the integrity must be checked. One of
the main reasons, why ARINC 664 Part 7 convinced certification bodies of
its robustness and safety is that it is a low complexity solution for the single
fault assumption where one packet might be lost. As such it was certified for





























Figure 5.2: AFDX Redundancy Management, Source:Figure 3-16, ARINC
664P7 [Aer09]
W.r.t. automotive architectures a number of fail-safe platforms have been
proposed. However, the ones reported in the literature do focus on other
aspects of fail-operational capability. For instance, based on the platform
for the RACE project [SCB+13], [BSBA14] computes fail-operational deploy-
ments of software based on hardware aspects, such as redundant power
supplies, i.e. such that each dual modular redundancy (DMR) channel is
dependent on a different power supply. Yet, correct timing behavior as a
technical safety aspect is out of scope of the reported platform. In [BRKS07]
a number of generic redundancy mechanisms for LET based designs are
mentioned. However, the authors strongly focus on an LET implementa-
tion based on TDM scheduling, which significantly limits the flexibility,
as LET is interpreted rather as time triggering. Furthermore, the focus is
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on code generation to develop for such platforms rather than the safety or
fail-operational aspect of timing requirement. Other related work that is not
domain specific can be categorized in two branches: First, system-level mech-
anisms to incorporate fault detection and recovery mechanisms such that
timing guarantees can be provided and second timing analysis techniques
that favour probabilistic bounds instead of static bounds. W.r.t. fault-tolerant
operating systems we focus on two designs here: the ROMAIN framework
[Dö14] and the COMPOSITE OS with extensions for fault tolerance [Par10].
In the two systems a different focus is made for the fault-tolerance aspect for
real-time computing. The work in [SP15] and [SWP13] focuses on latent fault
detection and a recovery with a real-time guarantee, i.e. that a timing bound
on the recovery action is provided through analysis. The system reported
on in [SP15] is a component-based system which tracks all communication
between each component and the rest of the system (such as the event of
component invocation, context switch or interrupt), and dynamically vali-
dates that execution behavior and timing conform to the models specified
offline to analyze the system. Although the system can detect WCET overrun
due to its inherent monitoring features, it suffers from the WCET dilemma
laid out in Section 4.1, i.e. that conservative bounds on the WCET itself are
necessary. However, the timing diversity approach in combination with it
could prove effective, since in the timing diversity approach an exceedance
of the (SL-LET) specification only requires to bring the timing channel in
a defined state for the next execution, i.e. keeps the recovery overhead low
while not requiring conservative WCET bounds. The only limitation is that
an upper bound on the CET must be available for which the probability of a
violation is sufficiently small – this can e.g. be achieved through extensive
measurement campaigns.
The ROMAIN framework is a solution how the state of task replicas can be
compared and treated on mismatch [AEDH12][Dö14]. In DMR mode recov-
ery rolls back the replicas to their last valid state and re-executes them; in the
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) mode, the state of the faulty replica is
replaced with the state of a healthy replica. For the ROMAIN framework dif-
ferent scheduling variants have been proposed in [AQN+13], [Axe16], [RE17],
and [Ram19]. All the reported scheduling variants are based on the BET
model and provide timing bounds on the response-time even if recovery
actions are necessary. In [AQN+13] a fork-join construct is proposed that
divides a protected task in different stages and parallel segments of stages.
Scheduling under partitioned SPP is investigated in [AQN+13] and later in
[Axe16] revised due to optimism in the original approach. As in [Axe16] the
priorities of task stages decrease as their deadlines increase, replicated tasks
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perform worse when mapped in parallel than when mapped to the same core,
i.e. if the redundancy is performed in time. This is due to the state compari-
son that cannot be handled well by the partitioned SPP scheme due to the
lack of a performant synchronization. In an SL-LET based design, this prob-
lem can be overcome by SL-LET’s implicit synchronization characteristic.
How this issue can be overcome from a scheduling perspective is reported
in [RE17] and [Ram19]. The authors apply gang scheduling, which is a co-
scheduling variant that schedules groups of interacting tasks simultaneously.
The “gangs” are the replicas that are mapped to SPP scheduled resources,
however have to be mapped with the highest priority, which inevitably cre-
ates timing dependencies. These dependencies become a limitation if tasks
of different criticalities are replicated and not enough resources are available
to distribute them timing dependence free. In summary, both approaches
provide timing bounds on the response-time of a diversified and redundant
mapping, however they are not directly targeted at faults that cause a devia-
tion of the response time. They rather catch faults that interfere with the
correct function as such they could be used to harden timing diversity setups
against such fault classes. Since also both scheduling variants suffer from the
problem, that they require conservative WCET bounds (cf. Section 4.1), an
SL-LET design with timing diversity based on optimistic worst-case bounds,
resulting e.g. from measurements, can enhance the approach. The timing
diversity approach can provide timing reliability although not necessarily
conservative WCETs are used. Furthermore, timing diversity introduces a
paradigm change in the design of real-time systems with such mechanisms,
as it separates the design model from the implementation model. This
allows the integration engineer to apply mechanisms such as [RE17] without
having to go through the loop with the functional engineer to clarify timing
aspects. The overarching SL-LET design provides clear deadlines (in the
form of the LET write times) for applying the methods from related work
during the integration.
The timing diversity approach also aims to relax the constraints on the
conservativeness of the WCETs parameters, while maintaining a sufficient
timing reliability. Probabilistic timing analysis (PTA) as an extension of
the BET model is a research field of its own, which can coarsely be divided
into the larger subfield of task WCET analysis and a smaller one that also
aims at probabilistic response-time analysis. In [CKM+19] an extensive
survey of past and contemporary probabilistic worst-case execution time
(pWCET) analysis methods are presented. It impressively underlines why
tight conservative WCET parameters are so hard to obtain on contemporary
architectures and that a need exists to deal with this issue at the system
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or cause-effect chain level. Within the field of pWCET analysis, often also
referred to as just PTA, exists a line of work that again takes scheduling effects
into account as a feedback on the observable pWCET behavior. In [KQA+13]
and [DSA+13] specifically the cache evictions that a task may suffer because
of preemption are addressed. However, employing such analysis techniques
on a design is the ultimate counterpart to composable design, as it requires
analyzing very specific configurations and compositions and this has to
be done for every ever so small change. While [CKM+19] surveys pWCET
analysis techniques, the authors of [BBB03] are one representative of work
where pWCET bounds are used in the context of CPA, i.e. where probabilistic
response time bounds are the goal. Similar to conventional performance
analysis methods with conservative WCET bounds which compute latency
metrics on data ([SMT+18], [FRNJ08]), pWCET based performance analysis
also suffers from the problem that results are only intervals, i.e. predictability
of data timing along a cause-effect chain is hard to obtain. A problem that
is overcome by the SL-LET specified system, where a run-time ensures the
adherence of the BET implementation to the SL-LET model.
5.3 Homogeneous Redundancy in SL-LET De-
signs
A generic method to handle stochastic error classes is to apply homogeneous
redundancy for error handling, as e.g. proposed by ISO 26262 in [Int18b, Part 6
Table 5-1c]. The redundancy is referred to as homogeneous, as the two channels
are identical and execute the same software, i.e. no diversification w.r.t. the
implementation of the function is performed. The only limitation for this
course of action is that run-time faults are no common cause faults, as e.g. a
common power supply would be. Common cause faults would invalidate
the statistical independence assumption from Eq. (5.1).
In addition to masking an execution time overshoot, homogeneous redun-
dancy is also able to handle run-time faults due to unexpected hardware
behavior, if the hardware is duplicated as well. In the following the concept
of homogeneous redundancy with redundant hardware is applied to capture
also this fault class and to ensure the statistical independence assumption
for the timing behavior in both channels.
In principle DMR can be applied in two operation modes. Either to only
detect that at least one channel has been struck by an error as a mismatch
between channels, or switching to the correctly functioning channel. In the
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latter case, the scheme requires, that the channel selection logic is capable
of detecting the correctly functioning channel. Here, the latter variant is
applied and the principle is depicted in Fig. 5.3. The setup features two
redundant channels, and a channel selection mechanism. The channels
consist of redundant computation in two SL-LET cause-effect chains C
and C ′ , as well as communication of their results to the channel selection
mechanism. Since the setup is intended to mask timing errors, these must








Figure 5.3: Generic homogeneous redundancy scheme with two redundant
cause-effect chains C and C′
5.3.1 Timing Error Detection in SL-LET Designs
Obviously the channel selection mechanism cannot only be implemented
by detecting the correctly functioning channel, but also by detecting the
faulty channel. It is the nature of timing violations, that they can be detected
by absence of an event at or before a point in time at which an event is
expected. In an SL-LET design, the suitable events are the publication times
of label instances, as the publication times are known in advance for each
job producing them. Hence, it is possible to monitor whether these events
are met for selecting the correctly working channel.
A SL-LET design whose implementation follows the BET execution semantic
is free from error, i.e. behaves as specified, if the correspondence according to
Definition 4.5.1 is fulfilled. Consequently, an error detection mechanism can
be based on the requirements of Definition 4.5.1. The detection mechanism
can e.g. be implemented in the SL-LET middleware that provides the correct
data, i.e. the currently published, to a succeeding job. Here it has to be
supervised that before publication time, the producing job has completed
delivering data. Data over two label instances can remain identical, however,
the middleware needs to be notified that the data is still “fresh”. If a job
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violates event correspondence, and misses the time to publish new data, the
error can be detected.
In a non-redundant setup, this detection mechanism still allows a fail-safe
behavior, as the timing error is detected. Depending on the application,
signaling the circumstance that a new label instance has not been produced
can be used to trigger an appropriate failure handling strategy. For instance
[MHMJZ20] asses methods how control software can still achieve stability
in the presence of timing errors that result in lost or delayed data for the
control algorithm.
5.3.2 Synthesis of DMR for LET Cause-Effect Chains
The goal is now to synthesise a structure that follows the DMR scheme
from Fig. 5.3 from an effect chain specification in SL-LET. Fig. 5.4 shows
in three steps, how a cause-effect chain C = (λ1, ..., λn) can be protected
by homogeneous redundancy. In the first step, the chain C is duplicated
such that we now have C and C ′ . In the second step, each chain is mapped.
Depending on the assumptions for the error model, the mapping process has
different constraints. If hardware characteristics are a fault class that trigger
the error model or cause common cause errors, i.e. make errors statistically
dependent, each chain must be mapped to a subset of the platform graph
such that the mapping relations for C and C ′ map its tasks and labels to
independent subsets of the platform graph Pch1 and Pch2:
Pch1 ∩ Pch2 = ∅ (5.2)
In any case, sufficient independence between the possible errors in both
chains must exist. Note that Eq. (5.2) assumes absence of any further common
cause effects in the platform design. In a case where power glitches can
have an impact on execution-time, e.g. redundant and independent power
supplies are necessary to power the platform in order to avoid a common
cause coupling. In the simplest case where a cause-effect chain only consists
of a single task and ECUs are perfectly common cause error free under the
assumed error model, the two steps only duplicate the task and map the
redundant counterparts to separate ECUs.
The third DMR synthesis step consists of adding two interconnect tasks Φb
and Φ′b that deliver a copy of the labels n and
′
n from the ends of both cause-
effect chains to the channel switch logic. For implementing the channel
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switch logic, two options exist: This can either be done in the SL-LET run-
time environment that takes care of label buffering, or by a receiving job
itself. In the first case, only the label from the correctly working channel is
published for reading by λc. More precisely, only the label that has arrived
in time is published at time Dminb,j = D
min
b′
for consumption by a job λc,k. In
the second case, where a receiving job λc,k itself checks the channels and
performs the switch, the SL-LET run-time must allow that a reading job is
able to determine whether it reads the label instance it is expecting from Φb
and Φ′b. For instance by checking a sequence number. This case is depicted
in Fig. 5.4.
Similarly to the platform subsets for C and C ′ in Eq. (5.2), the subsets for Φb
and Φ′b must also be common cause error free. However, this requirement is
more complicated to express than in Eq. (5.2), as the outputs of both channels
must converge at the channel selection logic. Hence, the mapping relations
ρLETΦ for Φb and Φ
′
b inevitably have common elements at the convergence
point. Typically, software is used at both ends to implement the copy action
of Φb and Φ
′
b, e.g. a communication stack on a joint resource. For sufficient
independence between Φb and Φ
′
b it is therefore acceptable if elements
from the realm of the channel switch logic’s resources are shared, however
the other resources Φb and Φ
′
b are mapped to must be disjoint: Formally,
this means that the sets R̂Φb and R̂Φ′b
consisting of all computation and
communication resources Φb and Φ
′
b consume service on must be disjoint
except for resources Psw that are part of the channel selection logic:
R̂Φb \ Psw ∩ R̂Φ′b
\ Psw = ∅ (5.3)
With:
R̂Φb = {r | (Φb, r) ∈ ρ
LET
Φ } ∀ r ∈ R̂ (5.4)
R̂Φ′b
= {r | (Φ′b, r) ∈ ρ
LET
Φ } ∀ r ∈ R̂ (5.5)
However, for sufficient independence between Φb and Φ
′
b, the common re-
sources must be free from common cause errors w.r.t. the assumed error
model. Note that this must also hold for the implementation, more precisely
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for common BET tasks in a BET implementation, e.g. if Φb and Φ
′
b share
the network stack on the receiving side.
The next section makes the argumentation why both channels only have a
bounded dependence w.r.t. timing based on the timing dependency analysis
from Chapter 2. First however, another important aspect of introducing
DMR to an SL-LET design must be mentioned. While duplicating the cause-
effect chain as shown does not alter the data age of either n nor
′
n, the part of
determining the correct channel and joining channels at the channel switch
logic introduces a delay. A (direct) reader of n without the DMR involved,
directly sees n in the data intervals Dn,i of λn. Yet the consumer λc from
Fig. 5.4 reads n+1 or
′
n+1, which is the copy of either n or
′
n. Hence, the age
of the data read by λc increases by the maximum read-to-write distance
of Φb/Φ
′
b – assuming that Φb and Φ
′
b have identical periods and LETs. If
this violates a data-age requirement from the higher-level software model,
another synthesis step becomes necessary to avoid the violation. In the
course of this synthesis step it can be checked whether LETs along C/C ′
could be optimized such that the software model’s data age constraint is
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Figure 5.4: Steps to duplicate a cause-effect chain ξ for homogeneous redun-
dancy
In order to be a meaningful design step, the DMR setup has to fulfill two
properties. First, that the introduction of DMR has no adversarial effect on
the design in terms of timing reliability and performance. While the check
for performance is already part of the synthesis steps proposed, reliability
is assessed in Section 5.3.4. Second, it has to be established that the timing
behavior in the two channels is (sufficiently) independent according to the
notions of Chapter 2. This is shown in the following.
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5.3.3 Bounded Timing Dependence of DMR channels
In this section we will see that it can be shown with the methods from
Chapter 2 that the channels of the DMR setup only have a bounded timing
dependence. To perform a timing dependency analysis for a cause-effect
chain that has been duplicated as described in the previous section, a BET im-
plementation model is necessary. We therefore assume that for the SL-LET
model resulting from the DMR synthesis process a corresponding BET
model can be derived. The assumptions here are identical to the ones made
for validation of an LET design in Section 4.6.2.
To recapitulate: every LET task λi has a corresponding BET task τλ_i or BET
task chain. Model correspondence is ensured by an appropriate response-
time requirement in the BET model. Furthermore, interconnect tasks Φj
correspond to task chains with event precedences where the source τΦ_j,Tx
and the sink τΦ_j,Rx of the chain are BET tasks on execution resources. The
tasks τΦ_j,Tx and τΦ_j,Rx model the communication stack/middleware ac-
tions to handle network communication. Both tasks communicate sampling
based with their preceding and succeeding tasks according to the cause-
effect chain specified in the LET design model. Computation resources are
assumed to be SPP scheduled and communication resources SPNP sched-
uled. Based on the resulting BET implementation model, the flow for the
bounded dependence proof is shown on the conceptual example.
As TDGs tend to grow easily – at least for visual inspection – we first investi-
gate a minimum example. The cause-effect chain w.l.g. is reduced to a single
task C = (λ1), that for longer chains produces the output label which is
copied by the interconnect task to the channel switch logic in the redundancy
setup. This reduced perspective of a single task is possible due to the injective
property of data-flow (cf. Theorem 4.3.4) in LET cause-effect chains which
results in deterministic input/output relations of label instances. In the
resulting TDG, shown in Fig. 5.5, three connected components (indicated by
blue boxes) can be identified. The first two describe the timing dependencies
on the individual resources of the two channels. We can observe that the
only connections (timing dependencies) from these components to the third
component in the TDG originate from the output event models which be-
come the input event models for τΦ_j,Tx and τΦ_j,Rx . These are highlighted
in red in Fig. 5.5. Consequently, bounded interference proofs are necessary
for these four dependencies, as they resemble the only (timing) interference
path from one channel to the channel switching. And consequently the only
way how a timing failure in one channel chain propagate to the channel
switch logic and impair it. Obviously, impairing correct timing behavior
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of the switch has to be prevented for the DMR setup to be effective against
timing errors in one channel.
Adding additional tasks on the resources of τλ_i and its redundant counter-
part τλ_i does not change the general picture. For sufficient timing indepen-
dence of the channels it is necessary, that the interference on any timing
dependence path originating from either of the channels can be bounded.
Obviously it is also required to ensure sufficient timing independence for
the switch logic as well. To ensure this, a dependency analysis in connection
with a confidence analysis or monitor synthesis can be used, as presented in
Section 2.5 and Chapter 3.
It has to be noted, that the rationale for bounded timing dependence here
is that the system is free of common cause failures[Int18b, Part 1, Clause
3.18] w.r.t. the timing in the two channels. A potential fault class which
can result in common cause failures (CCFs) are common “components”
(software and hardware) in both timing channels. Particularly, base software
and identical hardware could cause dependencies between the channels. It
will be elaborated later, how such dependence can be avoided, i.e. to achieve
statistical independence of the timing failures which can be masked by the
timing diversity setup. Applying measures to a design to avoid dependent
failures [Int18b, Part 1, Clause 3.27] is a common task in safety engineering
[Int18b, Part 9, Clause 7].
5.3.4 Reliability Considerations
In order to be able to evaluate whether a DMR setup actually improves
the reliability of cause-effect chain timing, we can examine the design’s
success probabilities. We will use the common notion of reliabilityR(t) as a
metric here. Generally speaking,R(t) denotes the probability, that a design
is working without an LET violation in the time interval [0, t]. Formally
expressed as:
R(t) = P[no LET violation in [0; t]] (5.6)
Reliability as a metric, broken down to individual tasks is also used e.g. in
[SE09b] for formal analysis of CAN bus communication or [Axe16] for the
formal analysis of BET task replicas on an multi-processor system-on-chip
(MPSoC). The objective here is to derive the reliability of entire cause-effect
chains and ultimately of the synthesised DMR setup. The knowledge of the
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Figure 5.5: TDG (labeled with the idices of ) of the corresponding BET model
showing that the only timing dependence between the DMR channels and
the channel switch are the output event models from the two channels,
assuming that an upper bound on transmitted data exists.
161
CHAPTER 5. TIMING DIVERSITY AS A SAFETY MEASURE
reliability function for the entire design, sometimes also referred to the
survival function, can also be used to calculate further common metrics to





It has already been mentioned that the DMR setup for timing diversity
is able to handle two error classes: First, timing errors that result in LET
violations, and second stochastic hardware errors that cause the failure of
a platform element. However, the latter is a byproduct of the mapping to
disjoint platform elements. Before considering these concrete error models,
we focus on the DMR setup’s reliability in general. To compute R(t) for
entire cause-effect chains we first focus on the reliability of timely execution
of individual tasks.
Definition 5.3.1: Success
The event such that the BET execution of the j-th job of an LET task
λi meets the LET LETi is referred to as Si,j.
Definition 5.3.2: Success Probability
The success probability P[Si,j] is the probability that the BET execution
of the j-th job of an LET task λi meets LETi.
Hence, we can conclude, that a cause-effect chain instance Ck,l is successful if
all of its jobs λi,j ∈ Ck,l yield success according to Definition 5.3.1. Deriving
the probability of this, however, is not trivial, since it requires knowing in
which time interval the jobs of Ck,l are active. However, we can derive the reli-
abilityRi(t) of any task λi, as the probability that all jobs λi,1, ..., λi,n, which
have completed with success (cf. Definition 5.3.1) and have been released in
the time interval [0; t] by:
Ri(t) = P[Si,1 ∧ Si,2 ∧ ...∧ Si,n] ∀λi,j : 0 ≤ R̂i,j (5.8)
This is done under the assumption that errors are statistically independent
w.r.t. individual jobs. Based on this assumption, it can be further reasoned
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about the reliability of a cause-effect chain instance Ci,j (cf. Definition 4.3.3),





Hence we can define the reliability of a cause-effect chain in the interval
[0; t]:
Definition 5.3.3: Cause-Effect Chain Reliability
A (serial, branch free) cause-effect chain Ci = (λ1, ..., λn), is successful,
if all instances of it started in the interval [0; t] are successful. Its
reliability is hence given by:
RCi (t) = ∏
j : Ci,jstarts in [0;t]
RCi,j
Theorem 5.3.4: Cause-Effect Chain Reliability Bound
For a serial, brach free, cause-effect chain Ci = (λ1, ..., λn), the relia-
bility in the time interval [0; t] can be bounded by the reliability of
the tasks contained in it, i.e. when these yield success according to
Definition 5.3.1:
RCi (t) = ∏
j : Ci,j starts in [0;t]
RCi,j
≥ ∏
k : λk ∈ Ci
Rk(t)
Proof 5.3.5:
The success probability of individual task instances are considered
independet of each other. Since Ra(t) for a task λa considers all
jobs of a task λa started in [0; t] it is a lower bound for a subset of
jobs, asRa(t) conservatively considers all (independent) jobs. Hence,
for a cause-effect chain all potential jobs are considered, not just
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Note that this is a conservative assumption which considers jobs that might
not necessarily have to be considered. This is for instance the case when
Ci contains tasks with different release periods and offsets. In this case,
oversampling and undersampling occurs, and hence not every job of a task
λj ∈ Ci is part of any cause-effect chain instance. In this case a job λj,k may
not be successful, however all cause-effect chain instances are. Nevertheless,
we consider this case as an unsuccessful execution. Hence, Theorem 5.3.4 is
a conservative approximation of the reliability.
The SL-LET DMR setup that we consider consists of two parallel cause-
effect chains out of which only one has to complete successfully, i.e. timely.
Furthermore, also the channel switch logic has to work successfully, i.e. de-
termine which channel has completed according to the LET scheme. Using
the theory of reliability block diagrams (RBDs) the success probability of
such complex structures can be computed [Mos58]. The theory assumes that
a system consists of a network of serial and parallel strands of blocks, where
a single block can be made up from a nested network of blocks. Through
computation rules for serial and parallel block strands the reliability for the
entire network can be computed.
We consider the three essential parts of the SL-LET DMR system (channels,
interconnect tasks, and channel switch logic) as blocks in the RBD. The
resulting RBD shown in Fig. 5.6 yields success, if either the orange strand,






Figure 5.6: Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) to calculate the success proba-
bility of an SL-LET DMR setup
Note that blocks in RBDs can be nested, i.e. a block can again contain an
entire reliability network. Hence, we assume w.l.g. that the RCh1(t) and
RCh2(t) blocks abstracts the initial cause-effect chain and the blocksRΦ (t)
andRΦ′(t) abstract the communication towards the channel switch logic.
The overall reliability of the blue (R1(t)) and orange blocks (R2(t)) in series
can be computed by:
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R1(t) = RCh1(t) · RΦ (t) (5.10)
R2(t) = RCh2(t) · RΦ′ (t) (5.11)
The parallel strands are successful if either one channel or both channels
are successful. The complementary event is both strands fail:
P[both fail in [0; t]] = (1−R1(t))(1−R2(t)) (5.12)
Hence, the success probability of parallel strands (R‖(t)) can be computed
as one minus the complementary event, resulting in a success probability
for the parallel strands of:
R‖(t) = 1− (1−R1(t))(1−R2(t)) (5.13)
The overall reliability is again a series concatenation ofR‖(t) and theRsw(t)
block: This yields a DMR success probability of:
RDMR(t) = R‖(t) · Rsw(t) (5.14)
This result can already be used to reason when the DMR setup is meaningful,




Whereas the reliability of the non-redundant variant is the reliability of for
the non duplicated LET cause-effect chain according to Theorem 5.3.4. The
logical constraint when to apply DMR is that the redundant variant is more
reliable than the non-redundant one.
Now we turn to the particular fault type we envision to mitigate with timing
diversity: violations of execution time assumptions that would ultimately
lead to response-time requirement violations. While the previous reliability
estimation does consider stochastic faults, which also have their error effect
at runtime, the faults considered here conceptually already happen at design-
time, but the effects only become observable at runtime. Hence, they are also
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at-runtime errors. With design-time faults the success in the sense of the
reliability estimation is that expected behavior as encoded by the CL-model
is actually observable at runtime. The reliability is thus the probability that
the observable behavior is covered by the model expectations.
The model for design-time faults that is taken as the basis here makes two
assumptions: First, that the structure of the design is correct. W.r.t. the model
layers of the CLM this means that the graphs that form the basis of a model
layer are structurally correct, i.e. that a design fault does not introduce or
omit edges or nodes in the CLM. Second, it assumes that the modeled
errors, i.e. different runtime behavior than described by the model, originate
from wrongfully specified parameters as the design fault. Wrongfully specified
parameters can have two types of effects on the verification and analyses
performed on the model: First, an erroneous specification causes overly
conservative verification and analysis results. As all the (timing) verification
methods considered in this thesis are conservative, these design-faults only
have benign effects at runtime. The consequence is that this type of faults can
be seen as immediately masked as no hazardous effects can occur at runtime.
Although it is undesirable that system resources are poorly utilized it does
not cause hazards at runtime and thus they are not considered. Second,
a faulty parameter specification can lead to non-conservative behavior at
run-time. This effect is targeted by the assumed error model for timing
diversity. The essence of it being that parameters which contain a fault in
their specification can cause run-time failures, such as exceeding a response-
time bound and eventually the violation of an LET leading to an invalid
model correspondence.
Furthermore, the error model is limited to the assumption that specifica-
tion faults do not trigger as common cause errors in both DMR channels
simultaneously at runtime. At first sight, this seems counter-intuitive as
the software in both channels might only be duplicate instances and hence
the design time fault would be the root cause making both channels de-
pendent. However, this common case only appears if execution in both
channels occurs in a lockstep manner, where the timing behavior of CPU
microarchitecture is deterministic, and scheduling and input data is syn-
chronized. Particularly, scheduling also includes the remaining load of the
system and not only the software under investigation. Instead, contemporary
embedded high-performance architectures as e.g. the Renesas RCar H3 SoC
[Ren] or Intel’s scalable Denverton platform [Int20] exhibit a different picture.
For computation performance, the RCar H3 SoCs rely on ARM Cortex-57
[ARM13] cores. Like comparable CPU microarchitectures these cores feature
out-of-order and speculative execution features. While traditional safety ar-
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chitectures as e.g. the Infineon TriCore [Inf12] refrain from such techniques
or restrict speculation to data reads, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) CPUs
that are also used in smartphones, etc., however, rely on these techniques
for optimal average case performance [ARM13]. This produces inherent
non-determinism w.r.t. the timing behavior of even a single instruction in a
core’s pipeline.
Further, performance architectures run a complex operating system stack.
Virtualization allows to execute a number of virtual machines (VMs) with
their own OS on a single SoC. This indirection w.r.t. hardware access fur-
ther increases non-determinism of the execution time behavior of tasks
residing in one VM. As (efficient) virtualization requires more complex
memory access handling through MMUs that support virtualization, data
access latencies become dependent on the memory hierarchy and how it
is accessed. While caches and cache coherence have a significant influence
[LGR+16], also page faults or TLB misses can trigger lengthy recover pro-
cedures. Particularly the fact “who” else and at which point in time access
memory becomes crucial. Static WCET estimation techniques as assumed
by classical system-level timing analysis like CPA or MPA are unable to fol-
low the pace of technical innovations for memory and cache hierarchies
[WEE+08]. The newer field of probabilistic timing analysis [CKM+19] is also
limited by the fact that the software under analysis is not in full control
of the platform. Furthermore, a significant number of future applications
functionally require rich OSes such as Linux. For instance applications built
on robot operating system (ROS) and data distribution service (DDS). Alike,
efforts in recent years were made to decrease the timing uncertainty of the
PREEMPT_RT Linux kernel [RMF19] [OO16] [OCOC20]. While the research
for PREEMPT_RT does not allow to provide conservative estimates, espe-
cially due to the reasons already named above, it allows reasonable bounds
for the “common worst-case” and the knowledge that a true worst-case rarely
appears. In conclusion, the view embraced here for the fault model accepts
inherent weaknesses of contemporary WCET estimation techniques and how
operating systems and computational platform specifics influence WCET
behavior. In addition to this, DMR introduces a method into the design that
remedies this weakness. Under the assumption that all sources of timing un-
certainty lead to different timing traces in both channels the common cause
fault of violating a specified parameter can be excluded. This assumption is
backed by the discussed timing uncertainties. The independence can even
be increased if the design makes sure that the background load on a resource
or shared SoC has a different execution trace characteristic in both channels.
The consequence of differing execution traces in both DMR channels is that
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no common cause fault event happens. A manifesting error (at runtime)
hence only affects one channel and consequently the SL-LET based DMR
setup protects against the timing error, as it can select the channel which is
on time.
The timing in the erroneous channel violates the assumptions for model
correspondence of the BET execution model and the SL-LET design model.
Hence, selecting the properly working channel can be performed by moni-
toring the LET of the interconnect tasks that deliver the data to the channel
switch logic.
The overall timing reliability of the setup can also be evaluated with the RBD
methodology applied in Fig. 5.6 with three basic steps:
• Assignment of a reliability to each LET task that models that the LET
will be met
• Computing the reliability of the two cause-effect chain strands that
form a DMR channel as a serial connection of reliability blocks
• Computing the reliability of the entire DMR setup as a serial connec-
tion of the LET task that implements the channel switch logic and the
two parallel strands that form the two channels.
Note that the channel switch logic does not necessarily have to be imple-
mented in a separate LET task, but can be part of a middleware implemen-
tation. In this case the reliability that this implementation provides the
correct data on time to the subsequent subscriber is used.
As concrete error probabilities are hard to obtain discretization of error
probabilities as done by safety standards and confidence analysis could be
applied. However, in the remainder of this work, the main focus is put on
the fact whether sufficient (statistical) independence between the timing
channels can be established, such that timing diversity increases the overall
reliability . Following Eq. (5.15) it can be seen that the DMR setup improves
reliability if sufficient independence for common cause errors can be argued
for a particular design. Consequently, the DMR setup can improve timing
reliability for designs where truly conservative specification is impossible
and e.g. only tracing-based WCET estimation is possible. The setup helps to
mitigate non-conservative specification (design faults) that can eventually
result in runtime timing errors.
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5.4 Experiments and Case Studies
5.4.1 Timing Diversity Case Study: Environment Perception
As laid out, a particular side effect of the timing diversity concept is that the
demands on the specification of WCETs can be relaxed, even if the timing
of the original cause-effect chain itself is already critical. This is due to the
fact that the redundancy can mask the effects of a timing errors. Hence, this
case study presents the design of a complex automated driving cause-effect
chain, that in contrast to the lateral controller example from Chapter 2
through Chapter 3 can not be easily implemented on timing predictable
architectures, or architectures that by configuration can achieve a timing










Figure 5.7: 3D perception cause-effect chain from autoware.auto as ROS
nodes
The example cause-effect chain that we consider here is a 3D-perception
application taken from autoware.auto [Aut] and shown in Fig. 5.7. In this
chain, LIDAR images from a Velodyne laser scanner obtained at 10 Hz are
processed by a point cloud filter before a ray-ground filter determines the
ground plane in the resulting data. For prototyping a recorded actual image
sequence is fed from a packet capture (pcap) file to the Velodyne driver. The
non-ground points in the resulting data are subsequently processed by an
euclidean cluster algorithm, clustering points into objects. The output of
this step could now for instance be used for sensor fusion, to fuse it with
objects detected by additional sensors or to check the objects for plausibility.
For the sensor fusion time coherence of the data is essential, which requires
some form of synchronization. At minimum the data age of the objects must
be known to resolve objects with high spacial accuracy in the environment
of the vehicle.
In terms of integrating the algorithms on a platform, they are characterized
by the fact that they are computationally demanding and thus require high
performance platforms. Besides this, they often entail the need for rich
operating systems that are at least POSIX capable, such as Linux or the
AUTOSAR adaptive platform.
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For the case-study we choose an Intel x86_x64 platform which already can
be found in automotive OEMs’ roadmaps for perception systems, e.g. the
Intel Denverton platform [Yos20]. The case study itself is the 3D perception
stack of the Autoware.auto project 1, which is based on ROS2 2 and runs on
Linux as operating system. ROS2 is a data-centric middleware essential built
around the DDS protocol suite. In ROS2 the producer and consumer of data
are essentially ROS nodes, whereas each of the nodes can exist as a separate
binary. The ROS2 API abstracts the DDS API of several DDS vendors for the
ROS client library. Essentially, the DDS specification would allow SL-LET to
be implemented as part of its interface, i.e. to become an SL-LET middleware,
as DDS takes care of publishing and delivering data.
The purpose of this case study is to show, that a cause-effect chain like
the one of the autoware.auto 3D perception example can be modeled and
specified with SL-LET and that the timing diversity scheme can be applied
to it in order to increase its timing reliability despite the fact that no hard
WCET bounds are available. Here, we focus on the three computationally
expensive nodes, namely the point cloud filter, the ray ground classifier and
the euclidean cluster node.
As a first step, either the execution time and activation pattern character-
istics, or directly the latency characteristics of the three nodes must be
obtained. Note that in the former case, latency characteristics would be
obtained through analysis of execution time and activation patterns of soft-
ware on the platform. Since for the experiments platforms no execution
time analysis tools are available, we resort to measuring the latency by in-
strumentation – if executed at the highest priority the latency effectively
becomes the execution time. Obviously this neglects blocking effects but
is a reasonable first approximation. For this purpose callbacks that record
the start and end time of a when a node is processing an image are inserted.
Hence, the time between recorded start and end time can be treated as a job.
The ROS middleware and nodes of the autoware.auto example used here
run on Linux. The Linux kernel in principle is a static priority scheduler
that distinguishes different policies. While the “normal” scheduling policies
execute on priority level 0 (lowest), the SCHED_FIFO policy that is used for
the ROS nodes here, assigns priorities between 1 (low) and 99 (highest). The
Linux documentation refers to SCHED_FIFO as a real-time policy [SCH]. In
the SCHED_FIFO policy, a thread that becomes runnable and has a higher
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running thread of lower priority. Threads on the same priority are executed
in FIFO order. For the measurements the PREEMPT_RT kernel extensions
are applied. Measurement-based execution times are also used in the evalu-
ation and case study of [CBLB19] who proposes a response-time analysis for
ROS2 nodes under the SCHED_DEADLINE policy of the Linux kernel.
To demonstrate the complexity and the numerous side effects of modern
platforms and Linux as an operating system, the measurements for each
node are performed in four different settings. To generate the four settings
we use a combination of two configurations with two alternating options.
The first configuration option is whether background load is applied to the
system, and second which power saving strategy is used. As background
load, we resort to mprime, which searches for prime numbers with special
properties [MR]. Mprime is chosen since the load it generates is not I/O
limited and mainly generates stress on the CPUs. Power saving as a feature
is particularly interesting, since it is somewhat inevitable on modern perfor-
mance architectures but can cause counter-intuitive effects as can be seen
in the measurements. It also demonstrates that a lot of effects can not be
treated in isolation but all its dependencies are also hard to consider due
to their variety. In the concrete case, power saving is disabled by choosing
the performance governor of the Linux kernel instead of the default power
management strategy which is the ondemand governor.
5.4.1.1 Execution Time Measurement Results
Fig. 5.8 shows the response time measurements obtained for the ray ground
estimation node while processing sensor data from a ≈ 8 min test drive
with new images sampled at ≈ 10 Hz. For this measurement, the node
received the highest priority in the system, i.e. the measured response-time
is effectively an execution-time measurement. For the remaining nodes,
the kernel’s ksoftirqd which manages soft interrupts interferes as it was put
on the second highest priority. The latter is necessary to ensure smooth
replay of the pcap file with sensor data. The remaining ROS nodes are
assigned a priority of the SCHED_FIFO policy. No other threads are put
on a priority from one to 99, i.e. other load is scheduled under the regular
policies. Specifically the background load that is applied in two experiments.
The results are shown as violin plots, which show the relative frequency
of different execution time/latency values. The plots include a marker for
the median of the data and a box indicating the interquartile range, as in
standard box plots.
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Figure 5.8: Relative frequency distribution of response-times of the ray
ground classifier node
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What can be observed in Fig. 5.8 from the first two experiments (orange and
blue violins), is initially counter-intuitive. The frequency distribution of
response times is more compact if background load is applied to the plat-
form, whereas it spreads if only the ROS chain is executed. Intuitively, one
would assume the narrow relative frequency distribution of response times /
execution times if the software executes in isolation without interference.
In these experiments the default power management strategy of the Linux
kernel is used and the effect can be explained by the way the default power
management strategy works: It decreases the number of cycles, in which
the kernel reduces the frequency of the core, based on the entire system
load. Hence, a higher loaded system generates shorter response times, as
the cores run with the maximum frequency which is thermally possible. It is
important to note, that the thermal budget of modern CPUs is typically the
limiting factor here, as continuous operation at maximum performance is
usually outside the long-term sustainable operational envelope. Due to this
reason power management is inevitable. Even the performance governor
used in two experiments here, can not guarantee that all cores will always run
at the highest frequencies, since the hardware itself dictates the maximum
possible speeds based on the thermal budget. The kernel’s governor is hence
limited by these values. However, we can observe that in experiments with
the performance governor enabled (green and red violins), the frequency
distribution of response times is similar, disregarding whether background
load is applied to the system or not. In the demonstrated case, no further in-
fluence on the thermal budget is present – at least not intentionally. However,
this might be different in real automotive conditions, where e.g. mounting
positions and long term mechanical stress on heat conductive material can
influence the thermal budget of cores. This is an easily overlooked aspect of
modern performance architectures.
What can be initially concluded from these experiments is that for individual
tasks a wide spread of the execution time / latency can be observed. The
frequency distribution is altered with a slightly different configuration of
the hardware and software platform, including the other load a system
executes. It can also be observed in Fig. 5.8, that all four experiments do not
exhibit significant outliers, and that although median values and observed
maxima vary an estimated WCET / WCRT including a safety margin could
be derived from the measurements. Such a specification can be subsequently
used for an SL-LET specified and BET implemented system with timing
diversity in which remaining timing errors can be masked due to timing
diversity. However, this does not yet show that a timing diversity scheme
with redundant channels can sufficiently handle the situation – this is shown
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in the last part of Section 5.4.1.3 for the SL-LET based timing diversity setup
from the next section.
Due to different core affinities, measurements of the latency between the
start callback and the end callback for the other two ROS nodes can also be
interpreted as execution times, as no overlapping execution of the nodes,
i.e. where preemption would take place, can be observed. This can be done in
the execution trace recorded with the LTTng toolkit [LTT]. Fig. 5.9 shows an
excerpt for one chain instance. The resulting relative frequency distributions




Figure 5.9: Sequential execution of the nodes in one chain instance
Particularly, the relative frequency distribution of response-times of the
point cloud filter in Fig. 5.10 shows the same “anomaly” as for the ray ground
classifier in the experiment with the default power management (blue and
orange violins). However, the relative frequency of response-times of the
euclidean clustering algorithm in Fig. 5.11 for the experiment with the de-
fault power saving strategy appear as expected, i.e. with a longer tail and
higher median value for the experiment with background load (orange vi-
olin) compared to no background load (blue violin). This effect cannot be
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Figure 5.10: Relative frequency distribution of response-times of the point
cloud filter node
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Figure 5.11: Relative frequency distribution of response-times of the eu-
clidean cluster node
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explained with the impact of the ondemand power governor. Nevertheless,
response times observed in Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11 allow to specify a WCRT
for BET execution and to apply the timing diversity pattern to catch residual
timing errors, as all observed response time samples are in the same order
of magnitude.
5.4.1.2 Specifying the Chain in SL-LET
Based on the measured execution times/latencies from Fig. 5.10, Fig. 5.8,
and Fig. 5.11, LETs are specified in Table 5.1. The chain is triggered with a
period of 100 ms corresponding to the 10 Hz of the new image arrival from
the LIDAR’s pcap file.
Table 5.1: SL-LET Specification for the system in Fig. 5.7 partitioned into a
cause-effect chain C = {λ1, λ2, λ3}.
Task Description LET Period Offset
λ1 point cloud filter 5.7 ms 100 ms 0 ms
λ2 ray ground filter 8 ms 100 ms LET1
λ3 euclidean cluster 120 ms 100 ms LET1 +
LET3
Table 5.1 shows one possible SL-LET specification for the cause-effect chain
presented in Fig. 5.7. By aligning the tasks with offsets to the LET of the prede-
cessor, the chain achieves a minimum end-to-end response time compared
to the case where all tasks operate with the same period but without offsets.
It has to be noted that C here exhibits a constant data-age, as all tasks λi ∈ C
execute with the same period. As in the case study in Table 5.1, the tasks
are aligned front-to-back, the end-to-end read-to-write latency (identical to
the data-age here) is the sum over the LETs, i.e. R2W−C = R2W
+
C = 133.7 ms.
The end-to-end data age will also stay identical when the cause-effect chain
is ported to a different platform, as long as the LETs of all λi ∈ C are still
met under normal operation. Executed with the timing diversity scheme
and timing errors, the chain C will still yield the same functional results
(given identical input data) compared to non-diversified execution, as long
as at least one channel is free from timing errors for each chain instance.
However, the LET of the interconnect task that is needed due to the diversity
scheme has to be added. Yet, this latency can be abstracted in the order of a
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few ms, e.g. for Ethernet-based communication, and thus keeps the resulting
end-to-end latency reasonable [TE16a] [ATED14] [TAE15] [TSAE16b].
The overall performance of the cause-effect chain in terms of read-to-write
latency is largely dependent on the LETs. While timing diversity can compen-
sate LETs errors, the fact how aggressively they can be shortened is a matter
of the desired timing reliability. Naturally, this requires further investiga-
tions for specific combinations of applications (algorithms), platforms, and
configuration of platforms, as they determine whether the required diversity
is in the execution and response time profile of a task. The values chosen
here for illustration, are rather aggressive. While the LETs safely and with
additional margin conform to the measurements with either background
load and/or the performance governor they are only above the 50%-quartile
in the case of the standard power governor (blue violin in Fig. 5.10, Fig. 5.8,
and Fig. 5.11).
5.4.1.3 Catching SL-LET Deadline Violations with Timing Diversity
To check whether the proposed DMR approach for timing diversity can
be effective we need to obtain measurements that allow to compare two
jobs/instances of all the LET tasks. These two jobs need to process the same
data, as they do in a DMR setup. Therefore, recorded traces with identical
input data are aligned and the latency of both executions compared. The
diversity in this setup is introduced through the fact that the kernel’s soft
interrupt handling interferes with node execution, no core pinning is done
(hence other workload in the system is able to influence the cache behavior),
and disabling the performance governor which resulted in the largest spread
of latencies. Due to the unpredictability introduced by these factors, it can
be expected that the timing channels behave differently.
A result’s data point consists of the latencies obtained for corresponding
node executions in both channels. Further each value is annotated in which
channel it was obtained. From the individual latencies, the difference in
latency is computed. The results are shown in a scatter plot for which Fig. 5.12
provides the explanation how to read the scatter plot. A scatter plot depicts
each result as a single point. In the plot, points are categorized by which
channel resulted in the maximum latency of a pair, i.e. categories are either
‘Channel 1’ or ‘Channel 2’. The y-axis provides the value of the maximum of
the two measured latencies. The x-axis shows the difference of the latencies
of both jobs processing the same data. Note that theoretically a third category
is necessary for points with an x-value of 0 ns, as in this case the latency in
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both channels is equal. However, in the experiment results in Fig. 5.13 such
a case was not observed. To interpret the data points, Fig. 5.12 shows the
deadline, i.e. the LET, for each node as a red line. For points below this
line both jobs meet the LET. The blue line represents f (x) = x + deadline.
Since, the x values are the latency difference of a redundant job pair, the
orange area between the red and the blue line contain all pairs, where the
job from the indicated category is above the deadline but the other one is
below the deadline. Consequently, points in this area mark job pairs, where
the timing diversity scheme actively masks the LET violation, regardless
of the cause of the LET violation. Only points above the blue line can not
be handled with the timing diversity approach, as an LET violation in both
channels would occur.





















One instance larger than deadline,
second instance below deadline
Feasible Region: Both instances below the deadline
Figure 5.12: Explanation of the scatter plot evaluating the timing diversity
experiment
To show the general applicability of the timing diversity concept to complex
cause-effect chains, we perform the experiment with the ondemand governor
in both DMR channels. The results are depicted in Fig. 5.13 for all three ROS
nodes, respectively LET tasks. The red line in all three (sub)plots, marks the
specified LET from Table 5.1.
Interpretation: First, we can observe in Fig. 5.13, that no instances are in the
unfeasible region, i.e. where the timing diversity scheme is unable to handle
LET errors. However, such instances would appear if the deadline / LET is
lowered further. Similarly, increasing it would push the region between the
red and the blue line upward, i.e. fewer cases would have to be caught by
timing diversity. Yet, this would also result in longer end-to-end latencies
over the SL-LET chain. Hence, the values for LETs have to be carefully chosen
in relation to the cause-effect chain and hardware / software platform at hand.
Second and most important, it can be observed in Fig. 5.13, that the points
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Figure 5.13: Scatter Plots showing the maximum latency of a job pair over
the difference in latency for the pair as explained by Fig. 5.12
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in the area where the DMR setup can correct LET violations are a mixture
from both categories, i.e. channels. This is an indication that the DMR setup
generally works, as not always the same channel has to be corrected and that
there is reason to assume that there is some level of statistical independence
that should be investigated in future work. Furthermore, since no points are
above the blue exclusion line, where no correction is possible, the experiment
also supports the claim that the DMR setup increases the overall timing
reliability. This is the case, since all the events in the area between the red
and the blue line would result in a timing failure, i.e. violation of the LET,
if the setup is not duplicated. In conclusion, for the parametrization of the
3D perception chain in Table 5.1 together with the LIDAR data of an eight-
minute test drive 1, the SL-LET DMR setup demonstrates its suitability. For
this parametrization the timing diversity scheme catches all LET violations
observed in the experiment, i.e. for a particular test drive / stream of LIDAR
data, whereas a non-redundant variant would have failed multiple times
(cf. Fig. 5.13).
5.4.1.4 Statistical Test of the Independence Hypothesis
In the context of student’s master thesis the statistical independence as-
sumption for response times was investigated further. Results thereof are
summarized and submitted in [MHCE21]. In this work, the environment
perception chain from Fig. 5.7 was tested with the same LIDAR data as
above, but on a different hardware platform, which is depicted in Fig. 5.14.
The two performance hosts thereby implemented the two timing channels.
The processors of the two hosts have six-cores without simultaneous multi-
threading (SMT). Their configuration is similar to the experiment above but
differs in details, like Linux Kernel version, and concrete priority assignment.
The Kernel version employed here is 5.6.19-rt12 with PREEMPT_RT. All the
nodes of the ROS chain receive priorities in ascending order, whereby the
node that performs the replay of the pcap file receives the lowest priority in
the chain and the driver node, which translates the pcap data into LIDAR
images, receives the second lowest. The point cloud filter and the ray ground
classifier node are pinned to core 0 at priorities 46 and 47, respectively, while
the euclidean cluster node is pinned to core 1 at priority 48. Power-saving
options, like C-States, are disabled and the performance governor is enabled.
All cores ran at a fixed clock frequency of 3.5 GHz. This configuration, at
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the experiment targeted caches as the source of the diversity. Therefore,
both hosts were stressed with background load from the stress-ng tool suite

















Figure 5.14: Platform used to obtain measurements for the statistical test.
Source: Robin Hapka.
On each host, all remaining four cores, i.e. cores 2 to 5, execute the cache
stress test from stress-ng, which performs random widespread memory read
and writes to thrash the cache. This workload not only stresses the cache
alone but also causes the core to be fully loaded. All stress-ng threads are
executed on a user-level priority.
Since the hardware platform is different from the one in the previous ex-
periment, and LETs where previously chosen aggressively, the LETs for the
nodes are adapted to be equally aggressive as above. They are based on
initially measured latencies, i.e. the approach is the same as above. The task
parametrization is provided in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Alternative SL-LET Specification for the system in Fig. 5.7 on the
platform from Fig. 5.14.
Task Description LET Period Offset
λ1 point cloud filter 1.3 ms 100 ms 0 ms
λ2 ray ground filter 2.7 ms 100 ms LET1
λ3 euclidean cluster 68 ms 100 ms LET1 +
LET3
The latency measurements, were performed 56 times with the same LIDAR
data, i.e. 112 times if executions in the timing channels are counted individ-
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ually. By feeding in the same LIDAR data on each run of the chain, the node
jobs become comparable, as each n-th job of a node processes the same data.
The response times are categorized into two categories: No LET violation
and LET violation. More precisely, the first category ranges from 0 ms to the
respective LET for each node (cp. Table 5.2), and the second category from
the LET to infinity. The resulting contingency table has two dimensions,
i.e. the both timing channels, with two categories each.
Since due to the long run-time of the experiments, only 56 comparable
repetitions are available. Therefore, Fisher’s exact test1 was applied to test
the statistics. It is particularly effective for 2x2 contingency tables and small
random sample sizes. Both is the case here.
Fisher’s exact test’s null-Hypothesis H0 is that the data is independent in the
two dimensions of the contingency table are statistically independent. In
the case here, the two dimensions are the timing channels, sub-categorized
in whether a job has completed below the LET or above the LET. The
test’s alternative hypothesis H1 is that the data is dependent. We choose a
confidence level of 95%. Fisher’s exact test was performed for all the 4715
samples processed by the ROS nodes in the 56 repetitions, i.e. each node
performs 4715 computations for each run of the pcap file. Due to effects of
the automatic lttng tracing, the execution of the first/last sample may not be
evaluated correctly – these obvious measurement errors were omitted in the
evaluation. The results are listed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Results of Fishers’ test on the response-time data from both
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For, in total only 9 samples, statistical significant independence could not be
shown, and the alternative hypothesis was adopted by the test. The decision
parameter of Fisher’s exact test is the computed probability of obtaining
a distribution at least as extreme as the one that was actually observed,
assuming that the null hypothesis is true. At a significance level of α = 0.05,
this probability must be at least 0.05 or higher. In six out of the nine cases
– twice for the ray ground nodes and four times for the point cloud node
– the probability is only ≈ 0.035, the remaining three cases range between
0.011 and 0.017. However, for the overwhelming majority of tested samples,
Fisher’s exact test shows a statistical significant independence of the response
times in the two timing channels, i.e. on the two hosts. In these cases, the
probability result approaches ≈ 1.
Interpretation: There are multiple factors that may influence the result
of the statistic test: First, there is the random sample size, which is fairly
small with only 56 samples. Although Fisher’s test is much better suited
for this situation than e.g. the χ2 test, it could cause the nine results where
the alternative hypothesis was adopted. Second, the tests are performed
on categorized data. Since the data is categorized based on a basically ar-
bitrary deadline, this choice obviously has an influence, as a change of the
(specified) deadline also changes the contingency tables. The choice of a
suitable deadline is highly application specific, hence it has to be taken into
account when the timing diversity scheme is considered for improving the
timing reliability of a design. Third, the algorithms in the processing chain
of this case study have a dependence on the input data. Hence, it has to be
studied whether the size and run-time complexity caused by the input data
has an influence on the response time behavior. Such a dependence could
be interpreted as a common cause failure which could not be captured by a
DMR scheme such as timing diversity.
5.4.2 Case Study: Exploiting Timing Diversity for ASIL De-
composition
In this case study we take another step back to the point of specifying timing
requirements and how they related to high level functional safety goals. The
question that shall be answered here is how the timing diversity can be
applied such that the safety and integration process benefits from it. We
again consider an environment perception function for which we assume
the chain in Fig. 5.7 is one possible implementation, or at least a part of it.
184
5.4. EXPERIMENTS AND CASE STUDIES
Assume that in the course of safety engineering one of the safety goals for
the sub function of the laser scanner specifies as: 1
An object in the detection area of the laser scanner must be in the object
map no later than x time units.
In the safety process this safety goal receives an ASIL value. This safety goal is
imposed on the implementation of the cause-effect chain implementing the
LIDAR-based object detection. Effectively, this means for an SL-LET design
that a maximum read-to-write distance R2W+C from reading the sensor
output to writing the object map, must be guaranteed with the assigned
ASIL.
ISO 26262 in Part 9 Clause 5 explicitly embraces the concept of ASIL decom-
position. It is a concept of “apportioning of redundant safety requirements to
elements, with sufficient independence, conducing to the same safety goal,
with the objective of reducing the ASIL of the redundant safety requirements
that are allocated to the corresponding elements” [Int18b, Part 1 Clause 3.6].
The intent behind this concept is that if in the design of the architecture is
sufficiently independent and redundant elements exist, then it is possible to
allocate a specific safety requirement to two (or more) of these elements. In
this case, the standard allows that the redundant requirements may receive
a lower ASIL than its original parent. As a consequence, this can signifi-
cantly reduce the development and documentation process efforts if parts
of a design element can be attributed with a lower ASIL. Nevertheless, the
decomposed requirement is effectively the same requirement. The possible
decompositions w.r.t. ISO 26262 are provided in Clause 5.4.9 of Part 9 in
[Int18b] and are depicted in Fig. 5.15.
Note that the original ASIL before the decomposition is applied is given in
parentheses – this is required by the standard in order to be able to trace
where a requirement came from [Int18b, Part 9, Clause 5.4.8]. Decomposi-
tions can also be applied recursively, however, for each decomposition it
must be argued that sufficient independence between the redundant elements
exists [Int18b, Part 9, Clause 5.4.10]. Furthermore, if the decomposition re-
sults in a function plus a safety mechanism, the safety mechanism must carry
1Note that this case study is limited in exhaustiveness and only focuses on aspects relevant
here. Further the argumentation brought forward here is largely based on ISO26262:2018 which
does not yet cover automated vehicle functions in general such as ISO/PAS 21448:2019 does.
However, since the case study is not focused on risk and hazard identification and classification
which is the major focus in the ISO/PAS 21448:2019 initiative but rather on the integration, the
steps discussed here are applicable anyway.
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Figure 5.15: Possible Decompositions of ASILs (Source: [Int18b, Part 9, Clause
5.4.8, Figure 2])
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the higher ASIL. E.g. in the case of QM(D) + ASIL-D(D) the safety mechanism
carries the ASIL-D(D) [Int18b, Part 9, Clause 5.4.7].
We can observe in Fig. 5.15 that symmetric decompositions (e.g. ASIL-D =
B(D) + B(D)) and asymmetric decompositions (ASIL-D = QM(D) + D(D)) are
possible. For both types we show how timing diversity can be applied:
5.4.2.1 Symmetric decomposition
W.r.t. timing diversity the symmetric decompositions can be applied to the
timing behavior of the chain in a timing diversity setup directly. In this
case both channels receive identical requirements on the timing behavior
in the channels, e.g. B(D) if an ASIL-D is decomposed. Obviously, estab-
lishing timing guarantees with a confidence corresponding to an ASIL-B
is much easier to accomplish than for ASIL-D, which substantially reduces
development cost and effort. Furthermore, it relaxes the sufficient inde-
pendence argumentation w.r.t. other software on the platform resources
a timing channel is implemented on, as only assigning the decomposed
value it does not taint the entire remaining software’s timing behavior by its
higher ASIL [Int18b, Part 4, Clause 7.4.2.2]. Furthermore, it is either possible
to confidence requirements minimal with the assignment method from
Section 3.1, or to ensure them with monitors as described in Section 3.2.
Note that the monitors in this case operate on the BET implementation,
ensuring the adherence to the SL-LET specification only and do not directly
enable the safety mechanism as such.
In the symmetric decomposition the channel switch of the timing diversity
scheme is a common element for which [Int18b, Part 9, Clause 5.4.10] requires
the original ASIL requirement as it can not be made sufficiently independent
of the timing behavior. However, the objective to be carried out by the
channel switch is relatively easy, as it only has to determine if either channel
is on time at pre-designated points in time. Hence, the higher, original
and non-decomposed, ASIL is comparatively easy to achieve for the channel
selection in respect to the timing behavior of the complex function. Sufficient
independence of the timing behavior between the two channels can be shown
in the form of bounded dependence as described in Section 5.3.3.
In conclusion, the symmetric decomposition allows relaxing timing require-
ments on complex software components and their underlying hardware
platform to easier achievable levels. In doing so it maintains a fail-operational
characteristic, w.r.t. timing errors, as the timing diversity setup is able to
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successfully mask them with the assurance of the original safety requirement.
Furthermore, the setup also catches “babbling idiots” in one of the channels.
These can easily be detected at the channel switch logic, as the logic also
kind of works as a monitor, i.e. it only forwards or publishes data at the point
in time that is given through the SL-LET specification. Hence, the “babbling
idiot” can be easily identified and silenced.
5.4.2.2 Asymmetric decomposition
Asymmetric decompositions require extending the argumentation for the
safety goal. The argumentation is extended such that either the object must
be detected after x units, or the detection chain must signal an error within
the same time frame. Signaling the error, i.e. that no processing of the
lidar image has happened, has the purpose that other functions that use the
resulting object maps can work with this information. A possible scenario is
for instance that a plausibility check of object data from another technology,
e.g. radar, based on the lidar’s object map can be skipped for this image.
The safety mechanism in this case obviously is the functionality to detect
the timing error and signal this circumstance to consumers of the object
map. Hence, in these decompositions, this functionality must receive the
higher ASIL [Int18b, Part 9, Clause 5.4.7]. The timing behavior itself receives
the lower ASIL, which depending on the original ASIL are: QM(D), C(D),
QM(C), A(C), QM(B), QM(A). In the QM(x)-cases, ensuring the timing is hence
reduced to a pure quality management effort. Nevertheless, the timing is
important, as it avoids a potential functional degradation. Hence, to avoid
these quality impairments timing diversity can still be applied, with the
benefit that its implementation and integration is not subject to the rigid
requirements of the safety standard w.r.t. the process, etc. [Int18b, Part 6].
In conclusion, the asymmetric decomposition follows a fail-safe pattern w.r.t
the safety design. However, the quality management effort in the form of
timing diversity can significantly improve product quality as detachment of
the function is prevented through high timing error resilience due to the
diversity scheme. In these cases the LETs for applications might be tailored
more aggressively as the margin between expected response-time and LET




This thesis is motivated by the fact that timing as an extra-functional property
can have an impact on the functional safety properties of a system. This
influence of timing manifests in design as well as synthesis aspects of systems,
which spawned the three initial research questions. In short these questions
were:
1. How can hidden timing dependencies be detected?
2. Which automated timing engineering efforts can ease the burden of
designers?
3. How can different levels of timing safety requirements be integrated
in mixed-critical systems?
This thesis has shown in Chapter 2 how a model-based development flow
supports the systematic identification of timing dependencies, based on
a conservative approach, as it assumes dependence by default. Only if the
analysis can show independence or at-worst bounded dependence based on
the confidence ratings of parameters that go into quantified timing analysis
methods, a design is cleared – meaning that freedom from (timing) inter-
ference can be assumed. The approach presented in Chapter 2 showed the
importance of traceability of requirements over multiple model layers. If
this is not given, there are problems to identify destructive interference that
violates the freedom from interference paradigm in a complex design with
multiple functions hosted in the same system. Such complex systems, how-
ever, are at the forefront of what is currently discussed for next-generation
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vehicular systems. The traceability of safety requirements on which the
timing behavior of the implementation has an influence was also shown in
Chapter 2. The approach presented there, goes together with new timing
analysis techniques that have recently been shown for systems with complex
call structures [SE17].
Chapter 3 has presented answers to questions two and three. The chapter
showed: First, how based on the top-down principle of the safety process,
timing parameter confidence values can be allocated to all timing parameters
a safety-critical timing property depends on. Second, how the automatic
synthesis of a monitoring network can isolate different levels of criticality
from each other. Particularly, the aspect that both levels of criticality are
isolated up to their required safety level, which quantifies the risk of ex-
periencing a timing failure. In the direction from a higher to lower level
we can safely assume that timing failures of the higher criticality are rarer
it has higher confidence requirements towards its parameters. As a con-
sequence a non-common-cause failure influencing the higher criticality
component is sufficiently unlikely for the lower critical one – hence freedom
from interference w.r.t. to the different levels is reasonably established. In
the direction from the lower to the higher confidence level, monitors as
“confidence boosters” together with the quantified timing analysis guarantee
the freedom from interference property. The method proposed in Chap-
ter 3 showed feasibility in the sense that for randomly generated systems
which resemble a zone like architecture reasonable amounts of monitors
are necessary.
But as already concluded in Chapter 4 all the engineering tweaks introduced
here do not solve the challenges raised in the research questions satisfactorily,
as they are unable to tame the timing unpredictability that arises with the
interaction of software with contemporary multicore platforms with shared
caches, MMUs, etc.. The high confidence into timing parameters needed
for mutual isolation of higher safety levels can simply not be guaranteed
by the methods available. Even if analysis techniques that would provide
reasonable confidence into timing parameters, it is safe to assume that they
in turn would be fairly complex. Consequently, the complexity of the design
itself would only be pushed to the next “lower level” – not limiting the effort
for designers in general. Hence, the research questions where extended
as to how the unpredictability of such platforms can be made sufficiently
predictable for timing requirements which are technical safety requirements.
To reduce the complexity of the design in general, a shift in the design
paradigm was ultimately necessary. With SL-LET such a design and pro-
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gramming paradigm was presented. The paradigm allows composable de-
sign of end-to-end timing properties along cause-effect chains. A fact that
is unprecedented with the contemporary BET timing model as design and
implementation model. Furthermore, the timing composability allows spec-
ifying predictable timing of data. A fact that we identified as very valuable
especially for future applications such as perception and automated driving
applications. SL-LET alone can improve timing error detection in complex
cause-effect chains, as it defines concrete points in time at which a result or
data must be available by design and transparent to the function developer. In
the state-of-the-art BET design assumed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 such
points are only implicitly defined in the process of monitor configuration.
A process most nontransparent for the function engineer, as it is hidden by
the complexity of the timing model. Based on SL-LET each execution of a
software block within an LET task, the function software can be notified with
low overhead, whether the data it reads is the instance it expects. This allows
to place timing error handling into the function software itself where neces-
sary, paving the way for advanced control-software error handling strategies
as presented in [MHMJZ20]. With BET execution and monitoring, the tim-
ing exception handling remains in the realm of the timing engineer who
might be agnostic of the exact impact of the violation of the extra-functional
property. In any case she/he is the wrong person to handle the exception
from the functional perspective.
Building on the property that timing violations are easily detectable in
SL-LET, Chapter 5 has introduced the concept of timing diversity to tackle the
issue of the unpredictable timing by the fact that abnormally high 1 execution
times are stochastically a rare event. Based on the observation that different
software structures lead to different execution time behavior, this thesis
could show that the timing diversity approach increases timing reliability,
i.e. the probability of an execution being on time, improves under it for both
fault classes: stochastic hardware faults that lead to prolonged execution
times and design faults where the assumed worst-case was too optimistic.
While the statistical independence assumption is subject to further research,
e.g. how it can be substantiated based on platform properties or software
composition, the foundation of the timing diversity concept are provided
in Chapter 5. Especially the applicability of the concept to ASIL tailoring
suggests that timing diversity is able to reduce costs although redundant
execution is necessary for it, as with lower (tailored) ASILs the process cost
are far less. Obviously the break-even point between these types of cost




(investment vs. recurring costs per piece) has to be decided on concrete
projects.
Since it is proposed to implement SL-LET by following a BET execution
semantic with a suitable middleware that handles the LETs label communi-
cation at the right point in time, the timing dependency analysis technique
as well as monitoring are not worthless. It is fact that the timing safety
property in SL-LET resides with fulfilling the LET specification and safety
mechanisms are also controlled base on the LETs. But, maintaining a low
rate of timing exceptions, i.e. violations of LETs is a quality management
effort. This effort can easily be supported by the timing dependency analysis
method presented in Chapter 2 that automatically reveals other BET tasks
on which the implementation of an LET task depends on. Sorting out which
dependencies are acceptable for a suitably low rate of timing exceptions
can now be taken care of by the real-time engineer without having to deal
with the burden of planing or coordinating the instantiation of a safety
mechanism. With SL-LET and traceable timing safety requirements this
can be easily addressed in the software design as the software designers are
provided with a timing composable interface.
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